Opinion
G057349
02-19-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendants and Appellants. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, D. Kevin Dunn, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15HF0797) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard E. Pacheco, Judge. Affirmed. Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendants and Appellants. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, D. Kevin Dunn, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The North River Insurance Company and Bad Boys Bail Bonds (collectively North River) posted a $50,000 bond for Shad Michael Ashman, who failed to appear. The trial court forfeited the bond and later entered summary judgment. North River appeals, arguing the court violated Ashman's due process rights because it did not consider Ashman's ability to pay at the bail setting hearing.
We disagree. A surety forfeits any objection to "procedural irregularities in the bail setting hearing when it 'assume[s] its obligations . . . at the time of the execution of the bond.'" (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 891, 898 (Accredited).) Further, procedural irregularities at the bail setting hearing have "'no legal effect on the forfeiture of bail upon defendant's failure to appear.'" (Ibid.)
Thus, we affirm the trial court's ruling for summary judgment.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2015, the People filed a complaint charging Ashman with one count of first degree residential burglary and related crimes. The trial court arraigned Ashman on the complaint and set bail in the amount of $50,000 (there is no record of the court inquiring into Ashman's ability to pay).
In August 2015, North River posted a bond (No. T50-50524075). North River agreed to pay $50,000 to the People of the State of California if Ashman subsequently failed to appear.
In December 2015, Ashman failed to appear at a preliminary hearing and the magistrate forfeited the bond. In March 2017, the court entered a $50,000 summary judgment against North River.
In October 2018, North River filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. In January 2019, the court denied the motion. North River appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
In 2018, an appellate court held that a trial court's decision to set a person's bail based solely on a bail schedule—rather than an inquiry of the person's ability to pay—violated that person's due process rights. (In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, review granted May 23, 2018, S247278 (Humphrey).)
Here, North River claims that because the court set Ashman's bail without considering his ability to pay, Ashman's constructive custody was illegal, and therefore "the bail bond contract is void and unenforceable." County counsel claims North River does not have standing to raise Ashman's constitutional rights.
We will review general legal principles, consider the ruling in Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, and then analyze the parties' respective claims.
1. General Legal Principles
A bail bond permits a defendant to be released from actual custody into the constructive custody of a surety. (Pen. Code, § 1268.) A "'bail bond is a contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant's appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond.'" (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 657-658.)
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
A trial court can set bail in any reasonable amount, but bail is usually determined according to a countywide bail schedule. (§§ 1268, 1269c, 1275, 1289.) If a defendant fails to appear, the court must ultimately declare a forfeiture of the bond. (People v. Tingcungco (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 249, 253.) Bond forfeiture issues are ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 588, 592.) However, "[w]hen the facts are undisputed and only legal issues are involved, appellate courts conduct an independent review." (Ibid.)
2. The Appellate Court's Ruling in Humphrey
In Humphrey, the police arrested defendant for robbery and related crimes. (Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1016-1017.) At his initial arraignment, defendant sought to be released on his own recognizance. The trial court ordered $600,000 in bail, relying on a bail schedule. (Id. at pp. 1017-1018.) Defendant later filed a motion to reduce bail, or to be released on his own recognizance. Defendant argued that he could not afford bail, and he should be entitled to individualized consideration under due process principles. (Id. at pp. 1018-1019.) At the bail review hearing, the trial court did not consider defendant's ability to pay. The court did not agree to release defendant on his own recognizance, but it did reduce bail to $350,000. Thereafter, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at pp. 1021-1023.)
