Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCD210016, Cynthia Bashant, Judge.
McINTYRE, J.
Marc Alden Northcutt appeals a judgment entered on his conviction of owning and operating a chop shop, unlawfully driving and taking a vehicle and receiving stolen property. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the defense of temporary possession for purposes of disposal. We find his argument unavailing and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2007, San Diego County Sheriff's Detective James Cady went to Northcutt's home after being informed that there might be a stolen vehicle on the premises. (All further dates are in 2007 except as otherwise noted.) From the street, Cady could see a largely disassembled green Honda Prelude in the driveway; after going up to the house, making contact with Northcutt and obtaining his consent, Cady examined the Prelude and saw that it had been "completely gutted." The trunk lid of the car had been removed and was sitting against a tree; it had a license plate other than the one for which the Prelude was registered.
After doing a record check, Cady discovered that the Prelude belonged to Jose Medellin, who had reported the car stolen in late February. When confronted with this information, Northcutt denied knowing that the car was stolen. After Cady arrested him, Northcutt claimed that the Prelude had been left behind by a woman named Cheryl who had stayed at his house one night a few months earlier. He also said that he had no way to contact Cheryl, so he eventually dismantled the car and sold its parts. Before leaving the property, Cady saw the gutted shell of another car, a Honda Accord, in the backyard. Northcutt was later released without charges being filed.
In November, Cady went to Northcutt's neighborhood to conduct another surveillance of Northcutt's house. As he was driving toward the property, Cady saw a white Nissan pickup truck parked in Northcutt's driveway. Cady ran a check on the white pickup's license plate number and determined that the car had been reported stolen by its owner a month earlier. While he was still surveilling the property from the street, another man (Keo Kamakea) drove up in a maroon Nissan pickup truck and parked on the street in front of Northcutt's home. Cady discovered that the maroon pickup had also been reported stolen by its owner, earlier that day.
Cady approached the house and walked over to the open garage, where Northcutt, Kamakea and a third man, Armando Martinez, were standing. Cady talked to Northcutt, who claimed that he was unaware the white pickup was stolen. Cady inspected the white pickup and discovered that its vehicle identification number (VIN) plate had been removed; a blank piece of metal similar to that used for VIN plates was underneath the car. The car's stereo was also missing and the key in the ignition could not be used to open its doors. Northcutt told Cady that he had driven the white pickup, but only on the property.
In January 2008, Northcutt was charged with owning and operating a chop shop and receiving a stolen vehicle (the Prelude) in July and unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle and receiving a stolen vehicle (both relating to the white Nissan pickup) in November. (None of the charges related to the Honda Accord or the maroon Nissan pickup.) Prior to trial, the prosecutor moved to admit evidence of Northcutt's statements to Cady and the court granted that motion.
At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of the foregoing and that the vehicles had been stolen from their rightful owners. In addition to testifying about the underlying facts, Cady testified regarding typical chop shops and their usual practices of using shaved keys and stolen license plates, dismantling stolen cars and selling the parts and VINs from those cars to third parties, particularly those who race cars.
Northcutt testified in his own defense, contending that, after losing his job, he resumed his prior methamphetamine habit and began allowing other addicts to stay on his property; he contended that these people frequently brought belongings with them when they arrived, but left those items behind when they departed. He specifically testified that the Honda Accord car sat on his property for two years, until he decided to cut the car up for salvage after his home was foreclosed on and he received a notice evicting him from the premises. He also reiterated his statements to Detective Cady that Cheryl had left the Prelude there.
Northcutt further testified that Kamakea had driven the white pickup to his house and originally told him that the car belonged to Kamakea's cousin, but that on the very morning of the day Cady came to his house in November, Kamakea admitted to him that both the white and the maroon pickups were stolen, at which point he told Kamakea that the pickups had to be removed from the property. He denied running a chop shop, but admitted that he had driven the white pickup truck after being told by Kamakea that the car was stolen, but only for the purpose of getting it off of the property.
The jury convicted Northcutt of owning and operating a chop shop, unlawfully driving and taking a vehicle and receiving stolen property. The court sentenced Northcutt to 180 days' local time, with 3 years' formal probation, subject to various conditions, including that Northcutt participate in drug treatment. The court also imposed certain fines and ordered restitution.
DISCUSSION
Even in the absence of a formal request, a trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744.) Thus, the court must instruct its jury on all of the elements of the charged offenses (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1311) and any defenses that are supported by substantial evidence and that are not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047.) In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the evidence, only whether there is evidence that, if believed by the jury, would support the instruction. (See People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
Northcutt contends that, in light of his trial testimony that he drove the white Nissan pickup for the sole purpose of getting it off of his property, the court was required to instruct the jury regarding the momentary possession defense recognized in People v. Mijares (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415. In that opinion, the California Supreme Court held that a person who establishes that his or her brief possession of illegal drugs for the sole purpose of immediately disposing of them has a complete defense to a charge of unlawfully possessing those drugs. (Id. at pp. 420-422; see also People v. Brown (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 736, 738- 740; People v. Frazier (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1310.) This momentary possession defense is based on considerations of public policy of encouraging disposal rather than retention of dangerous items, such as controlled substances and firearms. (People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1190-1191.)
Northcutt essentially acknowledges that there is no existing case applying the momentary possession defense under circumstances like those presented here, but argues that policy considerations support the recognition of a "momentary driving defense" to a driving a stolen car charge. We disagree.
Accepting Northcutt's trial testimony on its face (notwithstanding that it was not entirely consistent on this point), the circumstances of this case do not support the application of a momentary possession defense here. The simple reason for this is that, unlike illicit drugs or weapons, a car is not considered to be a dangerous item. As a result, public policy considerations would not be promoted by encouraging disposal of a vehicle, particularly where, as here, the person driving it did so to avoid his own criminal liability, not to protect the public. (People v. Mijares, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 422 [emphasizing that the defense "in no way insulates from prosecution under the narcotics laws those individuals who, fearing they are about to be apprehended, remove contraband from their immediate possession"]; see also People v. Brown, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 736 [concluding that public policy considerations did not support the application of the momentary possession defense to a prison inmate who said he found a weapon on the floor and was taking it to an outside toilet to dispose of it, because the inmate could have simply reported the existence of the weapon to a guard without ever handling it].) The trial court thus did not err in failing to give a momentary possession defense instruction to the jury.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P.J., NARES, J.