Opinion
9535 Ind. 2684N/11
06-06-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jose CRUZ ORTIZ, Defendant–Appellant.
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Svetlana M. Kornfeind of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Yan Slavinskiy of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Svetlana M. Kornfeind of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Yan Slavinskiy of counsel), for respondent.
Sweeny, J.P., Gische, Webber, Oing, Moulton, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Roger S. Hayes, J.), rendered August 12, 2014, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of conspiracy in the second degree, operating as a major trafficker and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 15 years to life, unanimously affirmed. The court accorded defendant an adequate opportunity to voice his concerns about defense counsel (see People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 99–101, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283 [2010] ). Late in the trial, defendant made a conclusory, unelaborated "objection" that his counsel was ineffective. Although this was initially conveyed to the court by counsel, the court confirmed with defendant, personally, that this was the extent of the statement he wished to make. Defendant did not expressly request new counsel, and there is no indication that the court understood defendant's statement as such a request. Even if defendant could be viewed as requesting new counsel, he "failed to make specific factual allegations of serious complaints that would trigger the court's obligation to inquire further" ( People v. King, 142 A.D.3d 917, 917, 37 N.Y.S.3d 881 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1147, 52 N.Y.S.3d 298, 74 N.E.3d 683 [2017] ).
Defendant affirmatively waived his challenge to voice identification testimony. Defense counsel originally objected to having a police wiretap monitor compare a voice heard on intercepted conversations with a recording known to be that of defendant's voice, arguing that instead the recordings should be played for the jurors so they could make their own comparisons. However, counsel then reversed course, stating that after discussing the matter with defendant he no longer wanted the recorded conversations played for the jury. In any event, the monitor's testimony was permissible as "an aid to the jury's identification process" (see People v. Boyd, 151 A.D.3d 641, 641, 58 N.Y.S.3d 43 [1st Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1124, 64 N.Y.S.3d 673, 86 N.E.3d 565 [2017] ).