Opinion
No. 340115
06-19-2018
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TARA MARIE NYE-CODY, Defendant-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED Ionia Circuit Court
LC No. 2017-017083-FH Before: MURRAY, C.J., and HOEKSTRA and GADOLA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals as of right the trial court's decision granting defendant's motion to suppress from evidence all items seized during a search of her home and giving rise to the criminal charges brought against her. Following the trial court's ruling, the prosecution voluntarily dismissed the charges on the record, and the trial court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice. We conclude that by voluntarily dismissing the charges, the prosecution rendered the present appeal moot, thus foreclosing review by this Court. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant shared a residence with John King, a parolee who, under the terms of his parole order, had consented to search of his person and property upon demand by a peace officer or parole officer. On March 16, 2017, parole officer Greg Garn received a report from Mr. King's employer that Mr. King was suspected of being under the influence of drugs. Agent Garn testified that he arrived at Mr. King's place of employment and, when patting him down, discovered a syringe in his coat pocket. Because possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia violated the conditions of Mr. King's parole, Agent Garn placed him under arrest and brought him to the Ionia County Jail. Accompanied by another parole officer, two police officers, and a police dog, Agent Garn then proceeded to defendant's residence to conduct a search. Defendant was present at the home and, although she consented to the parole officers' entry into the home, she expressly refused entry to the police officers. Nonetheless, the police officers followed the parole officers into the home and assisted with the search. It is undisputed that no warrant was obtained.
Agent Garn and the police officers testified that their search of the home led to the discovery of multiple syringes and vials containing traces of methamphetamine. Sergeant Star Thomas testified that she observed one of these syringes lying in plain sight on top of a purse located in defendant's bedroom. According to Sergeant Thomas, defendant denied any concrete knowledge of Mr. King's drug use and denied using narcotics herself. However, Sergeant Thomas observed a dark purple mark on the inside of defendant's left arm. When defendant grabbed the purse on which the syringe had been lying as she attempted to leave the home, Sergeant Thomas arrested her for possession of methamphetamine and transported her to jail.
On March 17, 2017, the prosecutor filed a felony complaint charging defendant with possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i). Defendant filed a motion to suppress from evidence all items seized from her home during the search, as well as any fruits of the search. After an evidentiary hearing held on July 24, 2017, the trial court granted defendant's motion and suppressed all evidence obtained during the search of her home. When the trial court inquired regarding the prosecution's intent to go forward with the charges, the prosecution responded that the charges must be dismissed without prejudice:
The Court: Well, I guess we need to inquire, or perhaps Mr. Butler [the prosecuting attorney] needs to consider whether or not he'll move forward, given the granting of your motion [to suppress evidence].The trial court thereafter entered an order on July 28, 2017, stating that "the evidence obtained is suppressed, and the case is dismissed without prejudice."
Mr. Butler: Frankly, I though[t] it stood as obvious that the People cannot move forward with the trial, if all the evidence just got suppressed.
Mr. Matwiejczyk [defense counsel]: Okay. Well, the case is still open though. Is it going to be dismissed, or is it in limbo?
The Court: Well the motion is—
Mr. Butler: If I have no evidence left, and I can't prove it's methamphetamine, then I, at this point in time, cannot proceed with the trial. The case is going to have to be dismissed—
Mr. Matwiejczyk: All right.
Mr. Butler: —without prejudice.
Mr. Matwiejczyk: All right. That's fine.
Mr. Butler: That will have to happen at this point in time.
The Court: Without prejudice.
Mr. Matwiejczyk: That's fine.
II. DISCUSSION
The prosecution appeals the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence. However, defendant contends that the appeal is moot because the prosecution voluntarily dismissed the charges, and, as such, there is no longer any controversy remaining for this Court's consideration. We agree with defendant.
A court's power to decide a case is constrained to actual cases and controversies and thus does not extend to matters that are moot. Federated Publications, Inc v City of Lansing, 467 Mich 98, 112; 467 NW2d 383 (2002), citing Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich 592, 610; 179 NW 350 (1920). A matter is moot if a court's ruling would have no practical legal effect, id., or when it presents "nothing but abstract questions of law which do not rest upon existing facts or rights," Gildemeister v Lindsay, 212 Mich 299, 302; 180 NW 633 (1920). However, an exception to the mootness doctrine exists when a matter of public significance is likely to recur yet evade judicial review. Federated Publications, 467 Mich at 112. Because courts lack jurisdiction over matters that are moot, "[w]hether a case is moot is a threshold issue that a court addresses before it reaches the substantive issues of the case itself." People v Richmond, 486 Mich 29, 35; 782 NW2d 187 (2010). When a case is determined to be moot, the appropriate disposition is generally dismissal without reaching the underlying merits. Id. at 35.
