["once the defendant (shows that the CPL 30.30 time limit has been exceeded), the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that the People were ready and remained ready during the requisite period …. If the defense fulfilled its initial burden and the prosecution failed to answer or to sufficiently controvert the defense allegations, the motion must be granted"]; 1 N.Y. CLS Desk Ed. Gilbert’s Criminal Practice Annual § 30.30 [pursuant to Brown, if after declaring readiness "the prosecution subsequently answered that it was not ready for trial, the burden would shift to the prosecution to explain how it could legitimately have been ready previously and later became unready"]; People v. Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549, 619 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dept. 1994); People v. Fields, 214 A.D.2d 332, 333–334, 625 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1st Dept. 1995) [where the People requested a specific adjournment and the court granted a further one at defense counsel’s specific request, the People were "properly charged only with the … postreadiness adjournment requested" however, where the People "failed to satisfy their burden of providing a clear record" of "the basis for (their) postreadiness adjournment" they "must assume responsibility for the entire postreadiness delay"]; People v. Betancourt, 217 A.D.2d 462, 464, 629 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1st Dept. 1995) ["While the People cannot be charged with any time added to the requested adjournment because of court congestion or inconvenience when, in a post-readiness period, they request an adjournment for a specific number of days to a date certain, and explain why such a limited adjournment is necessary …. when the record reveals no such request …." and the People never "explain(ed) why an adjournment was being requested or

Where, for example, the prosecution subsequently answered that it was not ready for trial, the burden would shift to the prosecution to explain how it could legitimately have been ready previously and later became unready"]; William C. Donnino, CPL 30.30 Practice Commentaries ["once the defendant (shows that the CPL 30.30 time limit has been exceeded), the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that the People were ready and remained ready during the requisite period.... If the defense fulfilled its initial burden and the prosecution failed to answer or to sufficiently controvert the defense allegations, the motion must be granted"]; 1 NY CLS Desk Ed. Gilbert's Criminal Practice Annual § 30.30 [pursuant to Brown, if after declaring readiness "the prosecution subsequently answered that it was not ready for trial, the burden would shift to the prosecution to explain how it could legitimately have been ready previously and later became unready"]; People v Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549 [2d Dept 1994]; People v Fields, 214 A.D.2d 332, 333-334 [1st Dept 1995] [where the People requested a specific adjournment and the court granted a further one at defense counsel's specific request, the People were "properly charged only with the... postreadiness adjournment requested" however, where the People "failed to satisfy their burden of providing a clear record" of "the basis for (their) postreadiness adjournment" they "must assume responsibility for the entire postreadiness delay"]; People v Betancourt, 217 A.D.2d 462, 464 [1st Dept 1995] ["While the People cannot be charged with any time added to the requested adjournment because of court congestion or inconvenience when, in a post-readiness period, they request an adjournment for a specific number of days to a date certain, and explain why such a limited adjournment is necessary.... when the record reveals no such request...."

Here, based upon the prosecutor's trial schedule, the People sought and obtained a five-day extension of time to respond to the defendant's motion. Inasmuch as the delay was not unreasonable and the People had a legitimate reason to seek additional time, which reason was explained to the court at the time the extension was sought, the court properly excluded the five-day period from the time chargeable to the People (seePeople v. Holden, 260 A.D.2d 233, 235, 689 N.Y.S.2d 40 ; cf. People v. Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549, 550, 619 N.Y.S.2d 620 ). The defendant's remaining contention that one additional day should have been charged to the People is unpreserved for appellate review.

Here, based upon the prosecutor's trial schedule, the People sought and obtained a five-day extension of time to respond to the defendant's motion. Inasmuch as the delay was not unreasonable and the People had a legitimate reason to seek additional time, which reason was explained to the court at the time the extension was sought, the court properly excluded the five-day period from the time chargeable to the People (see People v Holden, 260 A.D.2d 233, 235; cf. People v Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549, 550). The defendant's remaining contention that one additional day should have been charged to the People is unpreserved for appellate review.

