People v. Nurse

15 Citing cases

  1. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge

    85 Mich. App. 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 10 times

    Other states have reached conflicting results in analyzing double jeopardy challenges to their versions of a felony-firearm law. Compare Whitton v State, 479 P.2d 302 (Ala, 1970), Roberts v State, 228 Ga. 298; 185 S.E.2d 385 (1971), People v Nurse, 34 Ill. App.3d 42; 339 N.E.2d 328 (1975), and Cole v State, 539 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn Crim App, 1976), with Jones v Commonwealth, 235 S.E.2d 313 (Va, 1977), and State v Saxon, 193 Neb. 278; 226 N.W.2d 765 (1975). There can be no argument but that the Legislature has made its intent clear on the face of the statute.

  2. People v. Castillo

    2021 Ill. App. 2d 190670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill.2d 458, 473 (2006). The issue of compulsion is a question that must be resolved by the trier of fact, as the trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses and weighs their testimony; as a result, "this court will not set aside such a judgment unless the proof is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt." People v. Nurse, 34 Ill.App.3d 42, 46-47 (1975).

  3. People v. Reed

    634 N.E.2d 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    Young was armed with a .38-caliber pistol when he came to defendant's apartment. The State cites People v. Woods (1963), 26 Ill.2d 582, 187 N.E.2d 692, Sanders ( 168 Ill. App.3d 295, 522 N.E.2d 715), People v. Colone (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 1018, 372 N.E.2d 871, and People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 339 N.E.2d 328. The State emphasizes Reed's failure to report the murders to police and his willingness to accept some of one victim's jewelry from Young. Defendant's effort to distinguish Sanders, where the reviewing court upheld the trial court's determination that the State disproved defendant's affirmative defense of compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt from the case at bar is unpersuasive. That case is distinguished by Sanders' active participation in specific acts of violence.

  4. People v. Garcia

    169 Ill. App. 3d 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 16 times
    In Garcia, both the defendant and his brother testified that the victim and others physically struck them on a public way.

    In order for the comments by a judge to constitute reversible error, the defendant must show that the remarks were prejudicial and that he was harmed by them. ( People v. Heidorn (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 933, 937, 449 N.E.2d 568, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 545; People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 47, 339 N.E.2d 328.) A judge in his ruling may express an opinion as to the party's position and the context of such remark is not necessarily prejudicial to the defendant. ( People v. Merz (1984), 122 Ill. App.3d 972, 980, 461 N.E.2d 1380.)

  5. People v. Carrasquilla

    522 N.E.2d 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 11 times
    In Carrasquilla, a police officer testified that the usual and customary cost for the purchase of a gram of cocaine was $100.

    • 10 Reversible error is committed only where it is shown that the judge has made prejudicial statements and defendant can show that he has been harmed by the remarks of the judge. ( People v. Wells (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1077, 1086, 436 N.E.2d 688.) Where the comments by the court do not constitute a material factor in defendant's conviction or do not prejudice the defendant, the verdict will not be disturbed. ( People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 339 N.E.2d 328.) After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly considered the evidence before finding the defendant guilty and that the comments made by the court did not constitute reversible error.

  6. People v. Heidorn

    114 Ill. App. 3d 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 69 times
    Recognizing that a judge has great influence over the jury

    • 7 For comments by a trial judge to constitute reversible error, the defendant must show that the remarks were prejudicial and that he or she was harmed by the comments. ( People v. Wells (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1077, 1086; People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 47; see also People v. Parker (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 597, 605.) This may be shown where the trial court expresses disbelief in the testimony of defense witnesses, confidence in the credibility of prosecution witnesses, or an assumption of the defendant's guilt.

  7. People v. Wells

    106 Ill. App. 3d 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 18 times

    Defendant also argues that during re-cross-examination of Bauer by defense counsel, the judge gave his own version of the witness' testimony and, by so doing, prejudiced defendant and denied him a fair trial. • 7 It is not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to comment or question witnesses during cross-examination where the rulings complained of seek merely to eliminate confusion and curtail repetition. ( People v. Crenshaw (1959), 15 Ill.2d 458, 155 N.E.2d 599, cert. denied (1959), 359 U.S. 997, 3 L.Ed.2d 985, 79 S.Ct. 1133.) While it is the responsibility of the trial judge to remain impartial and to not display prejudice or favor toward any party ( People v. Williams (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 966, 379 N.E.2d 1268), reversible error is committed only where it is shown that the judge has made prejudicial statements, and it is defendant's burden to show that he has been harmed by the remarks of the judge ( People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 339 N.E.2d 328). Defendant asserts there was prejudicial error in a statement made by the judge while defense counsel was attempting to elicit testimony from Bauer regarding the distance from the cash register to the front aisle and the distance he traveled after he was down on the ground.

  8. People v. Levan

    425 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    The State urges that the testimony regarding defendant's defense of compulsion was not credible and that the proof established the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Gray (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 142, 408 N.E.2d 1150; People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 339 N.E.2d 328.) The State claims that since the compulsion statute applies only where the defendant is threatened with the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, the defense is not credible in the instant case because the record supports the State's position that the defendant was not actually threatened with the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm. ( People v. Ricker (1970), 45 Ill.2d 562, 262 N.E.2d 456; People v. Gray; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 7-11.

  9. PEOPLE v. BYER

    75 Ill. App. 3d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 17 times
    Stating purpose of exclusion "is to allow the trier of fact to compare individual and independent accounts of the facts of the case"

    The defense of compulsion is a question of fact which the trier of fact must resolve. ( People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 339 N.E.2d 328.) The trier of fact, in this case the jury, must determine the credibility of witnesses and weigh their testimony.

  10. People v. Williams

    62 Ill. App. 3d 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 27 times
    Finding defendant's sentence excessive in light of his age and environment and reducing the sentence

    People v. Sparks (1972), 9 Ill. App.3d 470, 292 N.E.2d 447. A similar factual situation was presented in People v. Nurse (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 42, 339 N.E.2d 328, wherein the defendant alleged prejudice on the part of the trial judge who had advised the prosecutor to pose questions to the witness in a way to elicit admissible testimony. The court in Nurse held: