.D.2d 882 (4th Dep't 1994); People v. Walker, 198 A.D.2d 785, 786 (4th Dep't 1993) (citing Sullivan); People v. Grant, 197 A.D.2d 910 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 895 (1993); People v. Sosby, 197 A.D.2d 909, 910 (4th Dep't 1993) (citing Cage and Sullivan); People v. Biro, 197 A.D.2d 866, 866 (4th Dep't 1993) (citing Sullivan); People v. Brinson, 195 A.D.2d 966 (4th Dep't 1993); People v. LaPlanche, 193 A.D.2d 1062 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 756 (1993); People v. Sneed, 193 A.D.2d 1139 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 759 (1993); People v. King, 193 A.D.2d 1118 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 721 (1993); People v. Timothy Freeman, 193 A.D.2d 1118 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 718 (1993); People v. Theodore Freeman, 193 A.D.2d 1117 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 718 (1993); People v. Banks, 193 A.D.2d 1051 (4th Dep't 1993); People v. Payne, 192 A.D.2d 1117 (4th Dep't 1993); People v. Frank, 186 A.D.2d 977, 978 (4th Dep't 1992) (citing Cage); People v. Newell, 178 A.D.2d 959 (4th Dep't 1991). But, it is possible to establish the guilt or [sic] a Defendant charged with a crime to a reasonable degree of certainty.
In each of the cases before us, the court instructed the jury that reasonable doubt must be "based upon some good sound substantial reason". We have condemned that formulation repeatedly, in language that leaves no doubt about its impropriety (see, People v Geddes, supra; People v Frank, 186 A.D.2d 977; People v Garcia, supra; People v Stewart, 185 A.D.2d 677; People v Newell, 178 A.D.2d 959; People v DeMott, 178 A.D.2d 935; People v Phoenix, 148 A.D.2d 942, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 1020; People v Jimenez, 147 A.D.2d 905, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 978; People v Luis, 145 A.D.2d 960, 961, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 923; People v Thompson, 145 A.D.2d 952, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 983; People v Price, 144 A.D.2d 1013, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 895; People v Balian, 49 A.D.2d 94, 98). We point out that almost all of the foregoing decisions reviewed trials conducted by the same Trial Judge.
Additionally, the court instructed the jury that it was not the People's burden to establish defendant's guilt "beyond all possible doubt or to a mathematical certainty" and emphasized that, "if the People were held to that burden of proof, it cannot be done * * * after all this is a November of 1989 charge, and there has been a period of time, again, it would be useless to try anyone in a criminal court if a higher burden existed". The court's use of the "good sound substantial reason" language in defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt, when coupled with the court's improper comments that implied that the People's burden of proof was diminished because the time of the alleged incident was remote, failed to convey the proper standard to the jury, and thereby deprived defendant of a fair trial (see, People v Frank, 186 A.D.2d 977 [decided herewith]; People v Garcia, 179 A.D.2d 1047; People v Newell, 178 A.D.2d 959). Furthermore, reversal is required because the court erred in refusing defendant's request that the jury be instructed that it could consider the victim's delay in reporting the incident in assessing her credibility (see, Baccio v People, 41 N.Y. 265; People v Derrick, 96 A.D.2d 600; cf., People v Bessette, 169 A.D.2d 876, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 992; People v Williams, 75 N.Y.2d 858, affg 147 A.D.2d 904).
Judgment unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and new trial granted. Memorandum: The trial court's instructions to the jury on reasonable doubt incorrectly employed the phrases "`morally and reasonably certain'" (People v Johnson, 145 A.D.2d 932; People v Hewlett, 133 A.D.2d 417) and "`reasonable doubt must therefore be based entirely and absolutely on good sound substantial reason'" (People v Johnson, supra, at 932; People v La Rosa, 112 A.D.2d 954; see also, People v Newell, 178 A.D.2d 959). Additionally, the trial court improperly instructed the jury that "it is possible to establish the guilt of a defendant charged with a crime to a reasonable degree of certainty. To that degree of proof the People must be held. If they fail to sustain that burden, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt and to acquittal" (emphasis supplied).
Here, the additional gratuitous comments by the trial court in its charge were patently improper and were properly objected to by defense counsel. In our view, those improper comments, when coupled with the trial court's earlier improper use of the phrase "good sound substantial reason", failed to convey the proper standard to the jury and require us to reverse defendant's conviction (see, People v. Newell, 178 A.D.2d 959; People v Phoenix, supra; People v. Jimenez, supra). Since a new trial is required, we need not address the merits of the other issues raised.