Our courts have held that rights related to a defendant's statements are “procedural.” People v. Ostas, 179 A.D.2d 893, 894, 578 N.Y.S.2d 934 (3d Dept.1992); People v. Benson, 88 A.D.2d at 231, 454 N.Y.S.2d 155. Under this framework, given that the defendant seeks to suppress his statements, New York law would apply.
Our courts have held that rights related to a defendant's statements are "procedural." People v. Ostas, 179 AD2d 893, 894 (3d Dept. 1992); People v. Benson, 88 AD2d at 231. Under this framework, given that the defendant seeks to suppress his statements, New York law would apply.
We note at the outset that the People are correct that New York law applies to the administration of defendant's blood test because "procedural and evidentiary issues are governed by the law of the forum" state ( People v Benson, 88 AD2d 229, 231; see People v Johnson, 303 AD2d 903, 904, lv denied 100 NY2d 539; People v Sebelist, 206 AD2d 901, lv denied 84 NY2d 910), and "New York has a paramount interest in the application of its laws to this case" ( Benson, 88 AD2d at 231; see People v Ostas, 179 AD2d 893, 894, lv denied 80 NY2d 932).
We turn first to defendant's contention that County Court erred in refusing to suppress his oral and written confessions because they were obtained in violation of the right to counsel that allegedly attached upon issuance of the Mississippi fugitive-from-justice warrant, because there was no probable cause for his arrest, and because his arrest became illegal when Sims, McHugh and Isaac failed to comply with Alabama law. Under New York law, which we apply because "procedural and evidentiary issues are governed by the law of the forum" (People v. Benson, 88 A.D.2d 229, 231; see People v. Ostas, 179 A.D.2d 893, 894, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 932), the right to counsel attaches indelibly and, therefore, may not be waived in counsel's absence, in two situations. "First, it arises when formal judicial proceedings begin, whether or not the defendant has actually retained or requested a lawyer.
Having elected to litigate this matter in New York, however, the procedural laws of this State control (see, Martin v. Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 588;People v. Ostas, 179 A.D.2d 893, 894, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 932). To that end, "[t]he rules governing our review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) are both simple and straightforward — we must afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept as true the allegations contained therein, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference and determine only whether the facts alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (1455 Washington Ave. Assocs. v. Rose Kiernan, 260 A.D.2d 770, 770-771; see, Murray v. Breski, 277 A.D.2d 867, 869).
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: County Court properly concluded that New York law applies to the custodial interrogation of a 16-year-old Pennsylvania resident conducted by members of the New York State Police in a Pennsylvania police station concerning the suspect's involvement in a homicide committed in New York (see, People v. Benson, 88 A.D.2d 229; see also, People v. Ostas, 179 A.D.2d 893, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 932). The court did not abuse its discretion either in denying defendant's request for youthful offender treatment or in imposing the maximum indeterminate term of imprisonment for the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty.
Further, the police officers' knowledge of defendant's intention to arm himself with at least one weapon led to a reasonable suspicion that defendant still possessed another, perhaps less conspicuous, weapon and justified at least a limited frisk (see, CPL 140.50; Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27; People v Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869). As for the inculpatory oral statement, the record amply supports County Court's finding that the utterance was genuinely spontaneous and not the product of police questioning or provocation (cf., People v Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 301; see, People v Ostas, 179 A.D.2d 893, 895-896, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 932). As a final matter, we are not persuaded that the People failed to furnish defendant with any exculpatory material that could have affected the outcome of the trial (see, People v Chin, 67 N.Y.2d 22, 33). Weiss, P.J., Crew III and White, JJ., concur.
We affirm. Defendant's argument that his statement should have been suppressed, because an Indiana law which prohibits the unilateral waiver of constitutional rights by a person under 18 years of age absent the presence of counsel or, inter alia, a custodial parent was violated by Indiana authorities, was previously rejected by this Court on the appeal of defendant's codefendant (see, People v Ostas, 179 A.D.2d 893). We find no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case.