Opinion
G028842.
10-28-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NICHOLAS GUTIERREZ NOVELO, Defendant and Appellant.
Howard C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster and Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Nicholas Gutierrez Novelo of second degree murder and found true an allegation he personally used a knife. The court sentenced him to serve 16 years to life in prison.
Defendant contends the court improperly excluded evidence, committed several instructional errors, and did not properly consider his motion for a reduction of the verdict to manslaughter. He also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that cumulative error mandates reversal of the judgment. None of these contentions has merit and we affirm.
I
FACTS
We present the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment in accord with established rules of appellate review. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh (1913) 166 Cal. 140, 142-143.)
About 6:30 p.m. on February 16, 1999, Santa Ana Police Officer Robert Faster was dispatched to investigate a report of an injured man. Faster responded to the indicated area and discovered Moreno lying on a sidewalk. Faster noticed several puncture wounds in Morenos back and Moreno appeared to be covered in blood. Faster asked Moreno for the location of other injuries. Moreno tilted his head back to reveal a very large cut underneath his neck. The cut extended from one side of his neck to the other. Moreno told Faster "Nick" had stabbed him and the attack occurred across the street.
Faster followed a blood trail to the apartment defendant shared with his father, Walter Novelo. Walter, who had just returned to the apartment, opened the front door for the officer. The officer immediately noticed blood on the white tile in the entryway. Faster and another officer proceeded to defendants bedroom. Defendant opened the door after several knocks on the door. Once inside the bedroom, Faster saw blood on the floor, walls, and bed. Defendant was attempting to bandage his right hand. Faster later determined defendant had suffered a serious cut in the web of his hand.
Moreno died a short time later. He had a total of 14 stab wounds: six wounds in the back, three of those being deep wounds that pierced his spleen, bowel, diaphragm, and left kidney; three deep wounds to his left upper arm; and one stab wound in the right cheek. There was a long cut on his neck, but this wound did not penetrate a major artery or vein. He also had superficial, perhaps defensive, wounds on his chest and hands. Officers discovered a small kitchen knife with a three-inch blade in the back pocket of Morenos pants.
The blood stains found in defendants home and on his person and clothing belonged came from Moreno. Defendants blood was found on the kitchen sink. A large, 13-inch knife with an 8-inch blade was found between defendants mattress and box springs. Bloodstains on this knife were tested and proved to be from Moreno and defendant. Only Morenos blood was found on the small knife in his back pocket.
The prosecution proceeded on a first degree murder theory. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence defendant met Moreno in the Orange County jail in 1998. On the day of the stabbing, they had gone together to Teresa Gonzalezs, Morenos sister-in-law, home in Santa Ana. Gonzalez was not home, but her roommates, Almira DeCastro and Nicole Ortiz were. DeCastro testified that defendant seemed angry and tense and may have been "on something." He grabbed Ortiz by arm. Later, DeCastro heard defendant ask Moreno when Gonzalez would be home. He angrily demanded to know exactly when she would be home and said he wanted to buy a "dime."
Moreno got upset, but tried to calm defendant. He suggested defendant have a beer and assured defendant Gonzalez would be home soon. Defendant watched television for a few minutes with the occupants of the home before deciding to leave. Moreno followed him outside, but came back inside the house in a few minutes. He seemed worried and anxious and asked Ortiz for a knife. She complied and Moreno and defendant left after approximately 45 minutes.
Gonzalez arrived home just as Moreno and defendant walked outside. Gonzalez agreed to give them a ride. During the journey, defendant swore at Gonzalez and complained about her driving. Moreno told defendant to stop yelling. When Gonzalez missed a turn, defendant said, "You passed it you stupid idiot. You were supposed to make a right, you were supposed to make a left." He also screamed, "Doesnt this stupid idiot know where we were going, doesnt she know the way?" Gonzalez dropped Moreno and defendant in an alley. Moreno seemed concerned, but not angry, and followed defendant into the alley. Gonzalez drove away.
Sometime later, Moreno asked a passerby for help. The man said he would help Moreno, who had difficulty walking and appeared to be covered in blood. Approximately 20 minutes later, Faster arrived at the scene.
Moreno, who was then 27 years old, five feet nine inches tall and weighed 282 pounds, had a blood alcohol level of between . 13 and .14 and "high therapeutic to toxic levels" of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in his system at the time of his death. Morenos wife testified that her husband was an infrequent, passive drinker.
