Opinion
E032360.
10-23-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANCISCO PADILLA, Defendant and Appellant.
Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Ivy B. Fitzpatrick, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Francisco Padilla appeals from judgment entered following a jury conviction for voluntary manslaughter. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a dangerous weapon, a stick. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 12 years in prison.
Penal Code section 192, subdivision (a). Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Sections 12022, subdivision (b) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23).
Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding he was competent to stand trial and he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Defendant also argues the trial court erred in finding he did not invoke his right to remain silent during a police interview and the court committed sentencing error by imposing an aggravated sentence.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
We conclude there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial courts competency findings and there was no invocation of defendants right to remain silent. The aggravated sentence was also proper. The judgment is affirmed.
1. Factual and Procedural Background
At around 11:00 p.m. on December 28, 1999, defendant and a companion, Fernando Mendez, beat Carlos Samaniego to death with a stick and baseball bat. The incident occurred in a residential neighborhood alley in Riverside. Several witnesses saw or heard the beating incident. When Linda Arrington, one of the witnesses who lived nearby, yelled for her son-in-law to come outside, the two assailants ran away. Another witness, Jose Gutierrez, heard one of the assailants say as they were running away, "Yeah, we got him." Gutierrez identified the assailants.
When the police and paramedics arrived, they found the victim, Carlos Samaniego, lying on his stomach, with his head in a pool of blood. He died within an hour from head injuries due to blunt force head trauma.
Defendant was arrested several hours later. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant gave a recorded statement during a police interview. Defendant initially denied any involvement in the incident. He claimed he was at home during the crime. Later during the interview he stated that he had discovered Samaniego trying to break into his car, confronted him, and told him to leave. Samaniego left but a little later again attempted to break into defendants car. Defendant confronted him again and, when Samaniego refused to leave, defendant grabbed a garden stake, and defendant and his companion chased Samaniego two blocks down the street and beat him. Defendant claimed he only hit Samaniego twice with the stick and then left Samaniego standing, with a warning to stay away from his car.
2. Competency to Stand Trial
Prior to trial on the criminal charges, the trial court declared a doubt as to defendants mental competence. The court suspended the criminal proceedings, ordered the Inland Regional Center (IRC) to examine defendant, received and considered medical reports from IRC psychologist, Dr. Chang, and two psychologists retained by defendant, held a competency jury trial, and found defendant mentally competent to stand trial. The court then reinstated criminal proceedings.
Conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a legally incompetent person violates due process. "A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he suffers a mental disorder or developmental disability rendering him `unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner." On appeal, a finding of competency cannot be disturbed if there is any substantial and credible evidence in the record to support that finding. Our power to weigh the evidence in this context is very limited by deference to the trier of fact and we must view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict.
People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951; see also People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 215.
People v. Hightower (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1111, citing People v. Campbell (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 599, 608.
People v. Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 215; People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 505.
Defendant challenges the trial courts determination that he was competent to stand trial and assist his attorney based on the following evidence. Two psychologists retained by defendant, Dr. Kalechstein and Dr. Kania, concluded defendant was incompetent to stand trial due to his significantly impaired language comprehension.
Kalechstein tested defendants intelligence and found his cognitive language abilities were impaired. Defendant tested in the first percentile for receptive language, which was consistent with his ninth grade test scores; had language comprehension of a six or seven year old; was mildly mentally retarded; and was not malingering during his evaluation. Defendant told Kalechstein he cheated on the drivers license test by obtaining a copy of the questions and answers. He claimed he missed a few questions to avoid detection of cheating.
Dr. Kania also concluded defendant was mildly to moderately mentally retarded but could become competent to stand trial if he received specialized training. Kania opined defendant had difficulty comprehending questions, assimilating information, and understanding the roles of the people in the courtroom.
Defendants mother indicated defendant was developmentally delayed, had received special education, and was unable to read or write. Defendants wife also testified defendant could not read or write, and she had to explain things to him, read his mail, and take care of the household finances.
Defendant argues this evidence required a finding he was incompetent to stand trial. Furthermore, defendant claims there was no evidence that he was capable of assisting his attorney at trial. We disagree. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial courts finding of competence, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support that finding.
This is not a case likePeople v. Samuel, in which there is uncontradicted evidence of incompetency. Court appointed IRC psychologist, Dr. Chang, tested defendants intelligence and his intellectual functioning. Although Chang found defendant had learning disabilities in language comprehension and expression, Chang concluded defendant was not mentally retarded and was competent to stand trial. Changs expertise in evaluating defendants competency is indisputable. Unlike defendants two experts, Dr. Changs entire practice is devoted to evaluating and treating patients with developmental disabilities and he has conducted over 2,000 evaluations involving developmental disabilities.
