Supra ¶ 21. Our supreme court's decision in People in Interest of R.D. , 2020 CO 44, ¶ 53, 464 P.3d 717, 731-32, guides the analysis of whether the subject statement rose to the level of a true threat. R.D. explained that determining whether a statement presented a true threat requires not only examination of the words themselves, but also the context of those words. Id. at ¶ 52, 464 P.3d at 731.

Even if Defendant were correct and we had to defer to Colorado's interpretation of the Colorado statute, Defendant has not persuaded us that the Colorado state courts, postHeineman and Elonis, would have done things any differently. See People In Interest of R.D., 464 P.3d 717, 733-34 (Colo. 2020) (en banc) (avoiding a Constitutional challenge to the Colorado harassing communication statute by interpreting the statute to include a subjective intent element-that the defendant subjectively intended to threaten). See also People v. Smith, 620 P.2d 232, 238 (Colo.

Under that standard, the State had to show that a reasonable person would have viewed the Facebook messages as threatening. By contrast, the State had no need to prove that Counterman had any kind of "subjective intent to threaten" C. W. In re R. D., 464 P.3d 717, 731, n. 21 (Colo. 2020). The court decided, after "consider[ing] the totality of the circumstances," that Counterman's statements "r[o]se to the level of a true threat."

¶55 Aish's statements could not be true threats of violence because he disclaimed any desire for violence to befall Kindschy. Lincoln, 403 F.3d at 707 (holding a letter could not be a true threat because the author "disassociated himself from any violent action"); In re R.D., 464 P.3d 717, ¶53 (Colo. 2020) (A true threats inquiry "should [] examine whether the speaker said or did anything to undermine the credibility of the [alleged] threat."); cf. Krij ger, 97 A.3d at 961 (speaker apologizing immediately after saying the listener would get into a car accident, just as his son did years earlier, undercut the threatening undertone of the statement).

Appellant maintains that allowing a conviction (or, as here, an adjudication of delinquency) for terroristic threats under Section 2706(a)(3) based merely upon a showing of recklessness will require individuals to speculate as to how others will perceive their speech, potentially casting too wide a net and criminalizing permissible speech. See, e.g. , In the Interest of R.D. , 464 P.3d 717, 733-34 (Colo. 2020) ("[W]hether a particular reader or listener will react with fear to particular words is far too unpredictable a metric for First Amendment protection. Such a rule would not give sufficient ‘breathing space’ to the freedom of speech.").

As the Supreme Court of Colorado has explained, the true threats inquiry "should include whether the threat contains accurate details tending to heighten its credibility." Colorado ex rel. R.D. , 2020 CO 44, ¶ 53, 464 P.3d 717. Here, Taylor did not specify a "date, time, and place" or method for where and how he intended to carry out his purported threat.

Moreover, that the Court in Elonis specifically declined to consider the First Amendment question suggests that it concluded that Black was not determinative. SeeElonis , 575 U.S. at 740, 135 S.Ct. 2001 ; see alsoPeople in Interest of R.D. , 464 P.3d 717, 729 (Colo. 2020) ("Thus, after Elonis , the proper test for true threats remains an unsolved doctrinal puzzle.").SeeElonis , 575 U.S. at 765, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (stating that the Court in Black had no reason to decide whether true threats required specific intent because the statute at issue explicitly required an intent to intimidate); id. at 746–48, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that, consistent with Black , "[r]equiring proof of recklessness is ... sufficient" under the First Amendment); United States v. Jeffries , 692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[Black ] says nothing about imposing a subjective standard on other threat-prohibiting statutes, and indeed had no occasion to do so: the Virginia law itself required subjective ‘intent.’ "

¶50 Although I understand and sympathize with the majority's apparent desire to move this case forward, we have consistently declined to address issues beyond the scope of those on which we have granted certiorari. See, e.g. , People in Int. of R.D. , 2020 CO 44, ¶ 32 n.16, 464 P.3d 717, 726 n.16 ; Bermel v. BlueRadios, Inc. , 2019 CO 31, ¶ 18 n.4, 440 P.3d 1150, 1154 n.4. ¶51 In my view, the merits of the issues that the People raised for the first time at the re-opened suppression hearing are beyond the scope of the very limited question on which we granted certiorari.

Finally, we note that our decision is consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions that have considered and rejected overbreadth challenges to similar statutes. See People in Interest of R.D., 464 P.3d 717, 721 (Colo. 2020) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect statements that the recipient would "reasonably perceive as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence"); State v. Taupier, 193 A.3d 1, 19 (Conn. 2018) (holding that a statute that prohibits statements made "in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror to another" does not violate the First Amendment (quotation omitted)); Major v. State, 800 S.E.2d 348, 352 (Ga. 2017) (holding that the inclusion of a reckless mens rea did not render the threats-of-violence statute unconstitutionally overbroad); but see State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805, 819 (Kan. 2019) (holding that the "reckless criminal threat provision" was unconstitutionally overbroad). We therefore conclude that the threats-of-violence statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad and we do not need to reach the fourth step of the analysis, whether we must narrow the construction or sever any language to cure constitutional defects.