Opinion
No. 571 KA 19-01422
07-28-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. SEAN J. O'BRIEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CLEA WEISS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (CLEA WEISS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CURRAN, BANNISTER, MONTOUR, AND OGDEN, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Stephen T. Miller, A.J.), rendered May 16, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 130.75 [1] [b]). Preliminarily, as defendant contends and as the People correctly concede, the record does not establish that defendant validly waived his right to appeal. County Court's "oral waiver colloquy and the written waiver signed by defendant together 'mischaracterized the nature of the right that defendant was being asked to cede, portraying the waiver as an absolute bar to defendant taking an appeal and the attendant rights to counsel and poor person relief, as well as a bar to all postconviction relief, and there is no clarifying language in either the oral or written waiver indicating that appellate review remained available for certain issues'" (People v Johnson, 192 A.D.3d 1494, 1495 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 965 [2021]; see People v Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 564-566 [2019], cert denied - U.S. -, 140 S.Ct. 2634 [2020]; People v Stewart, 210 A.D.3d 1445, 1446 [4th Dept 2022]). Although we are thus not precluded from reviewing defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence, we nonetheless perceive no basis in the record for the exercise of our authority to reduce the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]).