Opinion
2019–03832 Ind. No. 3253/17
12-20-2023
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Sarah B. Cohen of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Michael Bierce, and Terrence F. Heller of counsel), for respondent.
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Sarah B. Cohen of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Michael Bierce, and Terrence F. Heller of counsel), for respondent.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, PAUL WOOTEN, LAURENCE L. LOVE, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jill Konviser, J.), rendered April 4, 2019, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification evidence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in connection with a shooting incident in Brooklyn. At trial, an eyewitness, who testified that he knew the defendant as "T," identified the defendant as the shooter. The Supreme Court, after a hearing, also permitted the People to introduce the grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness, who had also identified the defendant as the shooter. The Supreme Court properly denied, after a hearing, that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the evidence of a pretrial lineup identification on the ground that it was tainted by undue suggestion (see People v. Bonilla, 151 A.D.3d 735, 736, 58 N.Y.S.3d 48 ; People v. Rodriguez, 17 A.D.3d 267, 268, 794 N.Y.S.2d 317 ). The fact that the witness who identified the defendant in the lineup had inadvertently seen a side-profile photograph of the defendant in a police folder did not violate the defendant's due process rights, since the evidence at the hearing showed that the accidental viewing was not a police-arranged procedure (see People v. Brown, 155 A.D.3d 509, 510, 65 N.Y.S.3d 36 ; People v. Stevens, 44 A.D.3d 882, 883, 843 N.Y.S.2d 446 ). The passage of at least six months between the display of any photographs to the eyewitness and his identification of the defendant at the lineup also attenuated any possible taint of suggestiveness (see People v. Choi, 137 A.D.3d 808, 26 N.Y.S.3d 333 ; People v. Butts, 279 A.D.2d 587, 719 N.Y.S.2d 680 ). Moreover, the court properly determined "that the [witness] was impervious to suggestion due to his familiarity with the defendant" ( People v. Richardson, 200 A.D.3d 984, 985, 159 N.Y.S.3d 120 ; see People v. Coleman, 73 A.D.3d 1200, 1202, 903 N.Y.S.2d 431 ), and therefore properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to preclude identification testimony on that ground as well (see People v. Fields, 212 A.D.3d 648, 649, 181 N.Y.S.3d 335 ). After conducting a Sirois hearing (see People v. Sirois, 92 A.D.2d 618, 459 N.Y.S.2d 813 ; Matter of Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 92 A.D.2d 405, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591 ), the Supreme Court correctly determined that a previously cooperative eyewitness had been rendered unavailable due to misconduct by the defendant, and thus, properly permitted the People to introduce portions of this eyewitness’ grand jury testimony and sworn audiotaped statement at trial (see People v. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d 68, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 699 N.E.2d 394 ; People v. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 625 N.Y.S.2d 469, 649 N.E.2d 817 ; People v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 879, 880, 983 N.Y.S.2d 439 ; People v. Tatum, 35 A.D.3d 511, 824 N.Y.S.2d 718 ). In any event, any alleged error was harmless. There was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, and no reasonable possibility that any error in curtailing the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness affected the jury's verdict (see People v. Wilkinson, 185 A.D.3d 734, 737, 127 N.Y.S.3d 496 ).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly permitted the People to introduce into evidence a recording of a telephone call that he made while he was incarcerated, in which he was addressed as "T," as the probative value of the recording outweighed any prejudice to the defendant (see People v. Porter, 210 A.D.3d 1012, 1013, 179 N.Y.S.3d 147 ; People v. Carmona, 185 A.D.3d 600, 603, 126 N.Y.S.3d 705 ). The court's limiting instructions regarding this evidence also "adequately minimized any resulting prejudice" ( People v. Doane, 212 A.D.3d 875, 881, 181 N.Y.S.3d 364 ).
The defendant's contention that Penal Law § 265.03 is unconstitutional in light of the decision in ( New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S Ct 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 ) is unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant did not raise a constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court (see People v. Cabrera, ––– N.Y.3d ––––, ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 05968, *3–8 ). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. The Bruen decision "had no impact on the constitutionality of New York State's criminal possession of a weapon statutes" ( People v. Manners, 217 A.D.3d 683, 686, 191 N.Y.S.3d 90 ; see People v. Joyce, 219 A.D.3d 627, 628, 194 N.Y.S.3d 303 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, WOOTEN and LOVE, JJ., concur.