Defendant, then 19 years old, approximately six feet tall and weighing 175 pounds, testified that he and Moreno met in the Orange County jail in 1998 following defendants conviction for automobile burglary and attempted theft. Occasionally, Moreno would suggest the two get together and "party." On February 16, defendant agreed to come to Morenos house. They drank some beer. Defendant thought Moreno was "a little pumped up, a little anxious." They moved the party to defendants house and spent most of the afternoon, drinking tequila, listening to music, and playing dominos. At some point, they moved to another house at Morenos suggestion. They sat in the kitchen and talked to some women. They drank another beer. Defendant, who wanted to leave and may have cursed at the women, could not recall saying anything about buying a "dime."
They waited for Morenos relative to come home and give them a ride. During the wait, defendant became agitated. He was still agitated during the ride and may have lost his temper. He was dropped at his home, but left again and may have gone to a nearby park, but he could not remember. All he wanted to do was get away from Moreno.
When defendant returned home approximately two hours later, Moreno was waiting for him. Moreno wanted to continue the festivities, but defendant said he had to work the next day. Moreno forced his way inside defendants home. He followed defendant to his bedroom. When defendant tried to get Moreno to leave his home, Moreno lunged at him and tried to hit him. Defendant struggled with Moreno, a much larger man, and Moreno grabbed a small knife. Defendant grabbed the large knife he kept in his room for protection from burglars. Moreno picked up the bar from defendants weight lifting bench, and defendant again told him to leave. Another struggle ensued. Defendant did not know if Moreno was trying to kill him or not, but Moreno tried to stab him and grabbed him in a bear hug.
Defendant did not admit stabbing Moreno, but stated he may have pushed him away with the knife. Moreno finally left and defendant locked the front door. He replaced the knife between the mattress and box springs and bandaged his hand. He took off his bloody shirt and put his shoes in the closet. He was just trying to understand what had happened when the police arrived.
Walter testified that Moreno and defendant spent the afternoon drinking tequila and beer and playing dominos at his home. Moreno left for a while, but returned later. Defendant was not home and Walter asked Moreno to wait for him inside. Moreno stated he would wait in the alley across the street and Walter left for an appointment. He returned from his appointment to discover police activity, an injured man in the street, and police officers waiting to greet him.
A defense expert and clinical psychologist testified about the flight or fight reaction associated with acute stress disorder. In his opinion, it would not be unusual for a person experiencing a sudden stressful situation to react and then not be able to recall details about the event later. It would also not be unusual for someone who had been attacked in his home to not immediately call the police.
The prosecution argued defendant committed premeditated and deliberate first degree murder because his desire to purchase methamphetamine had been thwarted. The court gave instructions on first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. The court also gave an instruction on voluntary intoxication and numerous instructions on self-defense.
II
DISCUSSION
Evidentiary error
During Walters testimony, the defense attorney posed the following question: "And as they took [defendant] out, did he say anything to you?" The prosecution objected on hearsay grounds and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel replied, "Your honor, it goes to state of mind." The court called for a discussion outside the presence of the jury, but indicated that the statement seemed to be inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1220.[]
Evidence Code section 1220 provides, "Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether the statement was made in his individual or representative capacity."
During the sidebar discussion, counsel again reiterated his belief that the statement was admissible as state of mind, "under [Evidence Code sections] 1250 or 1251 . . . ."[] The court stated, "No, any self-serving statement under those circumstances would be state of mind, so, no, it is not admissible under [Evidence Code section] 1220."
Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a) provides, "Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the declarants then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: [¶] (1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarants state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. [¶] (b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed."
Evidence Code section 1251 provides, "Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the declarants state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) at a time prior to the statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶] (a) The declarant is unavailable as a witness; and [¶] (b) The evidence is offered to prove such prior state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation when it is itself an issue in the action and the evidence is not offered to prove any fact other than such state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation."
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by excluding evidence of defendants out-of-court statement proclaiming his act as one of self-defense. He argues, " . . . given the relevance of a defendants state of mind in distinguishing between murder and voluntary manslaughter, Mr. Novelos statement should have been, at a minimum, admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that he had believed he needed to defend himself. . . . as circumstantial evidence of the crucial fact that Mr. Novelo believed he had acted in self-defense." He further contends, "[c]onsidering the guilty verdict, the jury must have doubted the credibility of Mr. Novelos story. . . . If they heard the evidence of his state of mind expressed minutes after the altercation, there is a reasonable chance that the jury would have found that he honestly believed he needed to defend himself and reached a different verdict."
