Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. NJ24755, John C. Lawson II, Judge.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Colleen M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
By petitions filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, it was alleged that appellant M.W. committed residential burglary and grand theft person (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 487, subd. (c)). Following contested jurisdictional hearings, the juvenile court found the allegations true, sustained the petitions, and declared M.W. a ward of the court. He was placed on home probation and ordered to serve 40 days in juvenile hall.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
The judgments are affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Viewed in accordance with the usual rule of appellate review (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), the evidence established the following. Inasmuch as M.W.’s appellate claim only relates to the petition alleging residential burglary, our statement of facts will not address the other petition, which concerned an unrelated incident involving grand theft.
1. Prosecution evidence.
Mary Degner resided at 5965 Lime Avenue in Long Beach. From her home, she ran a family day care center and an eBay business selling dog clothing. On November 10, 2010, Degner was home from 7:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m., when she went out. Before leaving, Degner locked all the doors and windows.
At 9:50 p.m. that night, Long Beach Police Officer Edmund Moscoso received a call about a residential burglary in progress at 5965 Lime Avenue. Moscoso responded to the scene with other officers and the house was surrounded. The people inside the house were ordered to come out with their hands up. M.W. and another juvenile exited the house.
When Degner returned around 10:30 p.m., there were police officers at her house. She found her bedroom window broken and her bedroom ransacked. Although nothing was missing, boxes of dog clothing had been overturned and left on the floor: “stuff [was] turned over like it had been gone through.”
2. Defense evidence.
M.W. testified that on the night Degner’s house was burgled, he had been walking down Lime Avenue with a friend at about 9:00 p.m., coming home from basketball practice. They walked past a house they thought was abandoned because it had multiple For Sale signs on the property. They also noticed one window was wide open and another was broken. Deciding to go into the house just to have a look around, they climbed through the open window. M.W. testified he did not intend to take anything, he just wanted to “hang out” in the abandoned house with his friend.
As soon as he climbed through the window, however, M.W. saw the cluttered room and realized someone lived in the house. He told his friend they should leave, but by that time the police had arrived. M.W. testified they were inside the house only for about 10 seconds before the police arrived.
The defense theory was that some third person had broken into Degner’s house and departed just prior to M.W.’s entry.
CONTENTION
There was insufficient evidence to sustain the finding that M.W. had committed residential burglary.
DISCUSSION
There was sufficient evidence of residence burglary.
M.W. contends there was insufficient evidence to prove he entered Degner’s house with burglarious intent. This claim is meritless.
1. Legal principles.
Section 459 provides, in pertinent part: “Every person who enters any house... with intent to commit a grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.” Under section 460, “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house... is a burglary of the first degree.”
“Where the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the conduct of the defendant reasonably indicate his purpose in entering the premises is to commit larceny or any felony, the conviction may not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations.]” (People v. Nunley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 232.) “Burglarious intent can reasonably be inferred from an unlawful entry alone. [Citation.] Even if no crime be committed after the entry, circumstances such as flight after being hailed by an occupant of the building [citation], the fact that the building was entered through a window [citation] or through a doorway which previously had been locked [citations] without reasonable explanation of the entry, will warrant the conclusion by a jury that the entry was made with the intention to commit theft.” (People v. Jordan (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 782, 786-787, italics added; see also People v. Nichols (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 223, 227 [“burglarious intent could be reasonably and justifiably inferred” because “the evidence unquestionably established an unlawful and forcible entry”].)
2. Discussion.
M.W. asserts the evidence failed to show he “had the requisite intent to commit a theft or other felony in Degner’s house at the time of entry.” We disagree. Not only was there clear evidence of an unlawful entry, but the circumstances of M.W.’s arrest and his attempt to explain his presence inside Degner’s home furnished even more inculpatory evidence.
M.W. testified he and his friend were walking home from basketball practice at approximately 9:00 p.m. when they noticed the For Sale signs on Degner’s property, decided to explore what they believed to be an abandoned house, climbed through an open window, and then realized the house was actually occupied. However, the evidence established M.W. was still inside the house at about 9:50 p.m. when the police arrived. Thus, M.W. and his companion must have been inside the house for far longer than the “ten seconds” claimed by M.W. In addition, M.W.’s testimony that he believed the house had been abandoned because there were For Sale signs “all around” the property was not particularly credible.
The trier-of-fact would have been well-justified in concluding M.W. had come up with these explanations in order to cover up his guilt. (See People v. Wayne (1953) 41 Cal.2d 814, 823, overruled on another ground in People v. Snyder (1958) 50 Cal.2d 190, 197 [“defendant did not simply deny his guilt; he ventured upon an explanation so unusual that the triers of fact could conclude that it was an intentional fabrication indicating consciousness of guilt and the absence of any true exculpatory explanation”]; People v. Beyah (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 [“if the jury concluded that defendant intentionally gave false or misleading testimony, it may infer that defendant is aware of his guilt and may consider that inference – along with other evidence – in determining defendant’s guilt”].)
The evidence amply showed M.W. committed burglary by entering Degner’s house with the intent to commit theft.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: CROSKEY, J.KITCHING, J.