Opinion
B320214
03-01-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE LUIS NAVARRO, Defendant and Appellant.
Sally Patrone Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. VA035673 Joseph R. Porras, Judge. Affirmed.
Sally Patrone Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BENDIX, J.
In 1996, a jury convicted defendant Jose Luis Navarro of possession of a firearm by a felon, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law. In 2022, the People filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.03, wherein they asked the trial court to reduce Navarro's prison sentence to six years with credit for time served. In the petition, the People argued Navarro's exemplary behavior in prison demonstrated that his continued incarceration would not serve the interest of justice.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code. Additionally, "[e]ffective June 30, 2022, '[t]he Legislature . . . renumbered section 1170.03 to section 1172.1, but made no substantive changes. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818.) For the sake of clarity and consistency, we refer to section 1172.1 when addressing the statute governing the petition for resentencing.
In response to the trial court's questions at the first hearing on the petition, the People disclosed that the exhibits offered in support of the petition did not constitute Navarro's entire prison record. The trial court requested that the People obtain Navarro's full prison record because the court indicated it needed the complete file to determine whether Navarro would have presented an "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" if the petition were granted. (See § 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Subsequently, the People submitted the documents to the court and defense counsel (which are not in the record before us), along with a transcript from Navarro's 2019 parole hearing (which also is not in the record before us). Navarro filed an objection, claiming the trial court lacked authority to consider materials the People had not initially submitted with the petition.
At the next hearing, the People stated that they intended to withdraw the petition. The People claimed that the newly obtained documents alleged that Navarro had held a leadership position in a security threat group. The trial court overruled Navarro's objection, and took the matter off calendar because the People had withdrawn the petition. The court never ruled on the merits of the petition.
On appeal, Navarro claims the trial court erred in (1) not ruling on the petition based solely on the exhibits originally accompanying the petition; (2) requesting that the People provide Navarro's complete prison record; (3) failing to hold a hearing on the merits of the petition and issue a decision thereon; and (4) permitting the People to withdraw the petition.
We conclude that section 1172.1 does not require a trial court to rule on the merits of a petition without first being afforded an opportunity to review the defendant's full prison record.
Navarro's other claims of error were not prejudicial even under the more exacting federal standard of prejudice. Had the trial court not requested Navarro's full prison file, the court would have denied the petition without prejudice on the ground that, because the People had not submitted Navarro's complete prison file with the petition, the court could not evaluate whether Navarro presented an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Although section 1172.1 does not expressly authorize a trial court to deny a resentencing petition without prejudice, a court nonetheless has the inherent authority to do so. Additionally, the record establishes that if the trial court had exercised that inherent authority in this case, the People would not have refiled the petition. Thus, Navarro was not prejudiced by the trial court's decision to refrain from ruling on the petition at the first hearing (in anticipation of receiving the full prison file), or by the People's subsequent decision to withdraw their petition.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Our procedural background is derived in part from admissions made in the parties' appellate briefing, and from assertions the Attorney General makes in the respondent's brief to which Navarro does not respond in his reply. (See Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 668, 674 [criminal case in which the Court of Appeal stated:" 'An express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in the disposition of the case.' "]; Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [" '[B]riefs and argument . . . are reliable indications of a party's position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use of statements therein as admissions against the party.' "]; Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 & fn. 4 [criminal case in which the Court of Appeal assumed that an assertion made by respondent was correct because the "defendant did not dispute respondent's claim in his reply"]; Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89-90 [concluding that the appellants made an implicit concession by "failing to respond in their reply brief to the [respondent's] argument on th[at] point"].)
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition of this appeal.
1. The information, Navarro's conviction and sentence, and his appeal of the judgment
On February 7, 1996, the People filed an information charging Navarro with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a)(1). The People alleged that Navarro had previously been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1); first degree residential burglary, in violation of section 459; and second degree robbery, in violation of section 211. At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Navarro guilty as charged.
On June 26, 1996, the trial court sentenced Navarro to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law. The trial court also imposed, but stayed, two section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancements. We affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion.
