¶ 34 Lay opinion testimony is admissible when a lay witness would have difficulty explaining the facts upon which the opinion or inference is based, or where the opinion is of a condition that the witness could not easily describe. People v. Owens, 372 Ill.App.3d 616, 622, 874 N.E.2d 116, 120 (2007). All lay opinion testimony must be relevant to be admissible. Maffettv.

Thus, such evidence should assist the jury in resolving questions of fact. People v. Owens, 372 Ill.App.3d 616, 622 (2007). However, a statement, even if relevant, should be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.

See, e.g., People v. Smith, 402 Ill. App. 3d 538, 547 (2010) (evidence sufficient to convict a defendant of attempted murder exists where jury could infer intentto kill based upon fact that defendant drove his car, a deadly weapon, toward police officer, even though police officer was not seriously injured, because natural consequence of defendant's act would have been to harm officer or destroy his life had officer not dived out of the way); People v. Owens, 372 Ill. App. 3d 616, 618, 624-25 (2007) (attempted murder conviction affirmed where defendant choked the victim and doused her in gasoline, even though defendant tried, but failed, to successfully ignite the gasoline and victim therefore did not receive serious injuries).¶ 33 In this case, there was unrebutted evidence, from multiple witnesses (including the defendant), that the defendant used a deadly weapon-the car he was driving that day-to strike the victim, Shride.

Although we agree that describing M.W.'s injuries as “non-accidental” necessarily said something about defendant's mental state—which was the critical issue of fact at trial—we disagree that the State's medical experts improperly used that terminology. ¶ 98 As this court noted in People v. Owens, 372 Ill.App.3d 616, 620, 314 Ill.Dec. 206, 874 N.E.2d 116, 119 (2007), Illinois courts have rejected the so-called “ultimate fact” doctrine, which held that a witness may not express his opinion as to the ultimate issue in a case. Instead, “it is now well settled that a witness, whether expert or lay, may provide an opinion on the ultimate issue in a case.

Lay opinion testimony, like all other evidence, must be relevant to be admissible. People v. Owens, 372 Ill. App. 3d 616, 622 (2007). "[O]ne of the tests that a trial court may use when evaluating relevance is to ask how it would view the evidence if it were the trier of fact.

Lay opinion testimony, like all other evidence, must be relevant to be admissible. People v. Owens, 372 Ill. App. 3d 616, 622 (2007). "[O]ne of the tests that a trial court may use when evaluating relevance is to ask how it would view the evidence if it were the trier of fact.

We note that it is well settled that an attorney may forego an objection or a motion to strike for strategic reasons. People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill.2d 1, 13 (1991) ("As a general rule, trial strategy encompasses decisions such as what matters to object to and when to object."); see People v. Evans, 209 Ill.2d 194, 221 (2004); People v. Leger, 149 Ill.2d 355, 396-97 (1992); People v. Owens, 372 Ill.App.3d 616, 625 (2007). A strong presumption exists that the action or inaction by counsel was the product of sound trial strategy.

Counsel may well have chosen not to object in order to avoid highlighting the testimony even further or inviting further explanation, which might only reinforce Bausily's in-court identification. See People v. Owens, 372 Ill.App.3d 616, 625, 874 N.E.2d 116, 122 (2007) (opining that defense counsel may have opted not to object to avoid highlighting the testimony). Because there was no error in Bausily's redirect examination testimony, we do not find defense counsel ineffective for failing to assert a meritless objection.

Additionally, lay opinion testimony must be relevant to be admissible, like all other evidence. People v. Owens, 372 Ill. App. 3d 616, 622 (2007). ¶ 36 The admission of evidence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review.

Our supreme court has recognized that an attorney may forego an objection or a motion to strike for strategic reasons. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 221 (2004); People v. Leger, 149 Ill. 2d 355, 396-97 (1992); People v. Owens, 372 Ill. App. 3d 616, 625 (2007). A strong presumption exists that counsel's action or inaction was the product of sound trial strategy.