Because the instant matter presents the same procedural circumstances confronted by our Supreme Court in People v Richmond, we are constrained to adhere to the reasoning and outcome set forth in that binding majority opinion. In Richmond, after the trial court ruled to suppress all the evidence against defendant, the prosecution moved to voluntarily dismiss the charges without prejudice, stating on the record that dismissal was appropriate because the prosecution was unable to proceed in the absence of any admissible evidence. Id. at 33. The trial court entered an order of dismissal indicating "that the case was dismissed without prejudice 'on the motion of the People.' " Id. Vacating a decision by this Court to reverse and remand the case, the majority determined that appellate review was precluded, as
the prosecution's own action clearly rendered its subsequent appeal moot. . . . As a result of the prosecution's voluntarily seeking dismissal of the charges, the circuit court dismissed the charges without prejudice and any existing controversy between the parties was rendered moot. Once the charges were dismissed, an action no longer existed, and, thus, there was no longer any controversy left for the Court of Appeals to consider.Id. at 35.
The prosecution in the present matter likewise voluntarily dismissed the charges against defendant when it stated on the record before the trial court that "[t]he case is going to have to be dismissed . . . without prejudice." Certainly the trial court formally dismissed the charges in a "final order" within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(b) and 7.203(A)(1), the provisions concerning appellate jurisdiction. However, as emphasized in Richmond, this dismissal was ordered solely at the prosecution's request. See id. at 36. Indeed, defendant's motion to suppress did not seek dismissal of the charges as part of the relief sought. Although the trial court's order is unlike that at issue in Richmond insofar as it does not expressly state that dismissal was ordered "on the motion of the People," the colloquy cited above makes clear that this was the case. Accordingly, because the prosecution voluntarily dismissed the charges before seeking appellate review, we conclude there remains no actual controversy for this Court to consider.
The majority noted in Richmond that "whether the prosecution's voluntary dismissal of the charges was a nolle prosequi under MCL 767.29" did not affect its analysis of the issue. Richmond, 486 Mich at 33 n 1. --------
However, were we deciding this matter on a clean slate, we would adopt the more compelling reasoning set forth in Justice Corrigan's dissenting opinion in Richmond. See People v Richmond, 486 Mich at 42 (CORRIGAN, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that, in spite of the voluntary dismissal of the charges, the prosecution retained a legally cognizable interest in the resolution of a live controversy regarding the suppression ruling. Id. at 43. As articulated in the dissent,
"[T]hat a case is hopeless, given a prior ruling," does not extinguish the controversy concerning that prior ruling. On the contrary, agreement to a dismissal order permits the aggrieved party to avail itself of an appeal of right while avoiding the certain directed verdict that would result from proceeding with a hopeless case. This analysis is even more compelling in a criminal case, in which a directed verdict or acquittal bars any appeal under double jeopardy principles.Id . at 48, quoting Fairley v Andrews, 578 F3d 518, 522 (CA 7, 2009) (citation omitted). The dissent further noted several jurisdictions, including Delaware, New York, and Ohio, that provide statutory mechanisms by which the prosecution may appeal as a matter of right suppression orders that lead to a dismissal of charges. Id. at 48 n 6. Although we find this view more persuasive, we are nonetheless bound to apply the outcome reached by the Richmond majority.
It is vital to note that in reaching this conclusion, this Court does not preclude the prosecution from seeking future appellate review of the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence. In an order granting in part the prosecution's motion for rehearing in Richmond, our Supreme Court clarified that where, as here, a case is premised on non-frivolous arguments, "[t]he prosecution may refile the charges against defendant and, if necessary, file an interlocutory appeal to challenge the underlying suppression ruling." People v Richmond, 486 Mich 1041, 1041; 783 NW2d 703 (2010).
Thus, the prosecution is entitled to seek appellate review once it has complied with these procedural measures.
Dismissed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Michael F. Gadola