Opinion
G056746
10-21-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE CO., Defendant and Appellant; BAD BOYS BAIL BONDS, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendant, Appellants and Real Party in Interest. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and D. Kevin Dunn, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15WF2652) OPINION Appeal from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Terri K. Flynn-Peister and Cheryl L. Leininger, Judges. Affirmed. Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendant, Appellants and Real Party in Interest. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and D. Kevin Dunn, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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At his arraignment on a single charge of murder, Dagoberto Oropeza's bail was set at $1 million. At a subsequent pretrial hearing, a court clerk mistakenly input the bail amount at $100,000. Apparently neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel noticed the error, so bail remained set at $100,000 for the next year. Ultimately, the North River Insurance Company (North River), acting thru its agent Bad Boys Bail Bonds (BBBB), posted a bond in the amount of $100,000, and Oropeza was released from custody. He did not appear at his next court date. The bond was ordered forfeited and the trial court later entered summary judgment against North River. North River argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment because the $100,000 bond did not conform to the court's bail order of $1 million. We disagree and therefore affirm.
FACTS
On December 10, 2015, the Orange County District Attorney filed a felony complaint that charged Oropeza with murder. On December 14, Oropeza appeared in court and his bail was set at $1 million. Oropeza made three additional court appearances. His bail remained set at $1 million after each of these hearings. Following Oropeza's court appearance on March 21, 2016, the court clerk mistakenly input the bail amount at $100,000.
Oropeza then made court appearances on April 15 and May 20, 2016. Bail was not addressed at either hearing, and the minutes reflect that bail remained set at $100,000. On August 5, 2016, the court continued the case; the court noted that "[b]ail as set will remain." The minutes reflect that defendant's bail was to "remain at $100,000.00." The case was further continued at Oropeza's December 2016 and February 2017 hearings. The court's minutes again reflect that defendant's bail was "to remain at $100,000.00."
On March 23, 2017, BBBB, acting as an agent for North River, posted a $100,000 bail bond. Oropeza was released and did not appear at his next court date on April 7, 2017. The bond was ordered forfeited at the hearing. On May 18, 2018, the trial court entered summary judgment in the amount of $100,000 against North River. On June 22, 2018, North River and BBBB filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion on August 2, 2018. North River and BBBB now appeal.
Appellants are collectively referred to as North River.
DISCUSSION
North River argues that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment because Oropeza was released on a bail bond that did not conform to the bail order set by the court. North River analyzes the plain language of Penal Code section 1269b and concludes that a bond cannot be enforced when the posted bail amount differs from the amount ordered by the court. We disagree.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
When considering an issue of statutory construction, we apply a de novo standard of review. (People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1395.) We look first to the plain language of the statute, and if there is no ambiguity, "then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said." (Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 8.) We interpret the language within "the context of the statutory framework as a whole, keeping in mind the policies and purposes of the statute." (Rudd v. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 948, 952.) If there is an uncertainty to the language, "consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation." (Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688.)
North River begins its analysis by noting that section 1269b(b) requires that "the bail shall be in the amount fixed by the judge . . . ." North River then points out that section 1269b(g) requires that a defendant is to be released "[u]pon posting bail." Section 1269b(h) allows the court to institute forfeiture proceedings via sections 1305 and 1306 when a defendant "so released" fails to appear. North River argues that a defendant is only "so released" for the purposes of section 1269b(h) if he or she is released on the bail amount fixed by the court.
We disagree. North River in effect argues that any error in the bail amount causes the bail posted to be void, rendering the court unable to order forfeiture. Instead, North River argues, any error requires exoneration of the bond. We do not believe the statute requires such a result, as clerical error is not included in the list of statutory grounds for exoneration. (See, e.g., §§ 980, subd. (b), 1000.2, 1116, 1188, 1296, 1305, 1371, 1384.) Further, the Penal Code contemplates the possibility of a defendant being released on a bail amount that is different from that ordered by the court. Section 1269a makes it a misdemeanor for an officer to release a defendant arrested on a warrant in a bail amount that differs from that ordered by the court; it does not authorize exoneration of the bond on which the defendant was released.
North River cites three cases to support its argument that the bond is void: County of Merced v. Shaffer (1919) 40 Cal.App. 163 (Merced), People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 588 (International Fidelity), and San Francisco v. Hartnett (1905) 1 Cal.App. 652 (Hartnett). None of these cases support North River's position.
In Merced, codefendants were held on bail set at $500 each. (Merced, supra, 40 Cal.App. at p. 164.) A bond of $1,000 was submitted for the release of both defendants. The Court of Appeal determined that the bond was void for two reasons: (1) it promised that the defendants, not the sureties, were liable for the bail if the defendants failed to appear; and (2) it promised to pay $1,000 if either defendant failed to appear while the bail was instead set at $500 on each defendant. (Id. at pp. 167-168.) In contrast to Merced, North River promised to pay on the bond if Oropeza failed to appear, and North River did not promise to pay more than the bail amount originally set by the court.