We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of our prior opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
2. The People's petition for resentencing
On January 13, 2022, the People filed a petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1, wherein the People requested that the trial court resentence Navarro to an aggregate prison term of six years with credit for time served. The People represented that "[u]nder current Los Angeles District Attorney's . . . Office policy," the People would not have sought a 25-year-to-life prison sentence against Navarro for the instant possession conviction because doing so would not "serve[ ] the interest of justice." The People argued Navarro was eligible for a reduced sentence under section 1172.1 "based on the length of his current incarceration, his successful record of rehabilitation while incarcerated, and his lack of a recent record for violence." Among other things, the People asserted Navarro "is currently classified at the lowest risk level ('1 Low') to reoffend if released from custody according to the California Static Risk Assessment ('CSRA'), the validated recidivism prediction tool designed and administered by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ...."
The People attached 10 exhibits to their petition for resentencing. Most of the exhibits were prison records reflecting Navarro's successful participation in rehabilitative programs. Other exhibits included a prison assessment that Navarro had a low risk to reoffend based on his CSRA score of 1, and an exhibit showing Navarro had been accepted into a postrelease reentry program.
3. The February 4, 2022 hearing
On February 4, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the People's petition for resentencing. The People and Navarro's attorney attended the hearing.
At the outset of the hearing, the trial court inquired whether the documents offered in support of the petition constituted the entirety of Navarro's prison record (central file or C file), and the People represented the attachments were not Navarro's whole C file. Although the court stated that the petition appeared to be "well-taken," the court expressed concern that it was "being asked to exercise [its] discretion based upon . . . Navarro's background and history" without having access to records concerning Navarro's "entire history in prison." The court stated it "want[ed] to be comfortable in [its] decision by looking through everything ...."
The trial court asked the People and Navarro's counsel whether Navarro had any parole hearings, but neither attorney could provide a definitive answer to that question. The court expressed its belief that Navarro likely had one or more parole hearings already, given that he was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life approximately 26 years before the February 4, 2022 hearing. The court opined that records of Navarro's parole hearings "would be quite relevant . . . to [it] in making the decision." The court remarked that the outcome of Navarro's parole hearings "should be in the C file ...."
The trial court thereafter requested that the People provide the court with a copy of all portions of Navarro's C file in their possession, and that the People subpoena the full C file for the court to review. The minute order for the hearing indicates the trial court did not intend to make a ruling until it received a copy of the entirety of Navarro's prison records.
4. Navarro's "Objection to the Court's Refusal to Rule on the District Attorney's Resentencing Recommendation Without Eliciting and Considering Additional Information Not Presented"
On March 16, 2022, Navarro filed a document titled "Objection to the Court's Refusal to Rule on the District Attorney's Resentencing Recommendation Without Eliciting and Considering Additional Information Not Presented." In this filing, Navarro "object[ed] to the court requiring, eliciting, or considering any information outside of what ha[d] been already submitted by the District Attorney," and he "request[ed] that th[e] court rule on the Resentencing motion based solely on the moving papers." Navarro maintained that "the law does not contemplate the court conducting an independent investigation," and that, "by soliciting additional evidence[,] . . . the court [had] violate[d] federal due process guarantees and [the] separation of powers ...." (Boldface &capitalization omitted.)
5. The March 17, 2022 hearing and Navarro's notice of appeal
The trial court held another hearing on the People's petition on March 17, 2022. The People and Navarro's counsel attended the hearing, and Navarro appeared remotely via electronic means.
The trial court explained that during the February 4, 2022 hearing, it felt unable to make a determination regarding whether Navarro presented an "unreasonable risk of safety" based on a "truncated version" of his C file. The court stated that after that hearing, it received a copy of the materials the People had subpoenaed, which was comprised of several "CD's from state prison." Navarro's counsel had also received a copy of those materials. These materials, however, are not in the record before us. According to the court, although no documents relating to parole hearings were attached to the People's petition, the documents provided by the prison included a transcript from Navarro's 2019 parole hearing.
