Opinion
E051480 Super.Ct.No. RIF153753
12-16-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID KEITH PADILLA, Defendant and Appellant.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert E. Law, Judge. (Retired Judge of the former Mun. Ct. for the Orange Jud. Dist. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Sabrina Y. Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant and appellant David Keith Padilla of operating a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801, count 1), altering vehicle identification numbers (Veh. Code, § 10802, count 2), driving a vehicle without the owner's consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 3), and receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a), count 4). The trial court denied defendant's motion to reduce the convictions to misdemeanors, and then placed defendant on probation. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Between the evening of June 25, 2009, and the morning of June 26, 2009, the victim's pickup truck was stolen.
On September 1, 2009, defendant was stopped by the highway patrol while driving the victim's pickup truck. The vehicle's identification number had been altered to match the number of a different model pickup truck owned by defendant. In addition to vehicle identification number alterations, the grille emblem and license plates had been changed, and additional emblems and stickers had been affixed to identify the vehicle as matching the model owned by defendant. The glove box contained expired registration and insurance paperwork for defendant's pickup truck.
Defendant's pickup truck was found in his backyard covered with tarps. It was missing its grille work, vehicle identification plate, glove compartment stickers, and model emblems. Inside the vehicle was an owner's manual and grille work for the victim's pickup truck.
Defendant's motion to reduce his convictions to misdemeanors asserted that "at worst [he] was involved in misdemeanor conduct" and his conduct was "incredibly minor when compared with other felony offenses." The motion noted his crimes were not violent, were not "particularly sophisticated," and did not involve danger to the community, as weapons were not used or threatened to be used. The motion recited some of defendant's background; noting his age, a seizure disorder, prior employment as a truck driver and mechanic, prior military service, and almost nonexistent criminal history. The motion then asserted that defendant did not pose a threat, had a "lapse in judgment," regretted his actions, and would not reoffend.
The People opposed the motion: "Although the offenses were not violent, did not endanger the community or involve the use of a weapon, the defendant exhibited very sophisticated behavior. The defendant's behavior should not be viewed in comparison to all other felony offenses, but only to offenses of the same kind. In the scope of driving a stolen vehicle, the defendant's behavior was much more sophisticated than other similar offenses in that the defendant took very extensive and significant steps to hide the identity of the truck and instead represent it as a vehicle that he legitimately owned. With respect to owning and/or operating a chop shop, the defendant's conduct cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Although it was not a large scale operation, it was more dangerous in that the defendant was previously employed as an auto mechanic. Furthermore, the defendant was a self proclaimed 'motorhead' and 'car enthusiast.' Because of his intimate knowledge in mechanics, the defendant was more dangerous because he could do it all himself, one car at a time, living completely undetected, until now. [¶] Finally, the defendant's undiagnosed seizure disorder and prior service in the Army should have no bearing on reducing the offenses to misdemeanors. Neither one changes the defendant's sophistication demonstrated in committing the offenses for which he was convicted."
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had read the "People's sentencing memorandum, [defendant's motion to reduce, and] opposition thereto by the People. I read the probation order." The sentencing judge had also presided over the trial. The trial court denied the motion by stating: "Your request to make it a misdemeanor is denied. It is a felony. It was a felony. It's felony conduct." While discussing the length of the jail term to be imposed as a condition of probation, the trial court stated, "Was it sophisticated? I don't think it's particularly sophisticated. It was so sophisticated it was discovered immediately upon the first time he was stopped in the vehicle."
WOBBLER
On grounds identical to those raised in the trial court, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to reduce his convictions to misdemeanors. We disagree.
Trial courts have discretion to reduce an offense charged as a felony to a misdemeanor if the offense is a "wobbler," i.e., chargeable either as a felony or as a misdemeanor, upon imposition of a punishment other than state prison or by declaration as a misdemeanor after a grant of probation. (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b); People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 974 (Alvarez).) A trial court's decision under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Alvarez, at pp. 976-977.) " 'The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.' [Citation.] Concomitantly, '[a] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. "An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 977-978.) A trial court must base its decision on "individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest." (Id. at p. 978.) Specifically, the court should consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, the defendant's traits of character as evidenced by behavior and demeanor at trial and, in an appropriate case, the general objectives of sentencing. (Ibid.)
Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: "When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following circumstances: [¶] (1) After a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison. [¶] . . . [¶] (3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor."
Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the trial court's decision was irrational or arbitrary. To the contrary, the trial court had presided over the jury trial, reviewed the probation officer's report, reviewed defendant's motion, and reviewed the opposition to the motion. In so doing, the trial court considered the nature of the offense and considered defendant's character. To the extent defendant repeats the same contentions he raised in his motion below, we note that we have no reason to conclude the trial court did not consider his contentions and we do not reweigh the factors. (See Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 977-978.) Accordingly, since the record does not affirmatively reflect any failure to consider relevant factors and evidence, an abuse of discretion has not been shown.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
KING
J.
CODRINGTON
J.