Opinion
February 22, 1993
Appeal from the County Court, Suffolk County (Vaughn, J.).
Ordered that the amended judgment is reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and a new hearing is ordered. The facts have been considered and are determined to have been established.
The defendant's contention that the People failed to prove he violated the conditions of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence is without merit. The hearing court fully credited the probation officer's testimony that the defendant had missed numerous appointments and had failed to report for urine analysis on February 11, 1991. This testimony alone was sufficient to support the finding that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation (see, People v Mitchell, 184 A.D.2d 737).
We find, however, that reversal is warranted based upon the court's failure to grant the defendant's request for an adjournment. It is well established that the decision as to whether to grant or to refuse an adjournment is ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, People v Brown, 177 A.D.2d 584). However, an abuse or improvident exercise of discretion may occur where the refusal to grant an adjournment results in the deprivation of a defendant's fundamental right to confer with counsel (see, People v Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698).
In the instant case, the attorney assigned to the defendant's case was out of State and would not return until February 14, 1992. Accordingly, the associate who appeared in court on February 5, 1992, requested an adjournment until the attorney assigned to the case returned. The associate unequivocally stated that the defense counsel's file indicated that the case was on for a conference and that he was not prepared to go forward with a hearing. The associate further advised the court that no one in the office had had an opportunity to discuss the case with the defendant (who had been arraigned just a few days earlier on January 31, 1992) and that the defendant was not prepared to defend himself at the hearing. The defendant himself also indicated that he had not had time to prepare. The court responded that the case was scheduled for a violation of probation hearing and that it intended to proceed. We find that the court's refusal to grant an adjournment under the circumstances herein implicated the defendant's fundamental right to effectively confer with counsel (see, People v Spears, supra; N Y Const, art I, § 6; see also, People v Speller, 133 A.D.2d 865), and constituted an improvident exercise of discretion. Even if the associate from the defense counsel's office was mistaken and the case was actually scheduled for a hearing, it was clearly apparent that neither he nor the defendant was ready to proceed. Under these circumstances, the inconvenience that would have resulted from a short adjournment did not outweigh the prejudice suffered by the defendant.
In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the defendant's remaining contention. Thompson, J.P., Balletta, Rosenblatt and Eiber, JJ., concur.