People v. Samuel, supra, 29 Cal.3d 489.
In addition, Changs opinion as to defendants competency and level of intelligence is well-founded on the following factors: in ninth grade, defendant scored near grade level in mathematics; he was married for several years and actively cared for his children; defendant held a job painting for several years and drove to his various work sites; defendant passed the written drivers license test, which required significant cognitive ability; and defendants recorded police interview demonstrated he understood the questions, the seriousness of the charges, and basic judicial proceedings, and he malingered during Changs administration of the intelligence exam.
Police detectives Money and Sanfilippos testimony also supported the courts competency finding. They testified defendant appeared to understand their instructions and questions, and responded appropriately. Defendant provided the officers with his address, date of birth, height, weight, and drivers license number from memory. During an interview by defense psychologist, Dr. Kania, defendant claimed he did not know this information, thus indicating defendant was malingering.
Defendants statements during the police interview further confirmed defendants ability to comprehend the charges and assist his attorney at trial. During the interview, he initially denied he knew anything about the homicide, provided a detailed alibi, demonstrated he understood the value of money, gave detailed directions to his sisters house, including street names; indicated some awareness of the judicial system by stating he had not previously been to jail or Juvenile Hall; claimed he was taking full blame for the crime to avoid disclosing his accomplice; and indicated he was aware of the seriousness of the charges and attempted to mitigate his actions by claiming he only hit defendant two times and that the victim had something in his waistband, such as a gun, and could have shot him. There was ample evidence to support the trial courts finding defendant was competent to stand trial and assist his attorney.
3. Miranda Rights Waiver
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by finding that defendant waived his Miranda rights and did not invoke his right to remain silent during his police interview. Defendant argues he lacked prior experience in the criminal justice system and has a significant receptive language deficit which prevented him from understanding his Miranda rights.
After the competency trial, defendant moved to suppress his police interview statement in which he confessed to hitting the victim twice with a stick. Defendant argued he was incompetent to waive his rights and, during the interview, invoked his right to silence by stating he had nothing to say. During the suppression hearing, Dr. Kania, Dr. Chang, and defendants sister, Maria Cota, testified. Defendants police statement was also submitted for consideration.
Drs. Kania and Chang testified consistent with their testimony provided during the competency trial. Dr. Kania further testified defendant was unable to understand and knowingly waive his Miranda rights due to his receptive language deficit and lack of exposure to Miranda warnings and the judicial system. In addition, defendant was unable to provide Dr. Kania with definitions of the words, "consult," "interrogation," "appoint," "entitled," and "right." Defendant also confused the word, "right," with the homonym, "write." Dr. Kania stated that defendant tended to say he understood things he did not understand in order to conceal his limited intellect. But Dr. Kania also acknowledged that during the police interview defendant often was not compliant, he appeared to understand the detectives questions, and he asked questions if he did not, such as when defendant initially inquired as to what Miranda rights were.
Cota testified that defendant could not read, write or follow oral instructions, but later stated she was familiar with defendants handwriting. She also said defendant understood things when he did not, asked her to repeat and simplify statements, was unable to participate in adult conversations, and often did not remember what he had done during the day. She believed defendant would not understand his Miranda rights.
Dr. Chang, on the other hand, testified defendant was capable of understanding and knowingly waiving his Miranda rights. Even though defendants reading and spelling skills were very poor, this did not establish his overall intellectual and cognitive abilities were subnormal, particularly since he tested much higher in math and overall daily cognitive functioning. These factors indicated defendant functioned well above those with mental retardation.
Chang further based his opinion defendant understood the Miranda warnings on defendants police interview, and added that, generally, if an individual is competent to stand trial, he is competent to waive his Miranda rights.
The trial court found defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and did not invoke his right to remain silent by his statement, "I have nothing to say." As a consequence, the audio tape of defendants police interview was played for the jury and the court provided the jury with a transcript of the interview.
A. Standard of Review
Statements made by a criminal suspect during a custodial police interrogation are inadmissible unless the police first advise the suspect of certain constitutional rights and the suspect then knowingly and intelligently waives those rights.
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pages 478-479.
In considering a claim that a statement was obtained in violation of a defendants Miranda rights, we accept the trial courts resolution of disputed facts and inferences and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. Although we must independently determine from the facts whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained, we may give great weight to the conclusions of a trial court that has previously reviewed the same evidence. The trial courts ruling may not be set aside unless it is palpably erroneous, i.e., lacking support of substantial evidence.
People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 857-858; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 947.
People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 575.