When asked by the trial court whether she received those subpoenaed materials, Navarro's counsel answered in the affirmative.
If Navarro wanted us to consider any of the subpoenaed documents, then he should have filed a notice of designation with the trial court to ensure that they were transmitted to us. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(e) ["Exhibits admitted in evidence, refused, or lodged are deemed part of the record, but may be transmitted to the reviewing court only as provided in rule 8.224."]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224(a)-(b) [specifying the procedure by which "a party wanting the reviewing court to consider any . . . exhibits" may file a notice of designation, thereby obligating the trial court clerk or a party in possession of the exhibits to "send them to the reviewing court"].) We have no record of him doing so.
When the trial court asked whether the People had a position on Navarro's objection, the People responded they did not. The People instead asked the court for permission to withdraw the petition for resentencing. The People represented that upon "reviewing the additional documents" provided by the prison, the People discovered "information . . . that the inmate is involved in and has held a leadership position in a security threat group." According to the People, the documents "alleging [Navarro's] leadership position in a security threat group" included the parole hearing transcript, a comprehensive risk assessment, and a confidential memorandum dated January 14, 2019.
In his opening brief, Navarro cites the People's remarks from this hearing for the proposition that information showing he "held a leadership position in a security threat group ....was never validated." He misreads the People's remarks. The People stated that "when [they] originally reviewed the truncated version" of Navarro's C file, "[i]t appeared" there had "never been a validation" of Navarro's involvement in a security threat group.
The trial court stated it would not rule on the petition because the People had withdrawn the filing, and that the court was taking the matter off calendar and overruling Navarro's objection. The court further indicated that its tentative ruling would have been to deny the petition "based upon an unreasonable risk of safety to the public ...." The court explained that there were references in the 2019 parole hearing transcript to "this inmate running yards . . . drug-wise" and to "a 2017 assault," and that Navarro was found not to be "suitable for parole at least until 2024." At no point did defense counsel dispute the court's or the People's descriptions of the documents provided by the prison or request that the hearing be stayed to enable Navarro administratively to contest the negative references in his prison record.
On May 10, 2022, Navarro appealed the trial court's March 17, 2022 rulings.
DISCUSSION
A. Law Governing Petitions for Resentencing
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides in pertinent part: "When a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation[,] . . . the court may, . . . at any time upon the recommendation of . . . the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, . . . provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence." (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
Should the trial court decide to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(2) obligates the court to "apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing." (See § 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) Subparagraph (a)(3)(A) provides that "[t]he resentencing court may, in the interest of justice . . . [¶] . . . [r]educe a defendant's term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence." (Id., subd. (a)(3)(A).) Subdivision (a)(5) requires the court to provide "[c]redit . . . for time served." (Id., subd. (a)(5).)
As relevant here, subdivision (a)(4) of section 1172.1 states: "In recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant's risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice." (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).)
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(7) provides: "Resentencing may be granted without a hearing upon stipulation by the parties." (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(7).) Subdivision (a)(6) requires the court to "state on the record the reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and resentencing." (Id., subd. (a)(6).) "Resentencing shall not be denied, nor a stipulation rejected, without a hearing where the parties have an opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial or rejection. If a hearing is held, the defendant may appear remotely and the court may conduct the hearing through the use of remote technology, unless counsel requests their physical presence in court." (Id., subd. (a)(8).)
"If a resentencing request pursuant to subdivision (a) is from . . . a district attorney, . . . all of the following shall apply: [¶] (1) The court shall provide notice to the defendant and set a status conference within 30 days after the date that the court received the request. The court's order setting the conference shall also appoint counsel to represent the defendant. [¶] (2) There shall be a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18." (§ 1172.1, subd. (b).)
Section 1170.18, subdivision (c) in turn states: "As used throughout this code, 'unreasonable risk of danger to public safety' means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667." (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).)
Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) lists the following felonies: "(I) A 'sexually violent offense' as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. [¶] (II) Oral copulation with a child who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant as defined by Section 288a, sodomy with another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant as defined by Section 286, or sexual penetration with another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant, as defined by Section 289. [¶] (III) A lewd or lascivious act involving a child under 14 years of age, in violation of Section 288. [¶] (IV) Any homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive. [¶] (V) Solicitation to commit murder as defined in Section 653f. [¶] (VI) Assault with a machinegun on a peace officer or firefighter, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of Section 245. [¶] (VII) Possession of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 11418. [¶] (VIII) Any serious or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death." (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I)-(VIII).)
B. Standards of Review
"We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's denial of recall. [Citations.] We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo." (People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082 (E.M.).)
We review de novo whether a trial court has the "inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court." (See People v. Lujan (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1507 (Lujan).) "[W]e review the exercise of [that] inherent authority under the abuse of discretion standard." (See ibid.)
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining the intent of the Legislature, we first examine the words of the statute itself. [Citation.] If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory construction. [Citation.] However, 'the "plain meaning" rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose ....' [Citation.]' "We must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." [Citation.]' [Citation.] The legislative purpose 'will not be sacrificed to a literal construction' of any part of the statute." (People v. Lofchie (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 240, 250-251 (Lofchie).)
"Typically, when an 'error is purely one of state law, the [People v. ]Watson[ (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,] harmless error test applies.' [Citations.]" (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973.) The Watson "standard requires [a court] to evaluate whether the defendant has demonstrated that it is' "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error."' [Citations.] In contrast, we evaluate the harmlessness of violations of the federal Constitution under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, which requires reversal unless the error is harmless 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" (See People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195196 (Gonzalez).)
There are "three fundamental principles of appellate review: (1) a judgment is presumed correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving error." (People v. Arter (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 6; see also People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 (Sanghera) ["Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant's burden to affirmatively demonstrate error."].)
C. Navarro's Claims of Error Do Not Warrant Reversal
On appeal, Navarro argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection and permitting the People to withdraw the petition for resentencing. Navarro seems to advance the following contentions in support of his position: (1) the trial court improperly conducted its own investigation by requesting additional information not included with the petition; (2) the court violated Navarro's right to a hearing and a ruling on the merits of the petition; (3) the court should have granted the petition based solely on the materials the People submitted with their petition; and (4) the People lacked the authority to withdraw their petition for resentencing. Navarro contends that these errors are not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his opening brief, Navarro also asked us to instruct the trial court to strike the two section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancements. The presiding justice later granted Navarro's request to strike the portion of his opening brief that had raised this issue.
We reject Navarro's assertion the trial court erred in declining to grant the petition based only on the materials initially filed with the petition, and we conclude that the other alleged errors were harmless. Even if the trial court had not requested Navarro's C file and terminated the proceedings when the People withdrew their petition, the record demonstrates the court would have denied the petition without prejudice because the court did not have the information it claimed to need to ascertain whether Navarro presented an unreasonable risk of danger for the purposes of section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2). We further conclude that the trial court would have possessed the inherent authority to deny the petition without prejudice, and that the People's request to withdraw their petition based on information from the complete prison record demonstrates they would not have refiled it. In short, we reject Navarro's assertion that section 1172.1 required the court to grant the petition based on the materials initially attached thereto, and we conclude the other alleged errors were not prejudicial.
1. Section 1172.1 did not require the trial court to grant the resentencing petition based solely on the materials initially submitted by the People, which did not constitute Navarro's full C file
Navarro suggests in his briefing that if the People file a resentencing petition and the accompanying evidence does not show the defendant presents an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, then section 1172.1 requires the trial court to grant the petition, regardless of whether evidence relevant to the defendant's safety risk is missing from the People's submission. Specifically, Navarro asserts that in that scenario, once the People file the petition for resentencing, subdivision (b)(2) gives rise to a "presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant" that has not been rebutted (see § 1172.1, subd. (b)(2)), and no provision of the statute allows the trial court to decline to issue a final ruling on the petition until it receives additional evidence bearing on the defendant's safety risk.
