Defendant then reached into his sweatpants for his identification and, exhibiting nervous behavior, he "turned around blading himself" away from the officers and essentially spun around before he began walking toward the patrol vehicle. In considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers had at least a "founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot" when they exited the patrol vehicle and engaged in a common-law inquiry regarding what defendant had in his pocket (De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; see People v Simmons, 133 AD3d 1275, 1276 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1006 [2016]; People v Johnson, 129 AD3d 1516, 1517 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1009 [2015]; People v Niles, 237 AD2d 537, 537-538 [2d Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 861 [1997]). When defendant responded that he had a handgun, the officers were entitled to seize it and to arrest defendant (see Johnson, 129 AD3d at 1517).

ople v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 190–191, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 [1992] ; De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 220, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ). Defendant then reached into his sweatpants for his identification and, exhibiting nervous behavior, he "turned around blading himself" away from the officers and essentially spun around before he began walking toward the patrol vehicle. In considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers had at least a "founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot" when they exited the patrol vehicle and engaged in a common-law inquiry regarding what defendant had in his pocket ( De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ; seePeople v. Simmons, 133 A.D.3d 1275, 1276, 20 N.Y.S.3d 787 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1006, 38 N.Y.S.3d 115, 59 N.E.3d 1227 [2016] ; People v. Johnson, 129 A.D.3d 1516, 1517, 10 N.Y.S.3d 371 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1009, 20 N.Y.S.3d 549, 42 N.E.3d 219 [2015] ; People v. Niles, 237 A.D.2d 537, 537–538, 655 N.Y.S.2d 578 [2d Dept. 1997], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d 188, 683 N.E.2d 1062 [1997] ). When defendant responded that he had a handgun, the officers were entitled to seize it and to arrest defendant (seeJohnson, 129 A.D.3d at 1517, 10 N.Y.S.3d 371 ).

We additionally conclude that defendant's statement to the officer that he had a handgun in his pocket established a reasonable suspicion of a threat to the officer's safety, and that the officer was justified in reaching into that pocket and removing the gun (see Hensen, 21 AD3d at 174-176; Robinson, 278 AD2d at 809). Finally, we conclude that defendant's possession of the gun gave the officer probable cause to arrest him and subsequently question him at the police station (see People v Niles, 237 AD2d 537, 538, lv denied 90 NY2d 861; see also People v Hightower, 261 AD2d 871, 871-872, lv denied 93 NY2d 971). Insofar as defendant challenges the severity of the period of postrelease supervision, we decline to exercise our power to modify that part of the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]).

We additionally conclude that defendant's statement to the officer that he had a handgun in his pocket established a reasonable suspicion of a threat to the officer's safety, and that the officer was justified in reaching into that pocket and removing the gun (see Hensen, 21 A.D.3d at 174–176, 799 N.Y.S.2d 444 ; Robinson, 278 A.D.2d at 809, 718 N.Y.S.2d 524 ). Finally, we conclude that defendant's possession of the gun gave the officer probable cause to arrest him and subsequently question him at the police station (see People v. Niles, 237 A.D.2d 537, 538, 655 N.Y.S.2d 578, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d 188, 683 N.E.2d 1062 ; see also People v. Hightower, 261 A.D.2d 871, 871–872, 699 N.Y.S.2d 847, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 971, 695 N.Y.S.2d 57, 716 N.E.2d 1102 ).Insofar as defendant challenges the severity of the period of postrelease supervision, we decline to exercise our power to modify that part of the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6 ][b] ).

As soon as the defendant was handcuffed, he started crying and said that his brother was just shot and that the guns were in the “bag.” At that point, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for criminal possession of a weapon (see People v. Niles, 237 A.D.2d 537, 655 N.Y.S.2d 578 ). The arresting officer properly searched the defendant's backpack incident to the lawful arrest.

As soon as the defendant was handcuffed, he started crying and said that his brother was just shot and that the guns were in the "bag." At that point, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for criminal possession of a weapon (see People v Niles, 237 AD2d 537). The arresting officer properly searched the defendant's backpack incident to the lawful arrest.

The arresting officer then conducted a complete frisk of the appellant, and recovered a handgun from his pocket. Contrary to the appellant's contention, the totality of the circumstances gave the officers a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, which gave rise to the officers' common-law right to inquire (see People v Gerard, 94 AD3d 592; Matter of Jamaal C., 19 AD3d 144, 145; People v Hernandez, 3 AD3d 325; People v Pines, 281 AD2d 311, 312, affd 99 NY2d 525; People v Niles, 237 AD2d 537, 537-538; People v Esquilin, 236 AD2d 245, 246, affd 91 NY2d 902; see generally People v Evans, 65 NY2d 629, 630; People v Chestnut, 51 NY2d 14, 23). While the appellant is correct that, initially, he had a constitutional right " to be let alone' and to refuse to respond to police inquiry" (People v May, 81 NY2d 725, 728, quoting People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 590; see People v Nunez, 111 AD3d 854, 856), under the circumstances presented here, the arresting officer's conduct in following and stepping in front of the appellant in an attempt to engage him was a continuation of the officer's own common-law right to inquire, not a seizure (see People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 500; People v Bora, 83 NY2d 531, 535-536; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; People v Bolta, 96 AD3d 773, 774; People v Stevenson, 55 AD3d 486; Matter of Jamaal C., 19 AD3d at 145). Hence, the conduct of the arresting officer in this regard was not improper.

