Opinion
H049929
04-24-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS ALFONSO CEJA NUNEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 20CR006205
LIE, J.A jury convicted Luis Alfonso Ceja Nunez of aggravated sex crimes against two minors under the age of 14, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 255 years to life plus two years. On appeal, Ceja Nunez argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting expert testimony about common myths and misconceptions surrounding child sexual abuse. We conclude there was no error and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Monterey County District Attorney charged Ceja Nunez with 12 counts of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 as to John Doe from 1996 to 2002 (counts 1-12), and five counts of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 as to Jane Doe from 1995 to 2004 (counts 14-17, 19). (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The information further charged Ceja Nunez with sodomy of a person under 16 as to John Doe (count 13), and aggravated sexual assault of a child as to Jane Doe (count 18). (§§ 286, subd. (b)(2), 261, subd. (a)(2).) The information alleged various aggravated circumstances, including that Ceja Nunez committed the charged offenses against more than one victim and that both victims were under 14 when the offenses took place. (See §§ 667.61, subds. (b)-(e), 1203.066.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The case proceeded to trial in October 2021. John Doe and Jane Doe are siblings. Ceja Nunez married their mother and began living with the family in 1995, when John and Jane were seven and five years of age, respectively. John testified that Ceja Nunez molested him for about seven years, starting when John was eight years old until John went to live with his father. John did not tell his mother about the abuse until he was 18, when he learned that Ceja Nunez had also molested his sister Jane. Several more years passed before John finally reported Ceja Nunez's abuse to police.
Jane testified that Ceja Nunez began molesting her when she was five years old and continued until she was in eighth grade, when Jane's mother left Ceja Nunez due to his infidelity. It was not until Jane was in high school that she told her mother about the molestation. And even then, Jane refused to report Ceja Nunez's crimes to the police, saying that if her mother reported it, Jane would claim her mother was lying. Jane did not speak again about the abuse until the police contacted her in response to John's report.
The defense theory at trial was that the allegations of sexual abuse were the product of the children's false memories. Defense counsel sought to undermine the children's credibility by emphasizing their multiyear delay in reporting the abuse and cross-examining John and Jane about having allowed themselves to be alone with Ceja Nunez for years after the abuse began. Besides the siblings' delayed reporting, defense counsel argued that the lack of objective corroboration and their inability to recall details of some specific incidents of abuse also undermined their credibility. Ceja Nunez testified in his own defense, as did several character witnesses, and defense counsel presented expert testimony on the creation of false memories.
As a part of its case-in-chief, the prosecution presented the testimony of clinical psychologist Blake Carmichael, Ph.D., whom the trial court recognized as an "expert on the psychological effects of child sexual assaults." Carmichael's testimony was admitted over defense objection and with the stipulation that he would not use the words "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome" (CSAAS) while testifying. At the outset, Carmichael clarified that he knew none of the witnesses and had not reviewed police reports or interviewed people involved in the case. Carmichael stated that he could not give an opinion on whether John or Jane had been abused or whether Ceja Nunez committed the charged offenses. Instead, Carmichael explained that he could discuss how children suffering from sexual abuse "may act in ways that are counterintuitive" as compared with common myths, misconceptions, and preconceived notions about how children respond to sexual abuse.
Consistent with language used in California case authority, we refer to Carmichael's testimony as CSAAS evidence or CSAAS testimony in this opinion, despite his abstention from the term CSAAS and certain of the "components" of the syndrome. (See People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 169 (Lapenias) [summarizing the five components of CSAAS].)
Carmichael first testified about delayed disclosure, explaining that it is "not uncommon at all" for children suffering from sexual abuse to not report it immediately. According to Carmichael, "we see extensive delays at times where kids don't talk about what's happened to them for a matter of months or even years." Carmichael next testified about incremental disclosure-the phenomenon where children suffering from sexual abuse "may not share everything to the first person they tell and may tell different things to different people as time passes." Carmichael disputed that children who have been sexually abused will always appear angry or distressed when interacting with their abuser, testifying that some sexually abused children will "seek out contact with the perpetrator" because they enjoy other aspects of the relationship. He stated another common misconception is that people around children will always be able to tell when they are being sexually abused. Finally, Carmichael testified that "chronic repeated sexual abuse" may induce "disassociation" by which abused children may distance themselves from or "tune out" the immediate experience of abuse and therefore have trouble recalling the peripheral details of the abusive incident.