In International Fidelity, the defendant's initial bail was set at $35,000; a bond in that amount was posted by Bankers Insurance Company. (International Fidelity, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 590.) The prosecution later informed the court that the defendant had outstanding warrants. The court responded by remanding the defendant and increasing his bail to $100,000, but it allowed the $35,000 bond to remain in effect. (Ibid.) Thereafter, International Fidelity posted a $65,000 bond for the defendant. (Id. at pp. 590-591.) The defendant failed to appear on the specified court date and both bonds were forfeited. (Id. at p. 591.) A motion to vacate forfeiture of the initial $35,000 bond was thereafter granted by the court, and summary judgment was entered against International Fidelity in the amount of $65,000. (Ibid.) International Fidelity in turn filed a motion to set aside summary judgment. The court denied the motion and International Fidelity appealed. (Id. at p. 592)
The Court of Appeal reversed holding that, under section 1305, subdivision (c)(1), the $35,000 bond was exonerated as a matter of law as soon as the defendant was remanded into custody. (International Fidelity, supra. 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 594.) As a result, the trial court could not lawfully apply the $35,000 bond to the new bail of $100,000. Without applying the $35,000 bond, "it was legally impossible for the [$65,000 bond] to provide a total of $100,000 bail." (Ibid.)
The court then analyzed the consequences of the application of the $35,000 bond to the total bail amount. (International Fidelity, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.) The court observed, "The contractual nature of the relationship between the government and the surety leads to the conclusion that the bail order is the offer, and the posting of a bond is the acceptance of that offer." (Ibid.) The court concluded the bail agreement between International Fidelity and the trial court consisted of International Fidelity agreeing to post the $65,000 bond in exchange for two forms of consideration: (1) the release of the defendant from custody; and (2) the application of the $35,000 bond. (Ibid.) Because the $35,000 bond was exonerated when the defendant was remanded into custody International Fidelity "did not receive the benefit of the additional $35,000 of bail being in place," and the contract was therefore void. (Ibid.)
Unlike International Fidelity, North River here received the benefit of its bargain. When it posted the $100,000 bond, the defendant was released from custody. There was no other consideration owed to North River under the bond agreement.
North River also cites Hartnett, supra, 1 Cal.App. 652. In Hartnett, the defendant's bail amount was set by a warrant and bond clerk. (Id. at p. 653.) The appellate court ruled that the bond was void because the bail process outlined in the Penal Code specifically required that the bail amount be set by a court or magistrate. (Id. at p. 654). In this case, bail was set by the court as required by the statute. Hartnett is therefore not helpful to North River.
In any event, courts have generally rejected arguments that bonds are void due to defects if the bond company could have discovered the defect by exercising due diligence through routine investigation. For example, in People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 1 (Accredited), the trial court reduced the defendant's bail from $2 million to $20,000 following an agreement between the parties. Accredited posted a bond; the defendant failed to appear, and the bond was forfeited. (Id. at pp. 5-6.) Accredited argued the bond was void because the court failed to follow the procedures of section 1275 before reducing the bail to $20,000 and did not consider the severity of the charges involved. (Accredited, at p. 6.)
In rejecting these arguments, the Court of Appeal noted that there was no authority to support the claim that "noncompliance with section 1275 operates to exonerate the surety from liability on the bond." (Accredited, supra, 125 Cal.4th at p. 6.) The appellate court also observed that a routine investigation of the record and court file would have revealed the circumstances under which the bail was reduced to $20,000. (Id. at p. 10.) Since Accredited did not conduct an investigation before posting the bond, the forfeiture was affirmed. (Id. at pp. 10-11.)
Similarly, in People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 929, 934, the sheriff erroneously released the defendant before a required 1275.1 hearing was conducted. After the court became aware of the error, it allowed the defendant to remain on bond while the 1275.1 hearing was pending. The defendant failed to appear in court, and the bond was forfeited. (Indiana Lumbermens, at p. 934.) The surety argued that the bond was defective because it was not aware of the 1275.1 hold when it posted the bond. (Indiana Lumbermens, at p. 937.) In affirming the forfeiture, the Court of Appeal reasoned that a review of the court docket and file would have revealed the existence of the 1275.1 hold. (Indiana Lumbermens, at pp. 937-938.)
In the instant case, a review of the court docket and minutes by appellants would have revealed the error in the bail amount. The Orange County bail schedule for murder is $ 1 million. It is not unreasonable to expect and require North River to conduct due diligence by reviewing the docket and court file to confirm the bail amount before it posts a bond in a homicide case. If North River had done so, it would have discovered the clerical error before a bond was posted.
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the Orange County Superior Court Uniform Bail Schedules of 2015, 2016, and 2017. As required, the parties were notified of our intent to do so. No objection was filed. The scheduled bail amount for homicide was $1 million in each schedule.
DISPOSITION
We affirm. Respondent shall recover its costs.
GOETHALS, J. WE CONCUR: FYBEL, ACTING P. J. THOMPSON, J.