The Attorney General does not defend the courts ruling, but contends defendant did not rely on the argument put forth on appeal and has therefore waived the issue. Not so. State of mind was argued at trial and is argued on appeal, albeit a little more completely on appeal. The Attorney General then contends the courts ruling was proper under Evidence Code section 1252,[] or that it impliedly found the probative value of defendants statement outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 352. Lastly, the Attorney General contends any error was harmless because there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable result in the absence of the error.
Evidence Code section 1252 provides, "Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this article if the statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness."
Regardless of the correctness of the trial courts ruling, our review is governed by Evidence Code section 354, which provides: "A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice . . . ." Although the complete exclusion of evidence intended to establish an accuseds defense may impair his or her right to due process of law, the exclusion of defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not interfere with that constitutional right." (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103.)
The exclusion of a single statement, in light of defendants trial testimony and the testimony of other defense witnesses, does not rise to the level of a miscarriage of justice. The jury understood defendants self-defense claim. Defendant took the stand to prove it. Of course, the jury also knew defendant had pleaded guilty to automobile burglary and attempted theft. Defendants fathers testimony regarding a statement consistent with self-defense made near the time of the stabbing would have added little to defendants credibility. Further, during argument, the prosecutor focused on the discrepancies between defendants testimony and the evidence, and the inherent improbability of the sequence of events he described. She did not argue defendant recently fabricated his self-defense story. We find no basis for reversal.
Our conclusion defeats defendants alternate claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to get this statement admitted. Assuming error, defendant has failed to establish prejudice. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) There is simply no evidence to support the assumption that admission of defendants single statement to his father would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 389.) Moreno suffered 14 stab wounds, his back being the primary target. His neck had been slit from ear to ear. Granted, Moreno was the larger individual, but the nature and locations of his wounds, juxtaposed against the relatively minor injuries defendant suffered, support the judgment not defendants self-defense claim.
Instructional error
Defendant contends the court made numerous instructional errors. In general, "A court must instruct sua sponte on general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the facts presented at trial." (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 90.) The correctness of jury instructions "is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction. [Citations.]" (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753.) While it is the courts duty to give instructions on the general principles of law involved, it is the defendants responsibility to request instructions that "pinpoint" a theory of the defense. (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119) In light of the whole charge, the instructions were correct and adequate.
a. CALJIC No. 2.02
Defendant first contends the version of CALJIC No. 2.02 given by the court omitted a crucial paragraph contained in CALJIC No. 2.01. He did not object and request a pinpoint instruction addressing the issue at trial. Generally, this omission constitutes a waiver of the issue for appeal. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495.) Nevertheless, to stave off the inevitable ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we address the merits. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 693.)
CALJIC No. 2.02, as given to the jury, provides, "The specific intent and/or mental state with which an act is done may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act. [¶] However, you may not find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in count 1, murder, or the crime of voluntary manslaughter, which is a lesser crime, unless the proved circumstances are not only, consistent with the theory that the defendant had the required specific intent or mental state, but two cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. [¶] Also, if the evidence as to any specific intent or mental state permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the existence of the specific intent or mental state, and the other to its absence, you must adopt that interpretation which points to its absence."
The crucial paragraph from CALJIC No. 2.01 provides, "Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendants guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which the inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." This paragraph, which defendant now finds critical to his case, was not included in CALJIC No. 2.02, but it was given to the jury in the form of CALJIC No. 2.01. Further, in addition to CALJIC No. 2.01, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.90, the standard reasonable doubt instruction.
Our duty is to consider the whole charge and determine "`"whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violates the Constitution. [Citations.]" (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1013, quoting Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72.) Defendants assertion the jury decided his mental state on circumstantial evidence not proved beyond a reasonable doubt is unsupported by the record and speculative at best. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied CALJIC No. 2.02 and applied a different standard of proof to evidence of defendants mens rea as opposed to his identity.
b. CALJIC Nos. 5.54 and 5.55
The prosecution requested CALJIC Nos. 5.54, 5.55, and 5.56 and defendant did not object to them at trial. On appeal, the defendant claims this court may review the issue regardless of his failure to object because his "substantial rights were affected." (Pen. Code, § 1259.) In the alternative, he contends he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The gist of his theory is that the instructions were unnecessary, unsupported by the evidence, and prejudicial.