Section 1172.1 authorizes the trial court to "consider postconviction factors," including the defendant's "disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation . . . while incarcerated," and to determine whether "the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" in the course of adjudicating a resentencing petition. (See § 1172.1, subds. (a)(4), (b)(2).) In so doing, the Legislature manifested its intention that the trial court protect the public from defendants who present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (See People v. Superior Court (Sanchez-Flores) (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 692, 699 ["[T]he best evidence of the Legislature's intent is the statutory text itself ...."].) Navarro's interpretation of the statute would undermine that legislative purpose by obligating a trial court to resentence-and, in some cases, release-a defendant based on a patently deficient evidentiary record. Accordingly, we reject Navarro's proffered construction of section 1172.1. (See Lofchie, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 251 ["' "We must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences."' "].)
Navarro seems to argue, in passing, that because a trial court is supposedly obligated to resentence a defendant under section 1172.6 if the parties file a stipulation to that effect, the trial court lacked the discretion to reject the instant petition filed under section 1172.1. Navarro provides no analysis in support of this argument (e.g., a comparison of the text and purposes of the two statutes). We thus do not address this argument further. (See Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573 [holding the appellant bears the "burden to affirmatively demonstrate error"]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [" '[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.' "].)
2. The trial court had the inherent authority to deny the petition for resentencing without prejudice for lack of a sufficient record to determine whether Navarro presented an unreasonable risk of danger
Section 1172.1 does not prescribe explicitly any procedures governing the manner in which a trial court should proceed if it finds the People failed to provide it with sufficient information to assess whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety for the purposes of section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2). (See Discussion, part A, ante [summarizing relevant provisions of § 1172.1].) Nevertheless, "[t]rial courts . . . possess a constitutionally conferred, inherent authority to 'create new forms of procedure' in the gaps left unaddressed by statutes and the rules of court." (Lujan, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507.)
The parties do not identify any particular rule of court that governs this scenario, nor are we aware of any such rule.
There are limitations on this authority. "We may not sanction procedures of dubious constitutional validity. [Citation.] Nor may we bless procedural innovations inconsistent with the will of the Legislature or that usurp the Legislature's role by fundamentally altering criminal procedures." (Lujan, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507.) No such limitations prevent a trial court from denying without prejudice a petition for resentencing that does not disclose sufficiently the very information the Legislature has designated a court should consider in ruling upon a section 1172.1 recall petition, that is a defendant's disciplinary and rehabilitation record while incarcerated.
First, permitting a trial court to fashion its own procedure for handling a petition lacking sufficient evidentiary support would not be of dubious constitutionality. Determining the proper sentence for a criminal defendant is a core judicial function. (See Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 554 ["[O]nce the decision to prosecute has been made, the disposition of the matter is fundamentally judicial in nature."].) Further, so long as the trial court affords the defendant reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard, denying the petition for resentencing without prejudice would not violate his or her procedural due process rights. (See CREED-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 517 ["' "[R]easonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard . . . is all that is required [for due process]."' "].)
Next, as we explained in Discussion, part C.1, ante, section 1172.1 does not obligate a trial court to grant a petition based solely upon the evidence initially submitted therewith because such an interpretation would be inconsistent with Legislative intent. It follows that the Legislature did not intend to prevent a trial court from denying without prejudice a resentencing petition that lacks sufficient information for the court to determine whether the defendant presents an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety for the purposes of section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2). In addition, section 1172.1 expressly confers discretion upon a trial court evaluating a petition for resentencing. Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a trial court "may" "recall the sentence . . . and resentence the defendant" "upon the recommendation of . . . the district attorney." Thus, it is arguable the Legislature intended to grant a trial court authority to adopt its own procedure to resolve a petition lacking sufficient evidentiary support so long as the procedure is consistent with the express terms of section 1172.1 and not otherwise "arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd ...." At the very least, section 1172.1's broad grant of authority to the judiciary strongly suggests the Legislature had no intention to foreclose a trial court from filling in statutory procedural gaps.
