It is obvious at the start that the constitutional provision does not limit the right of recall to situations wherein facts could be alleged on the petition which constituted "nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance." See People, ex rel. Elliot, v. O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312, 314. Nor may any such limitation be found in the recall statute which was adopted pursuant to the constitutional mandate.

" People, ex rel Elliot v O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312, 314-315; 224 N.W. 384 (1929), construing Newberg, said: "Read in connection with the facts of the case, the ruling was that a petition is insufficient which merely charges an officer with doing what he has the legal right and duty to do, and which fails to set up facts, as distinguished from conclusions, showing misconduct.

In Eaton v Baker, 334 Mich. 521, 525-526; 55 N.W.2d 77 (1952), the Court summarized them in the following manner: "In People, ex rel Elliot v O'Hara [ 246 Mich. 312; 224 N.W.2d 384 (1929)] * * * we * * * stated that an allegation was sufficient when it was `a specific allegation of facts, and charges misconduct in office. It is not insufficient because it does not allege the time, person, and occasion involved.

From this lack of specificity, they argue that it would be improper to submit the issue of their recall upon a statement of cause for removal couched in such "vague and general" language. In support of their position, they rely upon the following decisions from other jurisdictions: People ex rel. Elliot v. O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312, 224 N.W. 384 ( Sup. Ct. 1929); Jacobsen v. Nagel, 255 Minn. 300, 96 N.W.2d 569, 572 ( Sup. Ct. 1959); Richard v. Tomlinson, 49 So.2d 798 ( Fla. Sup. Ct. 1951); Joyner v. Shuman, 116 So.2d 472 ( Fla. D. Ct. App. 1959); State ex rel. Peterkin v. City Council of City of Parkersburg, 95 W. Va. 502, 121 S.E. 489 ( Sup. Ct. App. 1924). The difficulty with these out-of-the-state decisions is that some of them involve local statutes and constitutional provisions different from our own, and others embrace a philosophy with reference to recall out of harmony with that heretofore reflected in decisions of our own courts.

Proceedings for removal are court proceedings and those for recall are passed upon by the electors. The leading case in this State is People, ex rel. Elliot, v. O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312, wherein Mr. Justice FEAD, speaking for the Court, stated: "It hardly need be pointed out that the recall is fundamentally different from proceedings for removal of an officer.

The early decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court interpreting Const 1908, art 3, § 8, and § 952, construed these provisions to require a valid recall petition to state facts that would constitute nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance. See Newberg v Donnelly, 235 Mich. 531; 209 N.W. 572 (1926); People, ex rel Elliot v O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312; 224 N.W. 384 (1929); Amberg v Welsh, 325 Mich. 285; 38 N.W.2d 304 (1949). However, the Court retreated from that position in Wallace v Tripp, 358 Mich. 668; 101 N.W.2d 312 (1960), where it held that the sufficiency of reasons in a recall petition is for the determination of the electorate rather than the courts.

By specifically making the substantive grounds for recall a political rather than a justiciable question, Const 1963, art 2, § 8, the framers of the constitution embraced the philosophy favoring recalls predicated on any identifiable acts by an elected official, without respect to whether the act in question might be deemed misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. This standard had only recently been clarified by the Supreme Court in Wallace v Tripp, supra, overruling Newberg v Donnelly, 235 Mich. 531, 534-535; 209 N.W. 572 (1926), and its progeny, People ex rel Elliot v O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312, 314-315; 224 N.W. 384 (1929); Amberg v Welsh, 325 Mich. 285; 38 N.W.2d 304 (1949), and Eaton v Baker, 334 Mich. 521; 55 N.W.2d 77 (1952), at the time of the 1963 Constitutional Convention. This Court has previously recognized that Const 1963, art 2, § 8 constitutes adoption of the Wallace holding.

"(2) That the Township residents should have been allowed an opportunity to vote on such an essential matter as changing the existing form of Township government and significantly increasing the powers of the Supervisor." The trial court found that the reasons were stated with sufficient clarity "to enable the officer and electors to identify the transaction and know the charges made in connection therewith", People, ex rel Elliot v O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312; 224 N.W. 384 (1929). We agree.

Appellants advance the theory that cause for recall must relate to official incompetency or misconduct in office, and be more than mere disagreement with policy decisions made by officeholders. Cases from three jurisdictions ( State ex rel. Peterkin v. City Council, 95 W. Va. 502, 121 S.E. 489; People ex rel. Elliott v. O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312, 224 N.W. 384; Newberg v. Donnelly, 235 Mich. 531, 209 N.W. 572; Joyner v. Shuman (Fla.App.), 116 So.2d 472) are cited by appellants in support of their position, although appellants' counsel fails to note that the cited Michigan cases were expressly overruled in Wallace v. Tripp, 358 Mich. 668, 101 N.W.2d 312, 315, where the cases he relies upon are classified as abberational. The remaining cases cited represent a minority view which we reject because we find a legislative intent embodied in our statutes that officeholders in the commission form of local government should be subject to recall by the voters for reasons which are purely political in nature. This philosophy was adopted in Westpy v. Burnett, 82 N.J. Super. 239, 197 A.2d 400, 404, where it is noted: "The courts throughout the United States have generally adopted the view that the power granted to electors of a municipality to remove certain public officers through recall procedure is political in nature and that it is for the people, a

The rule is that, at this state of the proceedings, the recall petitions having been circulated, signed, and canvassed, only the complete failure of all of the charges to meet the statutory requirements can justify enjoining the holding of the election; one charge meeting the statutory requirement is sufficient. Thiemens v. Sanders, 102 Wn. 453, 173 P. 26 (1918); State ex rel. Walter v. Houghton, 165 Wn. 220, 4 P.2d 1110 (1931); People ex rel. Elliot v. O'Hara, 246 Mich. 312, 224 N.W. 384 (1929); Amberg v. Welsh, 325 Mich. 285, 38 N.W.2d 304 (1949). The plaintiff contends that the charges held legally sufficient by the trial court fail to meet minimal requirements for the commencement of the recall process; because the charges are too indefinite and vague to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.