Within the concept of self-defense, there is the rule that an aggressor who uses deadly force must "`not only endeavor to really and in good faith withdraw from the combat, but he must make known his intentions to his adversary. [Citation.]" (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-365.) This is the essence of CALJIC No. 5.54. The instruction is proper if the original aggressor employs deadly force, but erroneous as applied to an aggressor who uses only nondeadly. (People v. Crandel, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 871, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365.) The difference is the duty to communicate the intention to withdraw.
The identity of the initial aggressor, assuming there was a struggle before defendant stabbed Moreno, is susceptible of two interpretations. If defendant is believed, Moreno was the initial aggressor. If the prosecutions circumstantial evidence is considered, it is likely defendant was the initial aggressor, who employed deadly force. Under these circumstances the instruction is properly given. (People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 872, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365.) Further, we discern no prejudice since the instruction permitted the jury to consider defendants self-defense claim even assuming it believed he was the initial aggressor. There is no evidence the jury focused on this instruction to defendants detriment.
CALJIC No. 5.55 provides, "A plea of self-defense is not available to a person who seeks a quarrel with the intent to create a real or apparent necessity of exercising self defense." The Attorney General counters the evidence of defendants ill temper prior to the fight supports giving the instruction. But assuming the instruction was unwarranted, defendant suffered no prejudice. We agree with the latter proposition.
The court gave CALJIC Nos. 5.12, 5.15, 5.17, 5.42, 5.43, 5.44, 5.50, 5.51, 5.52, 5.53, 5.54, 5.55, and 5.56 on various aspects of self-defense. In the veritable sea of self-defense instructions given the jury it is not reasonably probable the jury focused on this particular instruction to the defendants detriment. The jury heard the evidence, including evidence that Moreno was stabbed multiple times with a large knife, and concluded defendant did not act in self-defense. As the court in Crandell noted, "we are confident the jury was not sidetracked by the correct but irrelevant instruction, which did not figure in the closing arguments, and we conclude that the giving of the instruction was harmless error. [Citations.]" (People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 872-873 disapproved on other grounds in People v. Crayton, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 364-365.) True, the prosecutor did ask the jury to "figure it out," but that is the jurys duty in every case. (CALJIC No. 1.00) There is nothing remarkable about the prosecutors argument, and nothing suggests the jury misapplied the instructions given it.
c. CALJIC No. 5.56
Pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.56, the court instructed the jury as follows: "The right of self defense is only available to a person who engages in mutual combat if he has done all the following: [¶] One. He has actually tried, in good faith, to refuse to continue fighting. [¶] Two. He has clearly informed his opponent that he wants to stop fighting. [¶] Three. He has clearly informed his opponent that he has stopped fighting. [¶] And, four. He has given his opponent the opportunity to stop fighting. [¶] After he has done these four things, he has the right to self-defense if his opponent continues to fight."
Defendant asserts the trial court committed prejudicial error giving this instruction and, by implication, that his counsel performed inadequately by failing to object. He asserts, "the instruction could have led the jury to believe that the altercation in [defendants] room constituted `mutual combat, which, according to CALJIC No. 5.56, makes a self-defense justification valid only if a defendant clearly sought to stop fighting." He also complains the court erroneously neglected to define "mutual combat."
The latter contention is meritless. "A court has no sua sponte duty to define terms that are commonly understood by those familiar with the English language, but it does have a duty to define terms that have a technical meaning peculiar to the law. [Citations.]" (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 334.) There is nothing technical about the term mutual combat, and no indication the jury had any trouble understanding the term, assuming it applied the instruction.
