Opinion
2015-00218, Ind. No. 6027/13.
10-11-2017
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Michael OWOAJE, appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Caitlin Halpern of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, and Gamaliel Marrero of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Caitlin Halpern of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, and Gamaliel Marrero of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cyrulnik, J.), rendered December 3, 2014, convicting him of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial.
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in disallowing his peremptory challenges to two prospective white jurors. During the first round of jury selection, the prosecutor raised reverse-Batson challenges (see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ; People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235 ) to the defendant's peremptory challenges to certain prospective jurors. With respect to the subject prospective jurors, defense counsel proffered an explanation for challenging them, stating, among other things, that it was his practice to exercise peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who had previously served on a criminal jury that reached a verdict, as these prospective jurors had done. Defense counsel also stated that one of those two prospective jurors had the demeanor of a leader whom others would follow. When the court offered the prosecutor an opportunity to argue, he responded, "I don't think anything I have to say would be anything other than belaboring the obvious." In disallowing the peremptory challenges, the court determined that there was "nothing in any of [the prospective jurors'] responses that suggested that they would be influenced improperly by their prior jury service." In addition, the court stated that "the fact that an individual may be more forthcoming in their comments, etcetera ... does not necessarily exclude them from jury service."
New York courts apply the three-step test of Batson v. Kentucky (see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235 ) to determine whether a party has used peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors for an impermissible discriminatory reason (see People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 421–422, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239, 786 N.E.2d 1275 ; People v. Jones, 139 A.D.3d 878, 879, 31 N.Y.S.3d 191 ). "At step one, the movant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was used to discriminate; at step two, if that showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for striking the juror; and finally, at step three, the trial court must determine, based on the arguments presented by the parties, whether the proffered reason for the peremptory strike was pretextual and whether the movant has shown purposeful discrimination" ( People v. Bridgeforth, 28 N.Y.3d 567, 571, 46 N.Y.S.3d 824, 69 N.E.3d 611 ; see People v. Jones, 139 A.D.3d at 879, 31 N.Y.S.3d 191 ; People v. Carillo, 9 A.D.3d 333, 334, 780 N.Y.S.2d 143 ).
Here, the Supreme Court erred in disallowing the defendant's peremptory challenges to both of the subject prospective jurors. The defendant satisfied his burden of "articulat[ing] a non-discriminatory reason for striking the [prospective] juror[s]" ( People v. Bridgeforth, 28 N.Y.3d at 570, 46 N.Y.S.3d 824, 69 N.E.3d 611 ), namely, that they had previously served on a criminal jury that reached a verdict (see People v. Powell, 92 A.D.3d 610, 611, 939 N.Y.S.2d 51 ; People v.
Richie, 217 A.D.2d 84, 89, 635 N.Y.S.2d 263 ; see also People v. Morgan, 75 A.D.3d 1050, 1051–1052, 903 N.Y.S.2d 851 ). The People failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that the defendant's facially race-neutral explanation was a pretext for racial discrimination. Inasmuch as "the unjustified denial of a peremptory challenge violates CPL 270.25(2) and requires reversal without regard to harmless error" ( People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 662, 917 N.Y.S.2d 39, 942 N.E.2d 248 ; see People v. Marshall, 131 A.D.3d 1074, 1075, 17 N.Y.S.3d 140 ; People v. Parrales, 105 A.D.3d 871, 872, 962 N.Y.S.2d 663 ), the judgment must be reversed and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contention.