(See § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); see also People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448 [noting that a statute's "use of the word 'may'" is indicative of a grant of "broad discretion"]; E.M., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082 ["We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's denial of recall."].)
(See, e.g., § 1172.1, subd. (a)(8) [providing that a trial court shall not deny resentencing without first holding a hearing where the parties have an opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial].)
(People v. Velasco-Palacios (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 439, 445 (Velasco-Palacios) [describing the abuse of discretion standard].)
Additionally, a trial court's decision to deny without prejudice a petition for resentencing that lacks sufficient evidentiary support would not "usurp the Legislature's role by fundamentally altering criminal procedures." (Lujan, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507.) In reviewing trial court orders denying postconviction relief, Courts of Appeal have exercised their discretion to affirm these orders without prejudice to allowing defendants to refile their petitions and support them with sufficient evidence. Allowing trial courts to utilize a similar disposition for petitions for resentencing under section 1172.1 would thus be a mere "incremental extension" of the law that does not "transmogrify criminal procedure in any fundamental way." (See Lujan, at p. 1508.)
(See, e.g., People v. Johnson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 953, 956, 970-971 [utilizing this disposition for an appeal of the denial of postconviction relief under Proposition 47]; People v. Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 129, 133, 140-142 [same]; see also People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192, 196-197 ["Proposition 47 reclassified certain drug- and theft-related offenses as misdemeanors, except where the defendant has one or more disqualifying prior convictions ....[¶] . . . [¶] Proposition 47 also added section 1170.18, which permits a person who is currently 'serving a sentence' for a conviction of a reclassified offense to request to be resentenced to a misdemeanor."]; cf. Gomez v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 293, 305, fn. 6 [observing that the high court had previously denied a habeas petition without prejudice for failure to sufficiently allege facts supporting the petitioner's claims].)
3. Because the trial court could have denied the petition without prejudice at the initial hearing thereon, and the People would not have refiled the petition given the negative references in Navarro's prison record, Navarro's remaining claims of error do not warrant reversal
We assume arguendo that the Chapman standard of prejudice, rather than the less stringent Watson test, applies to this case. (See Discussion, part B, ante [indicating the Chapman standard is easier for appellants to satisfy than the Watson test].) Reversal is not required under Chapman if the" 'error is harmless 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" (See Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 196.) As explained below, even if the trial court had not requested the entirety of Navarro's C file and later allowed the People to withdraw the petition, the trial court would have properly exercised its discretion to deny the petition without prejudice, and the People would not have refiled the petition. Therefore, Navarro's remaining claims of error are harmless under Chapman.
Navarro does not assert the trial court committed structural error that is reversible per se.
For the reasons provided in Discussion, part C.1, ante, we have already rejected Navarro's assertion that the trial court erred in declining to grant the petition based solely on the materials the People initially submitted in support thereof.
As previously noted, during the February 4, 2022 hearing, the trial court indicated it could not grant the People's petition without first reviewing records of Navarro's "entire history in prison," to wit, the full C file. (See Procedural Background, part 3, ante.) The court stated that because Navarro had been sentenced to a 25-year-to-life prison term approximately 26 years before that hearing, Navarro likely had one or more parole hearings by that point. (See ibid.) The court found that documentation concerning Navarro's parole hearings "would be quite relevant . . . to [it] in making the decision" on the petition. (See ibid.)
Accordingly, the record demonstrates that if the trial court had not deferred ruling on the petition at the February 4, 2022 hearing, the court would have instead exercised its inherent authority to deny the petition without prejudice because the People failed to provide Navarro's complete prison record, information section 1172.1 expressly makes relevant to whether Navarro posed "an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety." (See § 1172.1, subds. (a)(4), (b)(2).) The reporter's transcript of the March 17, 2022 hearing shows the People would not have refiled the petition because according to the People, Navarro's complete prison record and his 2019 parole hearing transcript showed Navarro held a leadership position in a "security threat group." (See Procedural Background, part 5, ante.) As previously noted, at the hearing, defense counsel never disputed this conclusion in the prison record or indicated any intent to seek administrative relief from that conclusion. (Ibid.) Had the trial court denied the petition without prejudice, Navarro would have been in essentially the same position he is in now, to wit, no resentencing petition would be pending before the court.