The arresting officer then conducted a complete frisk of the appellant, and recovered a handgun from his pocket. Contrary to the appellant's contention, the totality of the circumstances gave the officers a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, which gave rise to the officers' common-law right to inquire ( see People v. Gerard, 94 A.D.3d 592, 942 N.Y.S.2d 112; Matter of Jamaal C., 19 A.D.3d 144, 145, 797 N.Y.S.2d 13; People v. Hernandez, 3 A.D.3d 325, 770 N.Y.S.2d 316; People v. Pines, 281 A.D.2d 311, 312, 722 N.Y.S.2d 239, affd.99 N.Y.2d 525, 752 N.Y.S.2d 266, 782 N.E.2d 62; People v. Niles, 237 A.D.2d 537, 537–538, 655 N.Y.S.2d 578; People v. Esquilin, 236 A.D.2d 245, 246, 653 N.Y.S.2d 567, affd.91 N.Y.2d 902, 668 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 691 N.E.2d 1024; see generally People v. Evans, 65 N.Y.2d 629, 630, 491 N.Y.S.2d 153, 480 N.E.2d 742; People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 23, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485, 409 N.E.2d 958). While the appellant is correct that, initially, he had a constitutional right “ ‘to be let alone’ and to refuse to respond to police inquiry” (People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760, 609 N.E.2d 113, quoting People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 590, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 408 N.E.2d 908; see People v. Nunez, 111 A.D.3d 854, 856, 975 N.Y.S.2d 125), under the circumstances presented here, the arresting officer's conduct in following and stepping in front of the appellant in an attempt to engage him was a continuation of the officer's own common-law right to inquire, not a seizure ( see People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496, 500, 814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141; People v. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d 531, 535–536, 611 N.Y.S.2d 796, 63

g officer to have approached defendant to ask him whether he was carrying a weapon and whether he was all right, based upon his founded suspicion that criminality was afoot, derived from (1) defendant's presence in a “drug-prone and gun-prone” location at approximately 2:45 a.m., (2) the weighted-down appearance of the left side of defendant's unzipped jacket; (3) defendant's change in course after he noticed the police officers, in which he made a hard left turn, quickened his pace and hugged the building line, with the weighted side of his coat very close to the wall; (4) defendant's act of blading his body towards the wall as the investigating officer neared, i.e. turning his shoulders so as to use the wall to shield his weighted-down pocket; (5) the bulge in defendant's weighted-down pocket; and (6) defendant speaking into a phone in a fast cadence ( see People v. Rodriguez, 207 A.D.2d 669, 616 N.Y.S.2d 31 [1994], lv. denied 84 N.Y.2d 939, 621 N.Y.S.2d 536, 645 N.E.2d 1236 [1994]; People v. Niles, 237 A.D.2d 537, 655 N.Y.S.2d 578 [1997], lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 861, 661 N.Y.S.2d 188, 683 N.E.2d 1062 [1997] ). “Although each factor, standing alone, could be susceptible to an innocent interpretation, a view of the entire circumstances” gave the officer a founded suspicion that criminality was afoot, which invoked the common-law right to inquire ( see People v. Evans, 65 N.Y.2d 629, 491 N.Y.S.2d 153, 480 N.E.2d 742 [1985] ). However, the officer's level of suspicion was not elevated to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in a felony or misdemeanor, as required for a stop and frisk, when defendant turned his left shoulder towards the officer, stated unresponsively that he did not have any drugs on him, continued to talk on his cell phone, and attempted to block the officer's hand as the officer reached towards his pocket to feel the pocket bulge ( see People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 185, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 [1992]; People v. Samuels, 50 N.Y.2d 1035, 1037, 431 N.Y.S.2d 694, 409 N.E.2d 136

Further, the reliability of the accomplice was demonstrated by the fact that the statement was against his penal interest ( see, People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417, 427; People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462, 466; People v. Messina, 209 A.D.2d 642, 642-643, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 1035). Moreover, defendant's inculpatory statement to police furnished probable cause for the arrest ( see, People v. Hoover, 251 A.D.2d 348, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 899; People v. Nichols, 250 A.D.2d 370, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 881; People v. Niles, 237 A.D.2d 537, 538, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 861). We have considered defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it is without merit ( see, CPL 390.30, [3]; see also, People v. Walworth, 167 A.D.2d 622, 623; cf., People v. Redman, 148 A.D.2d 966, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 745).