Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ct. No. FMB1000027 Rodney A. Cortez, Judge.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ P. J.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Dondi Edward Ogle pled no contest to felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)) and was placed on probation. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing terms of probation that required him to attend a domestic violence batterer’s program and to submit to warrantless searches. We affirm.
The parties stipulated that the police reports would provide a factual basis for defendant’s plea. Accordingly, we recite the facts from those reports.
On January 24, 2010, defendant and his wife were arguing. Defendant went to leave in his wife’s car; his wife got into the vehicle to stop him because he was unlicensed and her insurance would not cover him. He drove the car “recklessly on the berms” for a few blocks until it started making noises. The couple then walked back to their residence. The wife and the couple’s son returned in defendant’s truck to bring the car home. Defendant then got in the truck, revved the engine, and rammed his wife’s car. He got out of the truck and said to his wife, “How do you like that bitch?” The couple’s daughter then began cussing and hitting defendant. The wife called for the son, defendant went to his son’s room, grabbed his son’s guitar, swung the guitar at the son, who then started hitting defendant.
Under the “CRIME STATS” heading, the police report had the domestic violence line filled out, and indicated no injuries or weapons were involved. The report stated that they were “dispatched to a domestic dispute.”
The probation officer’s analysis recommended domestic violence terms, and in particular, stated “[t]here is a need for domestic violence counseling, with particular attention to the anger management portion.” Among the conditions recommended by the probation officer were “10. Submit to a search and seizure of your person, residence, and/or property under your control at any time of the day or night by any law-enforcement officer, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause, ” and “21. Successfully complete a Domestic Violence Batterers’ Program of fifty-two (52) weekly sessions. Submit proof of enrollment to the probation officer by May 7, 2010 and be responsible for payment of all program fees and attend all program appointments. Completion to be filed by July 6, 2011.”
At the sentencing hearing, defendant’s trial counsel challenged term No. 10 because there was “no illegal contraband in this case.” The trial court rejected the challenge because “10 is a reasonable condition for anyone that’s placed on felony probation. Probation often will show up day or night, with or without notice to ensure that the defendants are in compliance with all probation terms.” Defendant’s trial counsel also challenged term No. 21 contending there was no nexus justifying a batterer’s program because driving “an object doesn’t mean I’m battering my wife.” The trial court rejected the challenge, noting that “just because he didn’t strike her, doesn’t mean that this wasn’t an act of violence towards the victim in this case. He jumped in the car without a license. She jumped in there to try to stop him. He continued to show control over the situation and is, I suppose, in dominion and control over the relationship by then getting into his truck and ramming her car down.” Defendant’s trial counsel then argued for an anger management program “as opposed to one designed for people who hit people, not destroy property?” The trial court thought that counsel was “getting caught up... on the name of the program” and explained, “domestic violence sometimes goes beyond just striking someone. There is mental aspects to it as well.... [A]lthough it didn’t come out violently towards her, the next step could be, and there are some mental issues going on in terms of his actions toward her of showing the control that he can exhibit over her and her property, which is separate.” The trial court then imposed both of the challenged terms.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TERMS
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the domestic violence batterer’s program requirement because his conviction did not involve physical violence to his spouse and he has no record of such violence. The People contend the requirement was within the trial court’s discretion because defendant rammed his wife’s car after a domestic dispute. Because imposition of the term was mandated by Penal Code section 1203.097, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant did not challenge, on appeal or below, another term mandated by Penal Code section 1203.097, term No. 22, which requires a payment to a domestic violence fund.
“ ‘Domestic violence’ is abuse perpetrated against any of the following persons: [¶] (a) A spouse....” (Fam. Code, § 6211.) As used in Family Code section 6211, abuse is defined to include behavior that may be enjoined pursuant to Family Code section 6320. (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (d).) This includes destroying personal property. (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).) “If a person is granted probation for a crime in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the terms of probation shall include all of the following: [¶]... [¶] (6) Successful completion of a batterer’s program....” (Pen. Code, § 1203.097, subd. (a).) A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless: (1) it has no relationship to the crime of which the defendant was convicted; (2) it relates to conduct not itself criminal; and (3) it requires or forbids conduct unrelated to future criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.)
