People v. Nolan

3 Citing cases

  1. People v. Neumann

    148 Ill. App. 3d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 39 times
    In State v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 101 Ill.Dec. 899, 499 N.E.2d 487 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051, 107 S.Ct. 2184, 95 L.Ed.2d 840 (1987), the court held that a criminal record does not disqualify a person from testifying; it merely goes to his credibility.

    We find no error in the court's determination. (See, e.g., People v. Nolan (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 895, 430 N.E.2d 345; People v. Terlikowski (1967), 83 Ill. App.2d 307, 227 N.E.2d 521.) Indeed, the fact that defendant was accompanied by Federal marshals each time he visited the circuit court of Cook County and was returned to the Metropolitan Correctional Center is evidence that he was not even in temporary custody of this State but remained in Federal custody. ( People v. Dye (1977), 69 Ill.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630.) We further find no indication in the record of any voluntary relinquishment of custody by the Federal authorities to support defendant's citations of authority.

  2. United States ex Rel. Fitzgerald v. Jordan

    747 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1985)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that a delay of 8 months is enough to provoke a speedy trial inquiry

    See People ex rel. Davis v. Vazquez, 92 Ill.2d 132, 65 Ill.Dec. 262, 441 N.E.2d 54 (1982); People v. Edwards, 105 Ill.App.3d 822, 61 Ill.Dec. 582, 434 N.E.2d 1179 (1982) (in passing, the appellate court noted that the crimes involved in this case, attempted murder and solicitation to murder, were sufficient enough to constitute compelling reasons. Id. 61 Ill.Dec. at 827, 434 N.E.2d at 1184); People v. Nolan, 102 Ill.App.3d 895, 58 Ill.Dec. 403, 430 N.E.2d 345 (1981). Thus, not only may the murder charge be used to determine whether compelling reasons do exist, but also this charge can be used to determine the amount of bail which the person should be required to post during pendency of the appeal.

  3. People v. Gathings

    128 Ill. App. 3d 475 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 11 times
    In Gathings, 128 Ill. App.3d at 479, 470 N.E.2d at 1263, the court acknowledged that the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial provision "ordinarily is deemed a nonappealable interlocutory order."

    • 3 On the merits of the speedy-trial issue, we find that defendants' rights were not violated. Although the circuit court concluded that the term began when the appellate court mandate reversing defendants' original convictions was spread of record on April 22, 1982, under Illinois law the time for computing a speedy-trial violation begins on the date that the appellate court mandate is filed in the circuit court. ( People v. Dodd (1974), 58 Ill.2d 53, 317 N.E.2d 28; People v. Worley (1970), 45 Ill.2d 96, 256 N.E.2d 751; People v. Baskin (1967), 38 Ill.2d 141, 230 N.E.2d 208; People v. Nolan (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 895, 430 N.E.2d 345.) In the instant case, therefore, the term began on the mandate filing date, March 18, 1982.