Opinion
SC 162372 COA 349035
12-29-2022
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN CARLOS NUNEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Ottawa CC: 97-021297-FC
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch, Justices
ORDER
By order of September 22, 2021, the application for leave to appeal the October 22, 2020 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in People v Taylor (Docket No. 154994). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on July 28, 2022, 510 Mich___ (2022), the application is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals judgment addressing the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion under MCL 769.25, we VACATE the sentence of the Ottawa Circuit Court, and we REMAND this case to the trial court for resentencing. A court may not impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of his crime unless the prosecution has overcome its burden to rebut the presumption, by clear and convincing evidence, that life without parole is a disproportionate sentence. Taylor, supra. Because the sentencing court in this case did not apply the "clear and convincing" standard, the defendant is entitled to resentencing. Id. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
VIVIANO, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For the reasons stated in my dissent in People v Taylor, 510 Mich___ (2022) (Docket No. 154994), I do not believe there is a presumption that life without parole is a disproportionate sentence or that the prosecution is required to rebut this presumption in order for a court to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time of his crime. I respectfully dissent from the order vacating in part the Court of Appeals' judgment, vacating defendant's sentence, and remanding for resentencing; I concur in the denial of leave in all other respects.