Here, based upon the prosecutor's trial schedule, the People sought and obtained a five-day extension of time to respond to the defendant's motion. Inasmuch as the delay was not unreasonable and the People had a legitimate reason to seek additional time, which reason was explained to the court at the time the extension was sought, the court properly excluded the five-day period from the time chargeable to the People (see People v Holden, 260 A.D.2d 233, 235; cf. People v Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549, 550). The defendant's remaining contention that one additional day should have been charged to the People is unpreserved for appellate review.

This court is not bound by concessions that are contrary to law ( People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 366-367; People v Gates, 70 AD2d 734; People v Rojas , 2 Misc 3d 130[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50101[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2004]), and our analysis of the merits of defendant's statutory speedy trial claim is as follows: The 12-day period until May 4, 2006, when defendant made off-calendar motions, is chargeable to the People ( People v Owens, 209 AD2d 549, 550; People v Garrett, 182 AD2d 496, 497; People v Elm , 25 Misc 3d 141[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52459[U] [App Term, 9th 10th Jud Dists 2009]). The subsequent adjournments, until August 4, 2006, concerned excludable discovery, motion practice, and adjournments at defendant's request (CPL 30.30 [a]; People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523, 527).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from. The Supreme Court correctly determined that the People should be charged with the unreasonable period of delay resulting from their unexcused and prolonged failure to prepare a protective order and provide the defense with a redacted copy of the search warrant and the confidential informant's supporting affidavit (see, People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59; People v. Burwell, A.D.2d ** [2d Dept., Apr. 12, 1999]; People v. Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549; People v. Holmes, 206 A.D.2d 542; People v. Commack, 194 A.D.2d 619; accord, People v. Reid, 245 A.D.2d 44; People v. Lawrence, 222 A.D.2d 279; People v. Rodriguez, 214 A.D.2d 1010;People v. Harris, 187 A.D.2d 1015, affd 82 N.Y.2d 409). Contrary to the People's contentions, their unexcused failure precluded the defendant from moving to controvert the warrant and thus effectively prevented this action from going forward. Accordingly, considering all of the time periods involved, the defendant was not provided with a speedy trial and the Supreme Court correctly adhered to its determination granting his motion to dismiss the indictment.

The County Court granted the People a number of adjournments to respond to the motion, and the People responded within 28 days of the motion, which was made on October 4, 1993. We agree with the People that they responded to the motion within a reasonable time (see, People v. Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549 [allowing 47 days to respond, but charging the People with the excess]; People v Inswood, 180 A.D.2d 649 [allowing 64 days to respond]). Thus, excluding the 20 days from October 12, 1993, to November 1, 1993, the People are chargeable with only 175 days, which is within the six-month limitation period for the commencement of the criminal action in this case (see, CPL 30.30 [a]). Bracken, J.P., Copertino, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.

The district attorney concedes that the 33 days of delay between March 28, 2024, when the felony complaint was filed and defendant was arraigned in Criminal Court, and April 30, 2024, when defendant was arraigned on the indictment in Supreme Court, are chargeable (see People v Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d at 213 & n 5 [1992]; People v Correa, 77 N.Y.2d 930, 931 [1991]; People v Lisene, 201 A.D.3d 738, 740 [2d Dept 2022]; People v Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549, 550 [2d Dept 1994]). (33 days charged.)

Here, based upon the prosecutor's trial schedule, the People sought and obtained a five-day extension of time to respond to the defendant's motion. Inasmuch as the delay was not unreasonable and the People had a legitimate reason to seek additional time, which reason was explained to the court at the time the extension was sought, the court properly excluded the five-day period from the time chargeable to the People (see People v Holden, 260 A.D.2d 233, 235; cf. People v Owens, 209 A.D.2d 549, 550). The defendant's remaining contention that one additional day should have been charged to the People is unpreserved for appellate review.