Generally, "Once the defendant has been informed of his rights, and indicates that he understands those rights, it would seem that his choosing to speak and not requesting a lawyer is sufficient evidence that he knows of his rights and chooses not to exercise them."
People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 541, 558, disapproved on other grounds in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 899, footnote 8.
B. Miranda Rights Waiver
At the inception of defendants police interview, Detective Shumway advised defendant of his Miranda rights as follows:
"[DETECTIVE]: Okay you are being detained, therefore, you have uh Miranda rights. You had `em read to you
"[DEFENDANT]: No.
"[DETECTIVE]: before? Okay.
"[DEFENDANT]: What do Miranda rights mean?
"[DETECTIVE]: Ill explain that to you in a minute. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while youre being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish one.
"[DEFENDANT]: Hmhm.
"[DETECTIVE]: Okay. Do you understand each of these rights Ive just read to you?
"[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
"[DETECTIVE]: Okay. Having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to us and answer some questions?
"[DEFENDANT]: Hmhm
"[DETECTIVE]: Is that a yes?
"[DEFENDANT]: Yes."
Defendant argues he did not intelligently and knowingly waive his Miranda rights. We look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a Miranda waiver may be found to be knowing and intelligent. "Only if the `totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal . . . the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. [Citations.]" "Once it is determined that a suspects decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the States intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law." "[D]eterminations as to the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights—a predominantly legal mixed question—are reviewed independently. [Citation.]"
Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 486, footnote 9.
Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421.
Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at pages 422-423, footnote omitted.
People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649.
Defendant does not dispute that Detective Shumway advised him of his Miranda rights and defendant stated he wished to waive them. Rather, defendant argues he was not competent to understand and knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. But as we concluded with regard to defendants competency to stand trial, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial courts finding that defendant was competent to waive his rights based on Dr. Changs testimony and defendants recorded police interview. Although defendant had learning disabilities in language comprehension and expression, Dr. Chang sufficiently established that defendant was not mentally retarded and his overall cognitive abilities were sufficient to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.
Defendant argues there was evidence defendant tended to say he understood things he did not actually understand in order to conceal his lack of intelligence. While this may have been true on occasion, defendants police statement indicates to the contrary. During the interview he did not hesitate to ask questions and initially indicated he did not know what Miranda rights meant. After Detective Shumway advised him of his rights, he said he understood them. His police interview also revealed he withheld information he did not wish to disclose, thus indicating he was aware of the seriousness of the charges and was not overly compliant. For instance, he refused to reveal the name of his accomplice.
We thus conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the trial courts finding that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
C. Right to Remain Silent
Defendant argues he invoked his right to silence during the following portion of defendants police interview, when defendant told the police detectives he had nothing to say:
"[DETECTIVE] SHUMWAY: I, I was in my house all that long, all night long, thats not true. We know thats not true. You know thats not true.
"[DEFENDANT]: Well I was home.
"[DETECTIVE] SHUMWAY: Lets start over.
"[DETECTIVE] SANFILIPPO: Now tell us the truth.
"[DEFENDANT]: I have nothing to say.
"[DETECTIVE] SANFILIPPO: Nothing to say?
"[DEFENDANT]: No, `cause I was home.
"[DETECTIVE] SHUMWAY: Youre gonna stick with that.
"[DETECTIVE] SANFILIPPO: Lets say that, that even contradicts what your wife told us though.
"[DEFENDANT]: Hm.
"[DETECTIVE] SANFILIPPO: Is your wife lying to us?
"[DEFENDANT}: No."
Defendant then confessed he had stricken the victim twice with a stick after discovering the victim attempting to break into his car.
"[I]f a defendant expresses ambiguous remarks falling short of a clear waiver or invocation of his Miranda rights, the officers may continue talking with him for the limited purpose of clarifying whether he is waiving or invoking those rights."
People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 27; see also People v. Peracchi (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 353, 361, footnote 18; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215; and In re Brian W. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 590.
Here, defendants statement, "I have nothing to say," is not even an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent. It was not an invocation. It was a simple declarative statement that, after telling the detectives he was home during the homicide, he had nothing else to say or add and intended to adhere to his alibi. We thus reject defendants contention he invoked his right to remain silent by saying he had nothing to say.
4. Sentencing Error
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an upper term for his voluntary manslaughter conviction and use of a dangerous weapon enhancement. Defendant asserts that the court relied upon improper aggravating factors and disregarded several mitigating factors. For instance, the trial court made a prohibited dual use of the weapon use and caused great bodily harm factors. These were elements of the offense and enhancement. Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence that the victim was particularly vulnerable or that defendant induced his companion to participate in the murder.
