Opinion
KA 16–02095 972
09-28-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William E. NEWTON, Defendant–Appellant.
ERICKSON WEBB SCOLTON & HAJDU, LAKEWOOD (LYLE T. HAJDU OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. GREGORY S. OAKES, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OSWEGO (AMY L. HALLENBECK, FULTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
ERICKSON WEBB SCOLTON & HAJDU, LAKEWOOD (LYLE T. HAJDU OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
GREGORY S. OAKES, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OSWEGO (AMY L. HALLENBECK, FULTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of arson in the third degree ( Penal Law § 150.10[1] ) and reckless endangerment in the second degree (§ 120.20). Defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he intentionally set fire to his vehicle. We reject that contention (see People v. Dale, 71 A.D.3d 1517, 1517, 897 N.Y.S.2d 367 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 749, 906 N.Y.S.2d 821, 933 N.E.2d 220 [2010], reconsideration denied 15 N.Y.3d 803, 908 N.Y.S.2d 163, 934 N.E.2d 897 [2010] ; see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 649, 992 N.Y.S.2d 700, 16 N.E.3d 1178 [2014] ), is legally sufficient to establish that the fire started on the front passenger seat of the vehicle and not in the wiring underneath the seat or in the engine, and that defendant had the opportunity and the motive to set the fire. Thus, there was "[a] valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial" ( Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Although a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we cannot conclude that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded (see generally id. ; People v. Bowyer, 91 A.D.3d 1338, 1338–1339, 937 N.Y.S.2d 661 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 955, 944 N.Y.S.2d 484, 967 N.E.2d 709 [2012] ).
Finally, we note that the certificate of conviction incorrectly recites that defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.25 and it must therefore be amended to reflect that he was convicted of that crime under Penal Law § 120.20 (see People v. Green, 132 A.D.3d 1268, 1269, 17 N.Y.S.3d 807 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1069, 38 N.Y.S.3d 840, 60 N.E.3d 1206 [2016], reconsideration denied 28 N.Y.3d 930, 40 N.Y.S.3d 358, 63 N.E.3d 78 [2016] ; People v. Guppy, 92 A.D.3d 1243, 1243, 937 N.Y.S.2d 921 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 961, 950 N.Y.S.2d 113, 973 N.E.2d 211 [2012] ).