Defense counsel does not have a constitutional right to voir dire, so long as the court's "examination allowed counsel to determine whether any potential jurors possessed any beliefs that would bias them such as to prevent [the defendant] from receiving a fair trial." People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo. 1990). Likewise, defense counsel does not have a constitutional or statutory right to unlimited voir dire.
. Subsequently, in People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 178-79 (Colo. 1990), we upheld defendant's argument that the jury was not under any burden of persuasion in its fourth step of deliberations in violation of Tenneson. In a footnote, we noted that the fourth step had been eliminated by the 1988 amendment but that the pre-1988 statute was in effect at the time of the offense in O'Neill.
Based on the record, we conclude that the district court would nonetheless have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that death was the appropriate sentence if it had not considered the especially heinous statutory aggravator. See People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 178 (Colo. 1990) (holding that a capital sentencer must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment at the fourth step). We reach our conclusion in the present case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Voir dire, however, is not itself a constitutional right. See People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo. 1990). Rather, it is a tool that the parties use for the purpose of revealing and addressing bias in potential jurors.
A court may not enter judgments of conviction for felony murder and murder after deliberation for the murder of a single victim. See, e.g., People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 173 (Colo. 1990); People v. Saathoff, 790 P.2d 804, 807 (Colo. 1990); People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 246 (Colo.
We are here presented the unitary verdict unanimous instruction decidendi which has created unlimited litigative review with frequently differentiated results and inconclusive justifications used to affirm possible non-unanimous jury decisions. See Schad, 111 S.Ct. 2491, compared with People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1983) and State v. Alford, 329 N.C. 755, 407 S.E.2d 519 (1991), followed by People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1990); People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1983); State v. Boots, 308 Or. 371, 780 P.2d 725 (1989); and, in particular, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1990). Under Boulies, merger applies only to "a crime that is the lesser included offense of another crime for which the defendant has also been convicted in the same prosecution."
1990), overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Dunlap , 975 P.2d 723, 740 (Colo. 1999) ; People v. O'Neill , 803 P.2d 164, 173–74 (Colo. 1990) ; and People v. Glover , 893 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Colo. 1995).
With regard to the prospective jurors who were eventually struck and the alternate jurors who never deliberated, therefore, he cannot appeal the trial court's denial of his challenges for cause. See, e.g., Ma v. People, 121 P.3d 205, 210 (Colo. 2005); Rodriguez V, 914 P.2d at 263; People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 173 (Colo. 1990). The denied challenge for cause of the juror who actually deliberated, however, is a different matter.
In considering whether a trial court properly oversaw voir dire, this court has kept in mind that a key function of voir dire is to "`enable counsel to determine whether any prospective jurors are possessed of beliefs which would cause them to be biased in such a manner as to prevent the [defendant] from obtaining a fair and impartial trial.'" Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 260 (quoting Collins, 730 P.2d at 300); see also People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo. 1990). As such, an adequate voir dire is an essential part of the defendant's right to a fair trial.