Once again, defendant speculates that the jury misapplied a single instruction given it. The Attorney General concedes there was no evidence to support giving the instruction. However, even the giving of an irrelevant instruction may be harmless, if we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the courts error did not contribute to the verdict. (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 504.) Our faith in the verdict is not shaken by this particular error, and it is virtually certain the jury did not reject defendants self-defense argument solely because it concluded he was involved in mutual combat.
d. CALJIC No. 8.56
Finally, defendant contends the court erroneously gave CALJIC No. 8.56. The court instructed the jury as follows: It is not a defense to a criminal charge that the deceased or some other person was guilty of negligence, which was a contributory cause of the death involved in the case." The prosecutor stated, "I guess, with a guy that [Moreno] knows is agitated, they may have thought he put himself in that position." Defense counsel replied, "I wouldnt consider drinking negligence," but did not object to the courts giving the instruction. On appeal, defendant contends CALJIC No. 8.56 was not relevant. He further contends the instruction as given was inadequate because "contributory cause" was not separately defined. Assuming error, we find no basis for reversal.
Once again, defendant assumes prejudice where none is apparent. While the instruction was not necessary, it did not preclude, as defendant suggests, the jurys consideration of either perfect or imperfect self-defense. The mental state required for murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter was explained under other properly given instructions. (CALJIC Nos. 3.31, 3.31.5, 3.30, 8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 8.30, 8.31, 8.37, 8.42, 8.43, 8.44, 8.45.) In addition, the court gave CALJIC Nos. 4.21.1 and 4.22 explaining the extent to which the jury could consider voluntary intoxication in considering the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. In view of the whole charge given to the jury, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, we disagree that the courts failure to give CALJIC No. 17.31, the standard instruction directing the jury to disregard irrelevant instructions, in conjunction with giving other inappropriate instructions constituted error. Apparently, the prosecutor requested CALJIC No. 17.31, but the parties never discussed the instruction, and the court simply failed to include it. Assuming the omission amounted to error, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the courts failure to give a standard instruction on irrelevant instructions did not contribute to the verdict. (People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 504.)
Prosecutorial misconduct
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal argument by misstating the law regarding expert testimony. Specifically, he takes issue with the prosecutors statement that the jury could "totally disregard" his experts testimony. There was no objection at trial. "`As a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion — and on the same ground — the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. [Citation.] [Citation.]" (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.) A defendant may be excused from a failure to object and request for a curative admonition if (1) such an objection and request would have been futile, (2) an objection was made without opportunity to request a curative admonition, or (3) a timely admonition would not have cured the harm. (Ibid.) None of these circumstances is present here. Therefore, the issue has not been preserved for appeal.
Nevertheless, we find no error. To evaluate a claim of prosecutorial misconduct it is important to first place the prosecutors remarks in context. (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 534.) Taken in the context of the prosecutors entire argument concerning the value of expert testimony, this single statement did not constitute a misstatement of law. Further, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.80, the standard instruction on expert testimony. This instruction told the jury, "You are not bound by opinion. Give each opinion the weight you find it deserves. You may disregard any opinion if you fid it to be unreasonable." The prosecutors statement is but a short-form, albeit without any reference to the reasonableness of the experts opinion, of the jury instruction.
Sentencing
At the sentencing hearing, defendant moved, pursuant to Penal Code section 1181, to reduce the verdict from second degree murder to manslaughter. The court summarily denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contends, "The court did not demonstrate any independent weighing of the evidence and did not expressly rule on the motion." True, the court merely stated, "All right. Thank you." However, it proceeded immediately to sentencing for second degree murder. By implication, the court denied the motion.
Further, our review of this implied ruling is limited: the trial courts ruling will not be disturbed "`absent a manifest and unmistakable abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] [Citation.]" (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 364.) None is apparent here. The jury found defendant intentionally stabbed Moreno with malice aforethought. It simply rejected defendants explanation of events, and sufficient facts support its decision. Defendant had been agitated and hostile for several hours. He may have been unsuccessful in an attempt to purchase methamphetamine. While in his own home, he pulled a 13-inch knife and inflicted 14 serious stab wounds before deciding to call out or ask anyone for help. Afterwards, he put his bloody shoes and clothing away, and replaced the large blood stained carving knife under his mattress. There was no abuse of discretion.
Cumulative error
Defendant contends cumulative error mandates reversal of the judgment. We have individually considered each claim of error. We have either found no error, or no prejudice as a result of error. The few errors that occurred were harmless under any standard, whether considered individually or collectively. We find no deprivation of rights guaranteed under either the state or federal Constitutions. "Defendant was entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. [Citation.]" (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214.) He received a fair trial.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J. and OLEARY, J.