Opinion
A145583
02-23-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RACHEL MAURINE MUNYON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR302908)
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Rachel Maurine Munyon appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted her of felony vandalism. She argues her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when a police officer recorded her at the front door of her home after she opened the door to talk to the officer. She further asserts that the recording tainted the victim's subsequent identification of her because it was shown to the victim during the investigation. We conclude there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2013, Corinne Fernando was driving home from a dental appointment. She noticed a white pickup truck was following close behind. The truck followed Fernando to her home and stopped behind Fernando after she parked in her driveway. The driver of the truck was angry at Fernando and told Fernando she had been speeding. Fernando stayed in her car until she noticed her young daughter leaving the house. Fernando then exited her car and told her daughter to go back inside. Fernando followed her daughter inside. The person in the truck was screaming and said, " 'I wouldn't leave your car in the driveway if I were you.' "
Shortly after going inside the home, Fernando's daughter told Fernando that " '[t]he lady is doing something to your car.' " Fernando went outside and saw key scratches on her car. The person in the truck told Fernando " 'I hope you like your key job' " and then drove away. Fernando got back into her car and followed the truck. While in pursuit, Fernando called the police and provided the dispatcher with the truck's license plate number and a description of the driver. Fernando eventually lost sight of the truck.
Officer Roy Stockton, a Fairfield police officer, processed the license plate number provided by Fernando and learned the truck was registered to a person named Laura Cotton. Stockton created a photo lineup using Cotton's DMV picture and five other pictures of women with similar characteristics. He showed Fernando the pictures, but she was not able to identify the driver of the truck.
Stockton then drove to a home where the white truck was previously located by another police officer. He went to the front door and knocked. Defendant and her husband both answered. Stockton told defendant he was investigating a vandalism involving a car that had been keyed. Defendant denied being involved.
Stockton asked defendant to see her driver's license, and she provided it to him. Stockton noticed that defendant looked different in person than in her driver's license picture; her hair in person was lighter, and she was not wearing any makeup. Stockton asked defendant if he could take a picture of her. Defendant said she did not want her picture taken. Nevertheless, Stockton recorded defendant with a camera on his cellular phone while she was standing in the open doorway. The video showed defendant standing next to the open door. Her face and most of her body could be seen in the video, though her right arm and leg were out of view behind the door. She appeared to be looking at Stockton and speaking with him, although their conversation was not audible in the video. The video was approximately 30 seconds in length.
After leaving defendant's house, Stockton created a new photo lineup using defendant's DMV picture and five other pictures. Fernando identified the picture of defendant and told Stockton she was " 'pretty sure' " and " 'at least 75 percent sure' " defendant was the assailant. Fernando's hesitancy was defendant had lighter hair and less makeup when Fernando saw her in person than she did in the DMV picture. Since Stockton had noticed the same difference, he showed Fernando a still frame of the video he took of defendant. After viewing the still frame, Fernando told Stockton " '[y]es, that's her.' "
Defendant testified in her own defense. She denied encountering Fernando on July 17, 2013 and accusing her of speeding. She also denied using a key to damage Fernando's vehicle, or being in her driveway. She recalled that Stockton came to her door on July 17 and accused her of keying somebody's car. Stockton asked to take a picture of defendant, but defendant asked him not to because she was not wearing a bra under her shirt. She told Stockton that if she could change clothes, then she would let him take a picture. Stockton began recording or taking pictures of defendant from his cell phone, so defendant tried to stay behind the door. Defendant was upset and offended but did not make a complaint to the police department.
Defendant was found guilty of vandalism causing damage of $400 or more. (Pen. Code, § 594, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1).) The court suspended imposition of her sentence and placed her on three years of probation, which included 45 days in jail. This timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the video and still frame images of her taken by Officer Stockton, as well as "all evidence derived" from the video and images. The court held a hearing on the motion and heard testimony from Fernando and Stockton, who testified to essentially the same version of events about the alleged crime and subsequent video recording that were presented at trial.