We also conclude that the trial court would not have abused its discretion had it exercised its inherent authority to deny the petition without prejudice. Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(4) allows a court to "consider postconviction factors, including, . . . the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated" in the course of ruling upon a resentencing petition. (See § 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).) Although Navarro insists the People had "already conducted a rigorous investigation prior to seeking a sentence reduction," the statute obligated the trial court to determine whether Navarro was an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety for the purposes of section 1172.1. (See § 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Thus, denying the petition without prejudice to its refiling with a complete record of Navarro's prison behavior would not have been arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (See Lujan, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507 [holding that the trial court's exercise of inherent authority is reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Velasco-Palacios, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 445 [describing the abuse of discretion standard].)
We observe that Navarro seems to advance an interpretation of section 1172.1 that, if correct, arguably would have prevented the trial court from denying the petition without prejudice at the February 4, 2022 hearing. Navarro intimates in his briefing that section 1172.1, subdivision (b) requires the trial court to hold two separate hearings before it can deny a petition for resentencing: (1) a status conference within 30 days after the date the court receives the petition, and (2) a subsequent hearing on the merits of the petition. Yet, nowhere in section 1172.1 is there any text prohibiting a court from issuing a ruling on the petition at the initial status conference. Rather, the statute obligates the court to "set a status conference within 30 days after the date that the court received the request [for resentencing]" (see § 1172.1, subd. (b)(1)), and bars the trial court from denying the petition "without a hearing where the parties have an opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial or rejection," (see id., subd. (a)(8)). In the instant case, the parties had an opportunity at the February 4, 2022 hearing to address whether the People had submitted the full contents of Navarro's C file with the petition. (See Procedural Background, part 3, ante.) Consequently, the trial court could have denied the petition without prejudice at that hearing.
The trial court did not identify explicitly the February 4, 2022 hearing as a "status conference." Nevertheless, it seems the trial court intended the February 4, 2022 hearing to serve as the status conference because that was the first hearing on the petition.
There is yet another statutory provision that arguably could have prevented the trial court from denying the petition without prejudice at the February 4, 2022 hearing. We acknowledge that section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(8) permits a defendant to appear at the hearing at which the trial court denies the petition (see § 1172.1, subd. (a)(8)), and that, although Navarro's attorney attended the February 4, 2022 and March 17, 2022 hearings, Navarro appeared at only the second hearing. Thus, subdivision (a)(8) arguably would have required the trial court to provide Navarro with prehearing notice that it was considering denying the petition without prejudice in order to allow Navarro to make an informed decision whether to attend the February 4, 2022 hearing. Any violation of that provision would have been harmless under the Chapman standard, however, because even if Navarro had appeared at the February 4, 2022 hearing, portions of his C file still would have been absent from the People's initial submission.
Lastly, Navarro argues, "[T]he trial court's refusal to rule on the petition without further investigation pressured the [People] to withdraw the petition." (Italics added; boldface &some capitalization omitted.) We agree that it appears that the trial court's request for the complete C file caused the People to withdraw their petition, given that the People indicated their withdrawal was based on the additional documents they had received from the prison. (See Procedural Background, part 5, ante.) Nevertheless, the court's request for the complete prison file was harmless because as stated above, Navarro would be in the same position had the court instead denied the petition without prejudice. To recap, the court could have denied the petition without prejudice, and, had it done so, the People would have needed to obtain the complete prison file if they wanted to refile the petition. Because the complete file contained information that would have caused the People not to file a subsequent petition, any error in the court's request of the entire prison file was harmless.
In sum, we reject Navarro's assertion the trial court was required to grant the petition based exclusively on the materials initially submitted by the People. We also conclude Navarro was not prejudiced by the other errors he asserts on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's March 17, 2022 order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: ROTHSCHILD, P. J., CHANEY, J.