Opinion
2003-1457 N CR.
Decided December 23, 2004.
Appeal by defendant from an order of the District Court, Nassau County (K. Gartner, J.), dated July 8, 2003, deemed (see CPL 460.10) an appeal from the judgment, rendered September 24, 2003, convicting him, upon his guilty plea, of attempted escape in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 205.05) and disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20), and imposing sentence.
Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed.
PRESENT: McCABE, P.J., COVELLO and TANENBAUM, JJ.
The record amply supports the District Court's determination, after a hearing, to deny defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea (CPL 220.60). It is defendant's burden ( People v. Martin, 227 AD2d 416, 417) to demonstrate that the court failed to perform its "constitutional duty" ( People v. Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 402) to ensure that defendant understood the nature of his plea and of its consequences ( People v. Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 19). Because a judge is deemed "best able to determine whether a plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" ( People v. Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 485), in particular, to assess "firsthand . . . whether defendant was alert and knowledgeable enough to plead guilty voluntarily" ( id. at 486), the determination whether to vacate a guilty plea rests on the sound exercise of the court's discretion ( People v. White, 226 AD2d 750) which will not be disturbed absent an "abuse of [that] discretion as a matter of law" ( People v. Feliciano, 53 NY2d 645, 646).
Defendant's claim that he lacked the capacity to enter a valid plea owing to his medical condition, medication and emotional distress, is belied by the plea minutes, which reveals that defendant was "rational, coherent and unequivocal in assuring the court that he fully comprehended the meaning of his plea and that he was pleading guilty of his own free will" ( People v. Rodriguez, 302 AD2d 317, 317), and by the hearing testimony, which yielded no support for an inference that illness, medication, or some other physical or mental condition "so stripped him of orientation or cognition that he lacked the capacity to plead guilty" ( People v. Alexander, 97 NY2d at 486; see also People v. Stone, 303 AD2d 782; People v. Garcia, 4 Misc 3d 133[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50746[U] [App Term, 9th 10th Jud Dists]).
Defendant's additional allegations, that he was not aware that one of the offenses to which he pleaded was a crime and that he would not have pleaded guilty to a criminal offense given the potential impact of such a conviction on his employment status, are likewise unavailing. The court credited the testimony of defendant's counsel at the hearing that defendant was fully informed of the nature of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Matters of credibility are primarily for the finder of fact who heard and observed the witness ( e.g. People v. Cummings, 291 AD2d 454, 455; People v. Hernandez, 288 AD2d 489, 490), and upon the available facts and circumstances the court's conclusion thereon is not so clearly erroneous as to require that it be disregarded ( People v. Brown, 234 AD2d 211, 213, affd 91 NY2d 854). With respect to the significance of his plea for his employment status, we note that a criminal court "is in no position to advise [a defendant] on all the ramifications of a guilty plea personal to a defendant" ( People v. Ford, 86 NY2d at 403; see also People v. Latham, 90 NY2d 795, 798), the obligation being confined to matters constituting "direct" as opposed to "collateral" consequences of a plea ( People v. Ford, 86 NY2d at 403). Matters are collateral when they are "peculiar to the individual and generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control" as opposed to those which have "a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment" ( id.). The response, if any, of defendant's employer to defendant's conviction of a class B misdemeanor is clearly collateral. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of the motion to vacate the plea.