There is no bright-line rule as to how much time may intervene between obtaining the facts and formulating the affidavit upon which the warrant is based. People v Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600, 602; 198 N.W. 203 (1924). The measure of a search warrant's staleness rests not on whether there is recent information to confirm that a crime is being committed, but on whether probable cause is sufficiently fresh to presume that the items sought remain on the premises.
"There is no hard and fast rule as to how much time may intervene between the obtaining of the facts and the making of the affidavit upon which the search warrant is based." People v Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600, 602; 198 N.W. 203 (1924), quoted in People v Gillam, supra. If a pattern of violations is established by a history of criminal activity, the lapse of time is less critical, especially where information has been received which confirms the basic information supporting the warrant.
United States v Townsend, 394 F. Supp. 736 (ED Mich, 1975). "There is no hard and fast rule as to how much time may intervene between the obtaining of the facts and the making of the affidavit upon which the search warrant is based" People v Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600; 198 N.W. 203 (1924). Certainly the passage of time is a consideration in judging a search warrant's vitality.
People v. Chippewa Circuit Judge involved a case in which the search warrant issued was based on facts 66 days old. In People v. Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600, we said, at p 602: "There is no hard and fast rule as to how much time may intervene between the obtaining of the facts and the making of the affidavit upon which the search warrant is based, but it may be stated that the time should not be remote.
No hard and fast rule concerning the time within which the complaint should be made can be established, except that it should not be too remote. People v. Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600, 198 N.W. 203; People v. Chippewa Circuit Judge, 226 Mich. 326, 197 N.W. 539. It was unnecessary to state in the complaint the date on which the liquor was bought. People v. Shields, 309 Ill. 142, 140 N.E. 850.
This is made clear by the Constitution and every statutory provision with reference to search warrants." See, also, People v. Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600, 198 N.W. 203. The point is also illustrated by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Commonwealth v. Dincler, 201 Ky. 129, 255 S.W. 1042, from which we quote the affidavit for the search warrant and the comment of the court thereon as follows:
In both State v. Guthrie and People v. Wiedeman, supra, it is correctly said that there is nothing in the law concerning search warrants which indicates that such warrant may be held by the officer as a weapon to be used at his discretion. The views above expressed also find support in principle in the following cases: People v. Chippewa Circuit Judge, 226 Mich. 326; People v. Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600; Link v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 778, 251 S.W. 1016; State v. Pachesa (W. Va.), 135 S.E. 908. In Hiller v. State (Wis.), 208 N.W. 260, it was held that a delay of three days in executing the warrant did not render the search invalid.
No hard and fast rule concerning the time within which the complaint should be made can be established except that it should not be too remote. ( People v. Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600; People v. Chippewa Circuit Judge, 226 id. 326.) It was unnecessary to state in the complaint the date on which the liquor was bought. ( People v. Shields, 309 Ill. 142.) The fact that plaintiff in error had sold intoxicating liquor to the affiant constituted just and reasonable ground to believe that he would continue to do so for a short period thereafter, and the affiant was not required to go to the home of plaintiff in error repeatedly to ascertain whether he had ceased to make such sales.
The time was not too remote. People v. Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600. It is also urged that the warrant contains no sufficient finding of the justice to justify its issue. It recites:
No hard and fast rule concerning the time within which the complaint should be made can be established except that it should not be too remote. ( People v. Mushlock, 226 Mich. 600; People v. Chippewa Circuit Judge, 226 id. 326.) It was unnecessary to state in the complaint the date on which the liquor was bought. ( People v. Shields, supra.)