Defendant was the only individual included in both the photo array and the lineup. Contrary to the contention of the dissent, the fact that the eyewitness viewed the perpetrators at relatively close range and in well-lit conditions “does not constitute corroborating evidence of the identification for purposes of determining whether expert testimony regarding the accuracy of an eyewitness identification is admissible” (People v. Nazario, 100 A.D.3d 783, 784, 953 N.Y.S.2d 652, lv. denied20 N.Y.3d 1063, 962 N.Y.S.2d 614, 985 N.E.2d 924 [emphasis added]; see Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d at 669, 934 N.Y.S.2d 746, 958 N.E.2d 874). The only testimony corroborating the eyewitness's identification of defendantcame from Harvey, who even the prosecutor characterized as “a liar.” Harvey initially denied any knowledge of the robbery, and thereafter identified other individuals as the perpetrators.

Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the complainant, who is Trinidadian, is of a different cognizable racial group than the defendant, who asked the court to take judicial notice of him as "a light skinned Black male," and no studies were shown to have been conducted regarding the cross-race effect under these circumstances. Thus, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the proposed expert testimony on cross-racial identifications was both relevant to the complainant's identification of him and based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community (cf. People v Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251, 258; People v Nazario, 100 A.D.3d 783, 784). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the complainant's apparent mischaracterization of the defendant as being Hispanic does not establish his entitlement to present this expert testimony.

Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the complainant, who is Trinidadian, is of a different cognizable racial group than the defendant, who asked the court to take judicial notice of him as "a light skinned Black male," and no studies were shown to have been conducted regarding the cross-race effect under these circumstances. Thus, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the proposed expert testimony on cross-racial identifications was both relevant to the complainant's identification of him and based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community (cf. People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251, 258, 889 N.Y.S.2d 890, 918 N.E.2d 486 ; People v. Nazario, 100 A.D.3d 783, 784, 953 N.Y.S.2d 652 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the complainant's apparent mischaracterization of the defendant as being Hispanic does not establish his entitlement to present this expert testimony.

Upon a review of the witnesses’ testimonies, we find that the District Court did not improvidently deny defendant's mistrial motions, as many of the testimonial statements did not, contrary to defendant's speculative claim, clearly or inexorably paint defendant as an addict who repeatedly stole money from her parents. In any event, the prosecution witnesses’ occasional testimony that violated the District Court's pretrial order was harmless, as there is " ‘no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted [ ] defendant were it not for the error’ " ( People v Nazario , 100 AD3d 783, 785 [2012], quoting People v Santiago , 17 NY3d 661, 673-674 [2011] ). The testimonies of the People's witnesses were consistent, credible and demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took her parents’ vehicle without permission in the early morning hours of May 9, 2017.

Misidentification is arguably the most commonly-employed defense asserted by criminal defendants, and scientific studies have documented numerous factors that can undermine the reliability of an identification (see generally People v LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449). Thus, where the prosecution's proof consists of an identification by a single witness, the evidence must be closely scrutinized, and courts have even permitted expert testimony regarding those circumstances that can influence the accuracy of an identification (see People v LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449; People v Nazario, 100 AD3d 783). It is also clear from the present record that the defendant and his counsel appreciated that requesting the submission of the defense of justification, a defense logically at odds with the misidentification defense, could well reduce the defendant's chances of acquittal by rendering his position less credible in the eyes of the jury.

Misidentification is arguably the most commonly-employed defense asserted by criminal defendants, and scientific studies have documented numerous factors that can undermine the reliability of an identification (see generally People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374 ). Thus, where the prosecution's proof consists of an identification by a single witness, the evidence must be closely scrutinized, and courts have even permitted expert testimony regarding those circumstances that can influence the accuracy of an identification (see People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374 ; People v. Nazario, 100 A.D.3d 783, 953 N.Y.S.2d 652 ). It is also clear from the present record that the defendant and his counsel appreciated that requesting the submission of the defense of justification, a defense logically at odds with the misidentification defense, could well reduce the defendant's chances of acquittal by rendering his position less credible in the eyes of the jury.

d 436;People v. Stocks, 101 A.D.3d 1049, 1051, 957 N.Y.S.2d 356), rather than a merely “ministerial” one ( People v. Lockley, 84 A.D.3d at 839, 922 N.Y.S.2d 476;see People v. Brown, 106 A.D.3d 755, 756, 963 N.Y.S.2d 732;People v. Alcide, 95 A.D.3d 897, 898, 942 N.Y.S.2d 875,affd.––– N.Y.3d ––––, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 06598 [2013];People v. Bryant, 82 A.D.3d 1114, 919 N.Y.S.2d 341). As such, the trial court's failure to afford defense counsel “the opportunity to provide suggestions” ( People v. Lockley, 84 A.D.3d at 839, 922 N.Y.S.2d 476) regarding the court's responses to the jury's questions constituted “a mode of proceedings error ... requiring reversal” ( People v. Tabb, 13 N.Y.3d 852, 853, 891 N.Y.S.2d 686, 920 N.E.2d 90), despite defense counsel's failure to object to the trial court's handling of the jury's fourth note ( see People v. McGhee, 103 A.D.3d at 668, 960 N.Y.S.2d 436). In light of our determination, the defendant's remaining contentions have been rendered academic ( see People v. Nazario, 100 A.D.3d 783, 785, 953 N.Y.S.2d 652;People v. Thomas, 68 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 892 N.Y.S.2d 461).

Upon a review of the witnesses' testimonies, we find that the District Court did not improvidently deny defendant's mistrial motions, as many of the testimonial statements did not, contrary to defendant's speculative claim, clearly or inexorably paint defendant as an addict who repeatedly stole money from her parents. In any event, the prosecution witnesses' occasional testimony that violated the District Court's pretrial order was harmless, as there is" 'no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted [] defendant were it not for the error'" (People v Nazario, 100 A.D.3d 783, 785 [2012], quoting People v Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661, 673-674 [2011]). The testimonies of the People's witnesses were consistent, credible and demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took her parents' vehicle without permission in the early morning hours of May 9, 2017.