The jury found Ceja Nunez guilty as charged. The trial court thereafter sentenced him to a total term of 255 years to life plus two years. Ceja Nunez timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony on CSAAS. Even if a jury is not" 'wholly ignorant'" of the expert's subject," 'expert opinion may be admitted whenever it would "assist" the jury. It will be excluded only when it would add nothing at all to the jury's common fund of information.'" (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299-1300 (McAlpin).) Ceja Nunez establishes no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the evidence was relevant and a proper subject of expert opinion.
Ceja Nunez first argues that the trial court should have excluded Carmichael's testimony under Evidence Code section 403, because the prosecution failed to present sufficient facts to show "that jurors harbored . . . myths and/or misconceptions" surrounding child sexual abuse and did not "identify with any particularity whatsoever what myths or misconceptions the expert evidence was intended to dispel." But the prosecution need not "expressly state on the record the evidence which is inconsistent with the finding of molestation. It is sufficient if the victim's credibility is placed in issue due to the paradoxical behavior, including a delay in reporting a molestation." (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745.)
The credibility of John and Jane was squarely in dispute. Defense counsel cross-examined both about their multiyear delay in reporting the abuse to their mother and their still longer delay in reporting the abuse to police. Defense counsel elicited testimony from John that he allowed himself to be alone with Ceja Nunez and voluntarily went to him when Ceja Nunez "signal[ed]" him with his eyes. Defense counsel elicited Jane's testimony that she continued to go alone with Ceja Nunez to sell tamales after he began sexually abusing her. In closing argument, counsel pointed to purported gaps, vagueness, and inconsistencies in the siblings' testimony and urged the jury to find their accounts of sexual abuse to be "false memories" that the siblings "convinced each other" were true.
Ceja Nunez next argues that, even if relevant, the psychological effects of child sexual abuse are not "sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact." (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) But implicit in the defense trial theory was the premise that a true child victim of sexual abuse would have promptly reported the crime, actively resisted any relationship with the abuser, and would give a wholly consistent report of the abuse over time-i.e., an appeal to the same common perception that Carmichael's testimony would rebut.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's implicit determination that the various effects of child sexual abuse do not qualify as a matter of "common knowledge." Although knowledge about child sexual abuse may be more widespread than before, and a trial court might in certain circumstances exercise its broad discretion to exclude even relevant testimony under Evidence Code section 352, the defense challenge to John and Jane's credibility made Carmichael's testimony relevant. (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 171 [observing that the relevance of CSAAS evidence in evaluating the credibility of a child victim "is well established"].)
Carmichael's experience in the field enabled him to provide the jury a framework to assess the testimony of John and Jane. While defense counsel argued that the children's behavior from the time of the incidents indicated that no abuse had occurred, Carmichael's testimony supplied an alternative lens through which to view their behavior. (See People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394 [CSAAS-type evidence admissible to show that "victim's reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested"].) Carmichael stayed within permissible parameters, stating from the start that he had no basis to opine on the facts of the case. (Ibid. ["jury must be instructed simply and directly that the expert's testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim's molestation claim is true"].) The sole function of Carmichael's testimony was to assist the jury in understanding" 'the emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly self-impeaching behavior,'" and the testimony was appropriately limited to that purpose. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1301.)
In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that Carmichael's expert testimony was not evidence that Ceja Nunez had committed any of the charged offenses.
On this record, where Ceja Nunez's defense challenged the credibility of John and Jane based on the very features of CSAAS that Carmichael was able to address, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert's testimony.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR GROVER, ACTING P. J. BROMBERG, J.