In Humphrey, the appellate court held the trial court should have considered defendant's ability to pay and other factors when considering bail. (Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1022-1023.) The appellate court reasoned that "unquestioning reliance upon the bail schedule without consideration of a defendant's ability to pay, as well as other individualized factors bearing upon his or her dangerousness and/or risk of flight, runs afoul of the requirements of due process for a decision that may result in pretrial detention." (Id. at pp. 1043-1044.) The Humphrey court concluded defendant was "entitled to a new bail hearing at which he is afforded the opportunity to provide evidence and argument, and the court considers his financial resources and other relevant circumstances, as well as alternatives to money bail. If the court determines that [defendant] is unable to afford the amount of money bail it finds necessary to ensure [defendant's] future court appearances, it may set bail at that amount only upon a determination by clear and convincing evidence that no less restrictive alternative will satisfy that purpose." (Id. at p. 1048.)
The Supreme Court has granted review. "Pending review and filing of the Supreme Court's opinion, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court . . . , a published opinion of a Court of Appeal in the matter has no binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive value only." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1).) --------
3. Analysis
In 2019, another appellate court applied the holding in Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, under circumstances very similar to the facts in this case. (See Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 891.) In Accredited, the People filed an amended complaint charging defendant with various sex crimes. The trial court set bail at $290,000, and the surety posted a bail bond. After pleading no contest, defendant failed to appear at sentencing. The trial court ordered the bail forfeited and entered a $290,000 summary judgment. (Id. at p. 895.) The surety appealed, arguing the court violated defendant's due process rights when setting bail under Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1006. (Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 896.) Respondent argued the surety did not have standing to assert defendant's constitutional rights. (Ibid.)
The Accredited court first held the surety had standing. (Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 896-897.) The court reasoned that the surety, as a party to the bond contract, could raise objections to its validity, such as its theory that "the constitutional violation rendered the contract itself void." (Id. at p. 897.) However, citing several published opinions, the court explained that even if a trial court sets a defendant's bail in violation of due process, "that violation does not void the underlying bail bond" for two reasons. (Ibid.) First, a surety forfeits any objection to "procedural irregularities in the bail setting hearing when it 'assume[s] its obligations . . . at the time of the execution of the bond.'" (Id. at p. 898.) Second, a trial court's purported failure to constitutionally set a defendant's bail has "'no legal effect on the forfeiture of bail upon defendant's failure to appear for sentencing.'" (Ibid.) Thus, the court affirmed the order of the trial court denying the surety's motion to vacate summary judgment. (Id. at p. 900.)
We agree with the analysis and application of case law in Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 891. That is, we agree North River has standing. But even if we assume the trial court set bail in violation of Ashman's constitutional rights (see Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1006), North River forfeited any constitutional challenges when it posted the $50,000 bond, and the purported violation has "'no legal effect on the forfeiture of bail upon'" Ashman's later failure to appear. (See Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 898; see also County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1221, 1225 [surety forfeited its claim bond was void because it was not approved by a written order]; Western Surety Co. v. Municipal Court (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 442, 443-444 [surety forfeited its claim bond was void because it was presented to the wrong magistrate].) In sum, the trial court did not err when it denied North River's motion to set aside the $50,000 summary judgment.
North River attempts to distinguish Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, and its application in Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 891, by stating: "This case is different because [North River is] not arguing for exoneration based on the improper setting of bail. Rather, [North River is] arguing that the continued detention of [Ashman was] illegal because the Humphrey factors were not considered by the trial court in issuing the pre-trial detention order." But this is a distinction without a difference. North River is making precisely the same argument that was explicitly raised and rejected in Accredited. (See Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 896-897 [the appellate court rejected the surety's argument "that the constitutional violation rendered the contract itself void"].)
Finally, North River argues that "unlike the surety in Accredited, Ashman did not waive his constitutional rights as defined in Humphrey." But North River's argument misses the mark. Again, even if we assume the trial court violated Ashman's constitutional due process rights at the bail setting hearing under Humphrey, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, North River forfeited any constitutional objections on behalf of Ashman when it posted the bond. And again, this is precisely what happened to the surety in Accredited, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 891.
III
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying the motion to set aside the summary judgment is affirmed. Respondent County of Orange shall recover its costs on appeal.
MOORE, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: IKOLA, J. THOMPSON, J.