The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in disallowing his peremptory challenges to two prospective white jurors because he provided sufficient race-neutral explanations for challenging them ( see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, cert. denied 498 U.S. 824, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50). Defense counsel's proffered explanation for challenging one of the two jurors was that she “simply didn't like [him],” had not “ask[ed him] anything, didn't get a feel for him, and [had] confirmed with [her] client and he also did not like [him].” This explanation amounted, essentially, to no reason at all ( see People v. Carillo, 9 A.D.3d 333, 780 N.Y.S.2d 143; People v. Padgett, 303 A.D.2d 524, 756 N.Y.S.2d 620; People v. Smith, 251 A.D.2d 355, 673 N.Y.S.2d 716; People v. Stewart, 238 A.D.2d 361, 656 N.Y.S.2d 304). Defense counsel's challenge to the second juror was based on counsel's purportedly mistaken belief that he was a retired police officer. That juror, however, clearly stated during voir dire that he was a retired sanitation worker, and the Supreme Court properly determined that defense counsel's proffered explanation was not genuine ( see Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338–339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931; see also Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 244, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196; People v. McIndoe, 277 A.D.2d 252, 715 N.Y.S.2d 734; cf. People v. Lebron, 293 A.D.2d 689, 742 N.Y.S.2d 312). Although the Supreme Court did not use the word “pretext,” the finding of pretext can be reasonably inferred from the Supreme Court's language in disallowing the defendant's challenges to the two prospective jurors ( see People v. Payne, 88 N.Y.2d 172, 185, 643 N.Y.S.2d 949, 666 N.
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in disallowing his peremptory challenges to two prospective white jurors because he provided sufficient race-neutral explanations for challenging them ( see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638, cert denied 498 US 824). Defense counsel's proffered explanation for challenging one of the two jurors was that she "simply didn't like [him]," had not "ask[ed him] anything, didn't get a feel for him, and [had] confirmed with [her] client and he also did not like [him]." This explanation amounted, essentially, to no reason at all (see People v Carillo , 9 AD3d 333; People v Padgett, 303 AD2d 524; People v Smith, 251 AD2d 355; People v Stewart, 238 AD2d 361). Defense counsel's challenge to the second juror was based on counsel's purportedly mistaken belief that he was a retired police officer. That juror, however, clearly stated during voir dire that he was a retired sanitation worker, and the Supreme Court properly determined that defense counsel's proffered explanation was not genuine ( see Miller-El v Cockrell, 537 US 322, 338-339; see also Miller-El v Dretke, 545 US 231, 244; People v McIndoe, 277 AD2d 252; cf. People v Lebron, 293 AD2d 689). Although the Supreme Court did not use the word "pretext," the finding of pretext can be reasonably inferred from the Supreme Court's language in disallowing the defendant's challenges to the two prospective jurors ( see People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172, 185; People v Padgett, 303 AD2d 524; People v Stewart, 238 AD2d 361).
The prosecutor indicated that, therefore, he did "not have enough information about [the prospective juror] to feel comfortable in sitting her as a juror," and that "[a]s a general practice," he would only "sit jurors that [he] had an opportunity to speak with."The record reflects that the prosecutor's strategy was not to avoid or ignore a particular class of prospective jurors based on race but to remove jurors whom he did not have time to address (see People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d at 658, 917 N.Y.S.2d 39, 942 N.E.2d 248 ;People v. Richie, 217 A.D.2d 84, 89, 635 N.Y.S.2d 263 ; cf. People v. Padgett, 303 A.D.2d 524, 756 N.Y.S.2d 620 ). Indeed, the record indicates that the parties were operating under significant time constraints during voir dire. At the beginning of jury selection, the Supreme Court informed the prospective jurors that the attorneys had "a limited amount of time" to address them. During the first round of voir dire, in response to defense counsel's inquiry as to how much time she had remaining, the court responded, "[o]ne minute." Defense counsel herself acknowledged the time constraints, at one point advising the panelists that she only had a "few seconds ... left," and at another point stating that her "time is short.
