But several courts have addressed-and rejected-that contention. (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317 (Odell) [rejecting challenge under Bruen to section 29800(a)(1)]; People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 480 (Alexander) [same]; accord, People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 13011302 [similar; rejecting challenge to statute barring felons from possessing ammunition].) Alexander and Odell held that the change in analytic method mandated by Bruen did not affect the constitutionality of statutes barring felons from possessing firearms.
"All constitutional rights have limits." (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 316 (Odell).)
Nothing in Bruen signals any departure from the continuing validity of laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, as originally expressed in Heller and reiterated by the McDonald plurality. Even assuming the endorsements of such laws in Heller and McDonald are dicta, "they are sensible and persuasive dicta." (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317 (Odell).)
Some courts, focusing on the factual scenario presented in Heller itself (the case concerned an outright ban on the possession of handguns), observe that the case does not definitively resolve all aspects of who may lawfully possess a firearm, when or where they may do so, or how they may obtain the weapon. (See, e.g., United States v. Scroggins (5th Cir. 2010) 599 F.3d 433, 451; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317.) That is true, but it does not undermine the conclusion we have drawn-based on repeated admonitions from the high court itself (see, e.g., McDonald, supra, 561 U.S. at 742)-about the scope of the right to bear arms that the court recognized.
Third, California courts have recently rejected facial challenges to the constitutionality of other statutes regulating firearm possession, including possession of firearms and ammunition by felons. ( Alexander , supra , 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 480, 308 Cal.Rptr.3d 380 ; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 309 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 ( Odell ).) In Alexander , the Fourth District reasoned that these regulations were not covered by the Second Amendment because, as set forth in Heller , it confers " โthe right of law-abiding , responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.โ "
Felons thus are not among 'the people' who have an individual right to possess firearms under the Second Amendment." (Id. at p. 479; see also People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1301 [quoting and "agree[ing] with the cogent reasoning and analysis in Alexander"]; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 316-317 ["People who have been convicted of a felony are not 'law-abiding,'" and are therefore not among the people entitled to bear arms under the Second Amendment]; In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 166 (D.L.) [agreeing with Alexander and Odell "that Bruen did not expand 'the categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun,' and that those convicted of a felony are squarely in a category where gun possession is off-limits due to their prior criminal conduct"].)
In the wake of Bruen, the Courts of Appeal within our state have been divided on the first question of whether felons fall within the definition of "the People" who enjoy a constitutional right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. (Compare People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469 [felons are not within the class of people afforded rights under the Second Amendment]; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307 [same]; and People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296 [same]; with People v. Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 588 (Anderson) ["We see no basis for categorically excluding persons with prior felony convictions from the protections of the Bill of Rights.
(See Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 386-387.) Imperfect selfdefense occurs "when defendants act in the actual but unreasonable belief they are in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death." (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 321.) It requires "your actual belief that you must defend against an imminent danger."
The People construe these remarks as proof that only law-abiding, responsible citizens are among "the people" covered by the text of the Second Amendment, and some California courts have embraced this view. (See Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 478, 308 CaLRptr.3d 380; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 309 Cal.Rptr.3d 440; People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 839.) We reject this framing although, by a different route, ulti- mately will reach the same result as these California cases.
ng citizens to possess firearms and ammunition for the purpose of self-defense, not convicted felons like Mendoza. (See Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 479 ["[c]onvicted felons, by definition, are not law abiding" and "thus are not among 'the people' who have an individual right to possess firearms under the Second Amendment"]; see also People v. Ceja (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1301 ["We agree with the cogent reasoning and analysis in Alexander [and] hold that the felon in possession of ammunition prohibition [citation] does not facially violate the Second Amendment"]; In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 166 ["We agree with Alexander . . . that Bruen did not expand 'the categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun,' and that those convicted of a felony are squarely in a category where gun possession is off-limits due to their prior criminal conduct"]; People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317 [agreeing with Alexander that ยง 29800, subd. (a)(1) is constitutional].)