Because armed robbery was not the predicate felony involved in the instant felony-murder convictions, reversal is not required pursuant to People v Wilder, 411 Mich 328; 308 NW2d 112 (1981). We further conclude that the language "same offense" in Const 1963, art 1, § 15 means the same thing in the context of the "multiple punishments" strand of the Double Jeopardy Clause as it does in the context of the "successive prosecutions" strand addressed by the Court in People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). We therefore hold that Blockburger sets forth the proper test to determine when multiple punishments are barred on double jeopardy grounds.

A double-jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo. People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). III.

This provision is "essentially identical" to its federal counterpart, and was intended to be "construed consistently with the corresponding federal provision." People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 575, 594; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). The federal and state double jeopardy provisions protect against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.

"A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo." People v. Nutt, 469 Mich. 565, 573, 677 N.W.2d 1 (2004). Because defendant did not preserve this issue by raising it below, this Court's review is for plain error affecting substantial rights.

punishments for the same offense." Id. at 227, quoting People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). This case involves a "multiple punishments" issue as defendant challenges the court's duplicative sentencing for what he believes was one act.

In other words, a conviction of second-degree home invasion requires proof that the defendant (1) entered a dwelling, either by a breaking or without permission, and (2) intended to commit a larceny in the dwelling. People v Nutt, 469 Mich. 565, 593; 677 N.W.2d 1 (2004).

Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). These guarantees are substantially identical and should be similarly construed.

The elements of receiving or concealing a stolen firearm are "that defendant (1) received, concealed, stored, bartered, sold, disposed of, pledged, or accepted as security for a loan (2) a stolen firearm or stolen ammunition (3) knowing that the firearm or ammunition was stolen." People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 593; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). Here, Detective Sean Soulard testified that LEIN indicated that the firearm found in the duffle bag was stolen, and Eldon Lausch testified that a firearm matching the one recovered from the duffle bag was stolen from his home in August 2013.

This Court reviews de novo questions of constitutional law, such as a challenge premised on the double jeopardy clause. People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). This is the second time that a jury has found Conner guilty of these offenses.

Both the United States and Michigan constitutions protect an individual "from being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense." People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 574; 677 NW2d 1 (2004), citing US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. Double jeopardy doctrine "(1) protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."