" The record reflects that the prosecutor's strategy was not to avoid or ignore a particular class of prospective jurors based on race but to remove jurors whom he did not have time to address (see People v Hecker, 15 NY3d at 658; People v Richie, 217 AD2d 84, 89; cf. People v Padgett, 303 AD2d 524). Indeed, the record indicates that the parties were operating under significant time constraints during voir dire. At the beginning of jury selection, the Supreme Court informed the prospective jurors that the attorneys had "a limited amount of time" to address them. During the first round of voir dire, in response to defense counsel's inquiry as to how much time she had remaining, the court responded, "[o]ne minute." Defense counsel herself acknowledged the time constraints, at one point advising the panelists that she only had a "few seconds . . . left," and at another point stating that her "time is short.
The prosecutor proffered an explanation for challenging one of the two jurors at issue, stating that it was “just our instincts that we don't feel [prospective juror] number 4 would be a suitable juror for this particular trial.” This explanation was inadequate (see People v. Erskine, 90 A.D.3d 674, 933 N.Y.S.2d 740 ; People v. Carillo, 9 A.D.3d at 334, 780 N.Y.S.2d 143 ; People v. Padgett, 303 A.D.2d 524, 756 N.Y.S.2d 620 ). Under the circumstances, the fact that the prosecution, essentially, “offered no reason at all with respect to [its] challenge of the juror is dispositive of the Batson issue” (People v. Stewart, 238 A.D.2d 361, 361, 656 N.Y.S.2d 304 ; see People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 109–110, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 653 N.E.2d 1173 ; People v. Smith, 251 A.D.2d 355, 355, 673 N.Y.S.2d 716 ; see also People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 652, 917 N.Y.S.2d 39, 942 N.E.2d 248 ; People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 560, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 554 N.E.2d 47 ). In light of this determination, it is unnecessary to review the defendant's arguments with respect to the other potential juror (see People v. Carillo, 9 A.D.3d at 334, 780 N.Y.S.2d 143 ).
The prosecutor proffered an explanation for challenging one of the two jurors at issue, stating that it was "just our instincts that we don't feel [prospective juror] number 4 would be a suitable juror for this particular trial." This explanation was inadequate (see People v Erskine, 90 AD3d 674; People v Carillo, 9 AD3d at 334; People v Padgett, 303 AD2d 524). Under the circumstances, the fact that the prosecution, essentially, "offered no reason at all with respect to [its] challenge of the juror is dispositive of the Batson issue" (People v Stewart, 238 AD2d 361, 361; see People v Allen, 86 NY2d 101, 109-110; People v Smith, 251 AD2d 355, 355; see also People v Hecker, 15 NY3d 625, 652; People v Jenkins, 75 NY2d 550, 560). In light of this determination, it is unnecessary to review the defendant's arguments with respect to the other potential juror (see People v Carillo, 9 AD3d at 334).
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in disallowing his peremptory challenge to a prospective juror because defense counsel provided a sufficient race-neutral explanation for the challenge ( see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69;People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235). Defense counsel's proffered explanation was that “[n]o one seemed to ask [the juror] anything,” and defense counsel “didn't get enough about [the juror],” “didn't ask a lot of questions,” and “didn't have anything in line with [the juror].” This explanation amounted, essentially, to no reason at all ( see People v. Erskine, 90 A.D.3d 674, 674–675, 933 N.Y.S.2d 740;People v. Carillo, 9 A.D.3d 333, 334, 780 N.Y.S.2d 143;People v. Padgett, 303 A.D.2d 524, 756 N.Y.S.2d 620;People v. Smith, 251 A.D.2d 355, 673 N.Y.S.2d 716). Thus, the Supreme Court properly disallowed the defendant's peremptory challenge.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly disallowed his peremptory challenge to a prospective white juror ( see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79). The People established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based on the defense counsel's pattern of using peremptory challenges against prospective white jurors ( see People v. Jenkins, 75 NY2d 550, 557; People v. Lawson, 300 AD2d 319; People v. Chapman, 295 AD2d 359, 360), and the defense counsel failed to provide a nonpretextual race-neutral reason for his exercise of the subject challenge ( see People v. Padgett, 303 AD2d 524; People v. Lawson, supra; People v. Chapman, supra; People v. Smith, 251 AD2d 355). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v. Jackson, 308 AD2d 549).