Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL031365, Jacki C. Brown, Judge.
Beth Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.
We appointed counsel to represent the appellant Nicholas E. on appeal. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no issues were found to argue on appellant’s behalf. In an effort to assist this court with our independent review of the record, counsel provided this court pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 the following possible issue: whether the court correctly denied appellant’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 motion to suppress evidence. Appellant was given 30 days to file written argument in his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from appellant. We have examined the record and found no arguable issue. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)
I
FACTS
The Orange County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition in the juvenile court alleging appellant possessed a graffiti tool in violation of Penal Code section 594.2. The petition further alleged the offense qualified as a felony under Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (d). Appellant’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1) The court denied the motion and appellant then admitted the allegations in the petition and that he violated probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777), by “knowingly and unlawfully possess[ing] a marker intending to use it for vandalizing the property of others, in an effort to promote and assist Jungle City, a criminal street gang.” The court continued the appellant’s wardship under prior adjudications and ordered him to spend 90 days in juvenile hall, in addition to other conditions of probation.
Anaheim Police Officer Chris Petropulos testified at the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. He was working patrol on November 10, 2010 at approximately 10:00 a.m. and driving southbound on Harbor Boulevard when he saw appellant. Appellant was riding a bicycle northbound in the crosswalk at the intersection of Harbor Boulevard and South Street. He was riding against the direction of traffic and was not wearing a helmet. The officer thought appellant appeared to be under 18 years of age. Appellant rode up onto the sidewalk on the west side of Harbor Boulevard and continued northbound. The officer made a U-turn and detained appellant on the southwest corner of Harbor Boulevard and Water Street for riding a bicycle on the wrong side of the road, a violation of Vehicle Code section 21650.1.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
Petropulos asked appellant if he was on probation and appellant said he was on probation for a vandalism related offense and that his probation included gang terms. When asked if he had anything illegal on his person, appellant responded, “Just a marker.” The officer requested permission to retrieve the item and appellant consented. Petropulos found a thick, large black, marker in the right front pocket of appellant’s shorts. He asked appellant about the use of the marker. Appellant answered, “Jungle City, ” a gang Petropulos knew to be a documented criminal street gang in Anaheim. The officer then arrested appellant for possession of the marker in violation of Penal Code section 594.2.
II
DISCUSSION
The Motion to Suppress Evidence
“In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, deferring to those express or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] We independently review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. [Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969.)
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person’s, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Even the temporary detention of an individual constitutes a seizure of the person for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 16.) Appellant was clearly detained by the police officer in this matter and the district attorney did not contend otherwise. As the officer lacked a warrant to arrest or search appellant, the detention was lawful only if the officer had a reasonable suspicion appellant had committed or was about to commit a crime. (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 327-328; People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 386-387.) The officer stated he detained appellant because he observed appellant violate section 21650.1. That section provides: “A bicycle operated on a roadway, or the shoulder of a highway, shall be operated in the same direction as vehicles are required to be driven upon the roadway.”
The gist of appellant’s motion to suppress evidences was that he had been unlawfully detained, rendering the subsequent questioning and search the fruits of the unlawful detention. He contended he was not in violation of section 21650.1 because he rode his bicycle in the crosswalk.
We need not decide whether the crosswalk is considered part of the roadway for purposes of section 21650.1, although section 555 would seem to pretty clearly designate crosswalks as part of the roadway. The officer testified that appellant was riding the bicycle without a helmet and appeared to be under 18 years of age, a violation of section 21212, subdivision (a). This fact alone justified the detention.
“‘Sidewalk’ is that portion of a highway, other than the roadway, set apart by curbs, barriers, markings or other delineation for pedestrian travel.” (§ 555, italics added.)
“A person under 18 years of age shall not operate a bicycle... upon a street, bikeway, as defined in... the Streets and Highways Code, or any other public bicycle path or trail unless that person is wearing a properly fitted and fastened bicycle helmet....” (§ 21212, subd. (a).)
Appellant was required to wear a bicycle helmet even if he was not riding in a roadway. (§ 21212, subd. (a); In re Devon C. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 929, 933 [minor riding bicycle on sidewalk is required to wear a helmet per § 21212, subd. (a)].) In a Fourth Amendment setting, the relevant question is “whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action.’ [Citation.] If so, that action was reasonable ‘whatever the subjective intent’ motivating the [officer]. [Citation.] This approach recognizes that the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct rather than thoughts, [citation]; and it promotes evenhanded, uniform enforcement of the law, [citation].” (Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd (2011) U.S., [131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080].) The officer in this matter observed what he knew to be a violation of the Vehicle Code, a minor riding a bicycle without a helmet. (§ 21212, subd. (a).) The fact that he chose to stop appellant based on what he perceived as a separate violation is irrelevant. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 811-813 [if detention of suspect is justified by facts known to police officer, the officer’s subjective reason for detaining the suspect is irrelevant].)
The juvenile court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.
III
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P.J., FYBEL, J.