The probation officers report recommended an upper term based on the following aggravating factors: (1) the crime involved great violence, cruelty, viciousness, callousness, and great bodily injury, (2) defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, (3) the victim was particularly vulnerable, and (4) defendant engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society. The report listed a single mitigating factor: defendant did not have a criminal record.
Defense counsel objected to the probation officers reliance on the use of a deadly weapon factor since the enhancement was based on this factor. Defense counsel argued defendant should have received a mitigated term based on various mitigating factors, including the fact the victim was the aggressor, rather than defendant, defendants acts were induced by his companion, and defendant showed remorse.
In sentencing defendant to the upper term, the court stated that the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in the probation report were important and controlling. The court stated that, while Mendez was a more violent individual, in this case the victims attempt to break into defendants car provoked defendant to beat the victim, not Mendez. For this same reason, the court believed defendant induced Mendez to assist him in beating the victim. The court also concluded the crime involved some degree of planning since the two assailants joined together and chased down the victim, while carrying a bat and a stick, and when they caught up with the victim, they brutally beat him with the intention of teaching him a lesson.
Another factor the court relied upon was that defendant did not voluntarily stop beating the victim, even when the victim was on the ground helpless, moaning in pain and agony. They continued until a neighbor yelled at them to stop killing him. The court thus concluded the crime involved great violence, viciousness, and great bodily harm. The court stated, "You know, basically, they chased down Mr. Samaniego like a dog and then beat him to death in an alleyway and left him there to die."
The court also concluded the victim was particularly vulnerable. He was intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, and somewhat incoherent. In addition, at the inception of the beating, he had fallen down and was on the ground helpless, without any weapon to defend himself.
The court recognized defendant was remorseful for what he had done and did not have a prior criminal record but nevertheless imposed an aggravated term, stating: "Therefore, in conclusion, in weighing all the factors of aggravation and mitigation, I do find that the factors in aggravation greatly outweigh those in mitigation, . . ."
The People argue that defendant waived this contention by failing to raise it at sentencing. Defendant responds that the waiver rule does not apply because the trial court did not provide advance notice of its intended sentence and the reasons supporting it. Regardless of whether defendant waived his objections, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to an aggravated term.
People v. Gonzalez (2003) 74 P.3d 771; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353-356.
See People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 356.
A. Standard of Review
"`The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review. [Citation.]" "`Sentencing courts have wide discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors . . . ." This discretion also includes the authority to minimize or even disregard allegedly mitigating factors. A single aggravating factor will support imposition of an upper term.
People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.
People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1582.
People v. Holguin (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1308, 1317; People v. Lamb (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 397, 401.
People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433; People v. Carron (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1241.
B. Analysis
Although it appears the court erroneously relied on defendants use of a dangerous weapon, a stick, as one of the aggravating factors, the courts detailed statement as to why it imposed an aggravated term demonstrates that, even had it not relied on the weapon use factor, the trial court nevertheless would have imposed the upper term. There was substantial evidence supporting each of the other aggravating factors relied upon by the court. The court rejected most of defendants proposed mitigating factors and indicated the aggravating factors heavily outweighed the mitigating factors. It is not reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it not relied upon use of a weapon as an aggravating factor. Reliance on such factor was thus harmless error.
People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161-1165.
Defendant argues evidence that the victim was particularly vulnerable is incompatible with the jurys finding defendant acted in the heat of passion after sufficient provocation. But the trial court reasonably found victim vulnerability based on the fact the victim was alone, unarmed, intoxicated, and on the ground when defendant and Mendez beat him to death.
And while the court could not rely on the victims death as an aggravating factor, it could consider the viciousness and brutality of the offense.
People v. Duran (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 987, 990-991.
As to defendant inciting Mendez to participate in chasing down and beating the victim, defendant argues there was evidence that, to the contrary, Mendez incited defendant to kill the victim. Mendez had a reputation for violence, was a gang member and drug addict, and had a criminal record, whereas defendant had no criminal record and was asleep when the victim provoked defendant by attempting to break into his car. But the trial courts contrary finding, that defendant incited Mendezs participation, and the courts reasoning for reaching this conclusion is well supported by the record.
Defendant also claims the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring applicable mitigating factors, including the fact that defendant did not have a criminal record and he showed remorse for his involvement in this crime. However, a sentencing court has the authority to minimize, or even disregard allegedly mitigating factors. A trial court is not required to state reasons for rejecting a mitigating factor.
People v. Zamora (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1627, 1637.
People v. Holguin, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at page 1317.
Given the fact that defendant was directly involved in a murder involving a brutal, vicious beating of an unarmed, intoxicated victim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upper term, and the courts improper reliance on use of the stick as an aggravating factor constitutes harmless error.
5. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKinster Acting P.J., and Richli J.