The trial court denied defendant's motion. It stated that an officer "has the ability to approach the front door" and that "it is up to the individual inside the house whether they want to open this door or not." Once defendant opened the door, "that eviscerate[d] any claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy."
On appeal, defendant concedes that Stockton was "standing in a place where he had the right to be and could lawfully make observations from that position." Defendant argues, however, that Stockton's recordation of her without her consent transformed Stockton's actions into an unconstitutional search and seizure because a recording is "much more intrusive than an observation, especially when it is directed inside the home."
The Fourth Amendment provides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) "The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable intrusion on the part of the government." (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 971.) " 'An illegal search or seizure violates the federal constitutional rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place or seized thing. [Citation.] The legitimate expectation of privacy must exist in the particular area searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.' [Citation.]" (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171, italics omitted.) "The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]" (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
Here, as defendant concedes, Stockton acted appropriately prior to recording defendant. Stockton did not conduct an unconstitutional search by entering defendant's property, since "[a] sidewalk, pathway, common entrance or similar passageway offers an implied permission to the public to enter which necessarily negates any reasonable expectancy of privacy in regard to observations made there." (Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 629.) He was also permitted to knock on defendant's door to ask her questions. (See People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309-310 [during daylight hours, police may knock on front door of person's home with the honest intent of asking a question of the occupant].) And, once defendant opened the door to talk to Stockton, Stockton was permitted to observe her in her open doorway since she had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that area. (See United States v. Santana (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 42 [defendant had no expectation of privacy in doorway of house because she was "exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house"].)
Contrary to defendant's assertion, Stockton's actions did not become unconstitutional when he used his phone to record defendant. An individual's expectation of privacy does not extend to "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office." (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351.) As such, a defendant "cannot reasonably argue that [a] recording violates his legitimate privacy interests when it reveals no more than what was already visible" to law enforcement. (U.S. v. Wahchumwah (9th Cir. Wash. 2013) 710 F.3d 862, 867; see People v. Lieng (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1225, 1228 [police use of night goggles to make observation from driveway was not a search under the Fourth Amendment].) Stockton's video revealed nothing more than what could be observed with a naked eye, and did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
This case is distinguishable from People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, which defendant cites. In Camacho, in response to a complaint of a late-night " 'loud party disturbance,' " police officers went to the defendant's house without a warrant, walked into the side yard of the house, peered through a window, and observed defendant packaging drugs. (Id. at pp. 828-829.) The officers called for backup, then entered the house through the window and arrested defendant. (Id. at p. 829.) Our Supreme Court held that the officers had conducted an unconstitutional search when they looked into the defendant's window from the side yard. The officers "were standing in a place to which neither they nor the public had been invited, and no other circumstances authorized their entry into defendant's yard." (Id. at p. 837.) As such, the defendant "retained a reasonable expectation of privacy over his activities[.]" (Ibid.) Here, unlike the officers in Camacho, Stockton observed defendant in an area where she lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy—her exposed front doorway.
The facts of this case are also different than those in Kyllo v. United States (2001) 533 U.S. 27 (Kyllo). In Kyllo, law enforcement officers, without a warrant, used a thermal imaging device to detect the lights used in an indoor marijuana growing operation. (Id. at p. 29.) The high court held that "obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' [citation], constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use." (Id. at p. 34.) The thermal imaging device in Kyllo is a far cry from the phone used by Stockton. The phone was not sense-enhancing, it did not obtain information about the interior of the home that was otherwise unobtainable, and there is no dispute that phones with video recording capability are in general public use.
We therefore hold that under the specific facts of this case—where Stockton lawfully approached defendant's front door, defendant answered the door, and Stockton used a cellular phone camera to briefly record defendant in her open doorway—defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
REARDON, ACTING P. J. We concur: /s/_________
RIVERA, J. /s/_________
STREETER, J.