Opinion
03-17-2016
TERRAPIN INDUSTRIES, LLC, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. The BANK OF NEW YORK, etc., Defendant–Appellant.
Akerman LLP, New York (Jordan M. Smith of counsel), for appellant. Goldberg Weprin Finkel Goldstein LLP, New York (Matthew Hearle of counsel), for respondent.
Akerman LLP, New York (Jordan M. Smith of counsel), for appellant.Goldberg Weprin Finkel Goldstein LLP, New York (Matthew Hearle of counsel), for respondent.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., ANDRIAS, SAXE, KAPNICK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan M. Kenney, J.), entered May 29, 2015, which denied defendant's motion seeking to vacate a default judgment and dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the default judgment vacated, and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff, a limited liability company whose managing member is Colin D. Rath, was granted a default judgment on its action to discharge and cancel a mortgage concerning property located at 121 West 15th St., New York, New York. Defendant, the holder of the mortgage, moved to vacate the default judgment.
To vacate a default, a party must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse and the existence of a meritorious defense; "certain law office failures may constitute reasonable excuses" (Mutual Mar. Off., Inc. v. Joy Constr. Corp., 39 A.D.3d 417, 419, 835 N.Y.S.2d 88 [1st Dept.2007] ). Defendant, through an affidavit of a person with personal knowledge, established that the delay in responding was due to clerical oversight. Since plaintiff suffered no prejudice and there is no evidence of willfulness, defendant established a reasonable excuse for its delay (see Marine v. Montefiore Health Sys., Inc., 129 A.D.3d 428, 9 N.Y.S.3d 580 [1st Dept.2015] ; Mutual Mar. Off., Inc., at 419, 835 N.Y.S.2d 88 ).
Defendant also presented a meritorious defense through documents establishing that plaintiff had transferred the property at issue, along with the mortgage at issue, to Mr. Rath and his wife in 2007, and therefore had no standing to bring the action to discharge the mortgage (see Aerovias De Mexico, S.A. De C.V. v. Malerba, Downes & Frankel, 265 A.D.2d 214, 696 N.Y.S.2d 153 [1st Dept.1999] ; Guccione v. Estate of Guccione, 84 A.D.3d 867, 869–870, 923 N.Y.S.2d 591 [2d Dept.2011] ; Albino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 78 A.D.3d 485, 490, 912 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept.2010], citing Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 713–14, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ).