Defendant's argument alleging the excessiveness of his sentence is academic. By operation of law, defendant's definite sentences here merged with and are satisfied by his service of his indeterminate sentences imposed at his trial on the severed charges ( see Penal Law § 70.35; People v Muscoreil, 237 AD2d 970, 971; see also People v Leabo, 84 NY2d 952, 953). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

bery conviction was to run concurrently with a previously imposed definite sentence that defendant was presently serving ( see CPL 470.05). In any event, we note that the court did not actually specify whether the sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively and, thus, by operation of law, the sentence imposed herein ran concurrently with the prior sentence ( see Penal Law § 70.25 [a]). Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that the court had specified that the sentence imposed on the attempted robbery conviction would run consecutively to the definite sentence previously imposed, we conclude that the determinate sentence nevertheless would merge with the previously imposed definite sentence by operation of law ( see § 70.35). "The offense underlying the definite sentence was committed prior to the date on which the [determinate] sentence [was] imposed, and thus the sentences must run concurrently" ( People v. Sutton, 289 AD2d 1069, 1069; see People v. Leabo, 84 NY2d 952, 953; People v. Muscoreil, 237 AD2d 970, 971, lv denied 90 NY2d 861). Thus, the legal effect would be the same as if defendant had been sentenced in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.

t unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed in accordance with the following Memorandum: Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence and the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). We further conclude, however, that Supreme Court erred in directing that the definite sentences of incarceration imposed on counts one and four, assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00) and criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law § 215.50), be consecutive to the indeterminate sentences of incarceration imposed on counts two and three, attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 110.00, 125.25 Penal) and assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10). Because the offenses underlying the definite sentences were committed prior to the date on which the indeterminate sentences were imposed, the sentences must run concurrently ( see, Penal Law § 70.35; People v. Muscoreil, 237 A.D.2d 970, 971, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 861). We therefore modify the judgment by providing that the definite sentences of incarceration run concurrently with the indeterminate sentences.