People v. Olivera

189 Citing cases

  1. People v. Crotty

    394 Ill. App. 3d 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 22 times

    Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's statements were admissible. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 413, 103 S. Ct. at 2835. Following Bradshaw, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382 (1995). In Olivera, the 16-year-old defendant went with his father and his attorney to the police station to turn himself in for an offense unrelated to a homicide in which he was implicated. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d at 386.

  2. People v. Miller

    393 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 9 times

    The parties rely on two cases for their competing answers to this question. The State relies primarily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bradshaw, while defendant relies strongly on our supreme court's later decision in People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382 (1995). In Bradshaw, the accused, after invoking his right to an attorney, asked a police officer, "`Well, what is going to happen to me now?'" Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1042, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 410, 103 S. Ct. at 2833.

  3. People v. Dorsey

    2023 Ill. App. 200304 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 5 times

    The State asserts that defendant failed to address the second inquiry and, thus, "waived his opportunity to argue the second prong of Bradshaw's two-part inquiry." However, defendant's initial brief argued that defendant "requested a lawyer again," and his brief quoted the second Bradshaw inquiry, as phrased in our supreme court's case of People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382, 390 (1995) (citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044 (plurality opinion)). Thus, we do not find the second Bradshaw prong forfeited for our consideration.

  4. People v. Hernandez

    2017 Ill. App. 150575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 9 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reviewing an appeal of a remanded attenuation hearing to determine whether the defendant's statements were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest

    " ‘Interrogation’ " refers to express questioning, as well as to "any words or actions on the part of the police, other than those normally accompanying arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' " Jackson , 374 Ill. App. 3d at 106, 311 Ill.Dec. 882, 869 N.E.2d 895 (quoting People v. Olivera , 164 Ill. 2d 382, 391-92, 207 Ill.Dec. 433, 647 N.E.2d 926 (1995) ). The State admits elsewhere in its brief that "the test was certainly aimed at eliciting a confession."

  5. People v. Woolley

    178 Ill. 2d 175 (Ill. 1997)   Cited 58 times
    Finding the trial judge's comments showed he was aware that whether the defendant initiated further conversation was a necessary determination

    Edwards and its progeny direct that a two-part inquiry be conducted to determine if an accused's statements made in response to police interrogation which followed the accused's request for an attorney are admissible as substantive evidence at trial. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-45, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405, 412, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2834 (1983); People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382, 389-90 (1995); People v. Hicks, 132 Ill.2d 488, 493 (1989). The preliminary inquiry is whether the accused, rather than the police, initiated further discussion after invoking the right to counsel.

  6. People v. Flores

    315 Ill. App. 3d 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 15 times
    Recognizing that decision on appeal granting defendant relief may render additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel moot

    Thus, it is presumed that any waiver has "come at the authorities' behest" (Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681, 100 L.Ed.2d at 713, 108 S.Ct. at 2097), and the State bears a "heavy burden" to prove that a waiver of counsel following invocation of that right was knowing and intelligent (People v. Washington, 68 Ill.2d 186, 369 N.E.2d 57 (1977)). Where, as here, the issue is whether the "accused himself initiated further communication" (Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 412, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834 (1983)), the preliminary inquiry is whether, under the totality of circumstances, the defendant initiated the conversation in a manner evincing a "willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation"(People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382, 391, 647 N.E.2d 926 (1995)). If the defendant's comment or question does not express a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation, the officer must not respond in a manner which police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

  7. People v. Smith

    2015 Ill. App. 122306 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 8 times
    In Smith, the certification from the ISP merely listed numerical results of the accuracy tests without providing any interpretation of those results.

    For purposes of double jeopardy, our supreme court has distinguished between judgments reversing convictions on account of “trial error” and judgments reversing convictions on account of evidentiary insufficiency. People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382, 393, 207 Ill.Dec. 433, 647 N.E.2d 926 (1995). Our supreme court has held that “[a]lthough the double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying a defendant after a reviewing court has determined that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict, the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to the conviction.

  8. People v. Watson

    315 Ill. App. 3d 866 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 10 times

    The State notes that, in each of the cases cited by the defendant, the suspects expressly asserted their rights to counsel and silence, and yet the police nevertheless subsequently obtained incriminating statements from the suspects. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (1980); People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382 (1995); People v. Sanders, 55 Ill. App.3d 178 (1977); People v. Ruegger, 32 Ill. App.3d 765 (1975). In contrast, the instant defendant was warned of his Miranda rights at the outset of the interrogation, and he stated several times throughout the day that he understood them.

  9. People v. Smith

    306 Ill. App. 3d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 3 times
    Concluding that the defendant's request to speak with an assistant State's Attorney during an interrogation constituted an initiation of further discussions concerning the police investigation

    When during a custodial interrogation an accused invokes his right to counsel after being advised of his Miranda rights, interrogation by law enforcement authorities must cease until the accused has had an opportunity to confer with an attorney. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 (1966); People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382, 389-90, 647 N.E.2d 926, 930 (1995). The accused may not be subject to further custodial interrogation without the presence of counsel "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."

  10. People v. Rico

    2018 Ill. App. 2d 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    " Thereafter, he made written and video recorded statements, which defendant argues should have been suppressed for failure to honor his right to counsel. ¶ 55 Defendant discusses several cases in support of his argument, including People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382 (1995) and People v. Flores, 315 Ill. App. 3d 387 (2000). We address his case law in our analysis infra. ¶ 56 Defendant continues that even assuming that his questions evinced a desire to speak about the investigation, the detectives' responses escalated the interaction to the level of coercion.