Defendant pled no contest to the felony vandalism of his wife’s car. Ramming his wife’s car with his truck was an act of abuse that constituted domestic violence. (Fam. Code, §§ 6211, subd. (a), 6203, subd. (d), 6320, subd. (a).) Accordingly, defendant’s offense was a domestic violence offense for which the imposition of a probation term requiring completion of a batterer’s program was mandatory. (Pen. Code, § 1203.097, subd. (a)(6).) Thus, there was no error in requiring defendant to complete a domestic violence batterer’s program as a term of probation. (See People v. Brown (2001) 96 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 39-40.)
Given that the imposition of the challenged condition was mandatory, it is not clear that a Lent analysis is necessary. However, assuming that the application of Penal Code section 1203.097 was not mandatory, or that mandatory sentencing decisions are subject to a Lent test, the challenged condition does not violate Lent. As discussed ante, defendant’s conduct was domestic violence; thus, requiring completion of the domestic violence batterer’s program is both related to the crime of which defendant was convicted and to deterrence of future domestic violence criminality. Accordingly, under Lent, there was no error in requiring defendant to complete a domestic violence batterer’s program as a term of probation.
SEARCH TERM
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a standard search condition because his offense did not involve contraband of any kind. The People contend, in light of other unchallenged conditions prohibiting defendant from possessing unlawful weapons, using or possessing unprescribed controlled substances, possessing drug paraphernalia, or consuming or possessing alcohol, the search condition is valid as an effective means of supervising defendant’s compliance. We agree with the People.
“A probationer, unlike a parolee, consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608.) “Probation is ‘... an alternative form of punishment... when it can be used as a correctional tool. [Citation].’ [Citation.] With the benefit of probation comes the burden of a ‘consent search term.’ Such a term serves as a correctional tool....” (In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1006.) A sentencing court has broad discretion to impose “reasonable conditions” of probation “to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer....” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) “If a probation condition serves the statutory purpose of ‘ “reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer, ” ’ such condition is ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ and will be upheld even if it has no ‘ “relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Brewer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1311.)
In People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57 (Balestra), a warrantless search condition of probation was imposed upon a defendant who entered a guilty plea to inflicting willful cruelty on an elder. (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (a).) The Balestra court found the condition to be valid, despite the lack of any relationship between the underlying offense to theft, narcotics, use of firearms, or any other contraband item. (Balestra, at pp. 67-68.) The court stated: “As our Supreme Court has recently (and repeatedly) made clear, a warrantless search condition is intended to ensure that the subject thereof is obeying the fundamental condition of all grants of probation, that is, the usual requirement (as here) that a probationer ‘obey all laws.’ Thus, warrantless search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, and because such a search condition is necessarily justified by its rehabilitative purpose, it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms: ‘The threat of a suspicionless search is fully consistent with the deterrent purposes of the search condition. “ ‘The purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of defendant is to ascertain whether [the probationer] is complying with the terms of [probation]; to determine not only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. Information obtained under such circumstances would afford a valuable measure of the effectiveness of the supervision given the defendant....’ ” [Citations.]’ ” (Id. at p. 67, italics and fn. omitted.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a warrantless search condition as a term of defendant’s probation.
Defendant relies on In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577, for the proposition that a search condition is not necessarily related to future criminality because it deters future crime and permits effective enforcement of other probation terms. However, Martinez relied upon an earlier decision of the Balestra court, People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827, 840, overruled on other grounds by People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237, for the proposition that a constitutional mandate existed to require that probation conditions be reasonable, reasonable in proportion, and reasonably related to the crime committed. This addition to the traditional Lent analysis was rejected by the Balestra court because it was “inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the date of that decision.” (Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 67.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, J., McKINSTER J.