Opinion
E073361
02-14-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES JOSEPH MUNOZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Leslie Ann Rose, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FVI19001154) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lisa M. Rogan, Judge. Affirmed. Leslie Ann Rose, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant James Joseph Munoz was charged by felony complaint with failure to register annually as a sex offender. (Pen. Code, § 290.012, subd. (a), count 1.) The complaint also alleged that he had one prior strike conviction. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Defendant entered a plea agreement and pled no contest to count 1 and admitted the prior strike conviction. In accordance with the agreement, a trial court sentenced him to the low term of two years eight months in state prison.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal and request for a certificate of probable cause, which the court granted. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 25, 2019, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with failure to register annually as a sex offender. (§ 290.012, subd. (a), count 1.) It also alleged that he had one prior strike conviction. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Defendant pled not guilty and denied the prior strike.
On May 23, 2019, defendant, who was represented by counsel, entered a plea agreement, withdrew his plea of not guilty, and pled no contest to count 1. Before accepting the plea, the court questioned him. It asked defendant if he personally initialed and signed the plea form, and he confirmed that he did. The court asked if he discussed the plea form with his attorney and understood everything on it. Defendant confirmed that he understood all the constitutional rights he was waiving, the nature of the charges, and the penalties and punishments. He then affirmed that no one had made any promises of a lesser sentence, no one had used threats or violence to force him to plead no contest, he was not under the influence of alcohol or medicine, and he had enough time to discuss his case with his attorney, including all of his rights, potential defenses, penalties, and future consequences. When asked if he needed any further time to discuss or clarify anything, he said no. Defense counsel agreed that she had adequate time to discuss the issues with defendant and that he understood everything on the plea form. The court found that defendant had read and understood the plea form and was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights.
Defendant did inform the court that he "received medication" before he came to the hearing; however, he denied that the medication affected his ability to understand the proceedings.
Defendant orally entered a plea of no contest to count 1. He also admitted the prior strike conviction. Defense counsel joined, and the People accepted. As to count 1, the parties stipulated that the police reports established a factual basis for the plea. The court dismissed any remaining counts and allegations. It then sentenced defendant, pursuant to the agreement, to the low term of two years eight months in state prison. The court found that defendant did not have the ability to reimburse the county for court-appointed counsel fees, but it imposed other fines and fees.
On July 24, 2019, defendant filed a notice of appeal in propria persona indicating that he was challenging the validity of the plea. In his request for a certificate of probable cause, he made a myriad of allegations, including that his plea was made under duress and threats by his public defender, and that he was going through "withdrawals of morphine and mental incapacity" at the time of his plea, due to brain damage from a stroke he had suffered. The court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause on July 30, 2019.
DISCUSSION
Defendant appealed and, upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the case and a few potential arguable issues, including: (1) whether the waiver of the right to appeal is valid; (2) whether his guilty plea is constitutionally valid; (3) whether there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea; (4) whether the court erred in failing to consider his ability to pay when imposing the court security fee, court operations fee, and conviction assessment fee, although it found he did not have the ability to pay for court-appointed counsel fees; and (5) whether his counsel was ineffective. Counsel has also requested that this court undertake a review of the entire record.
We note that the court orally imposed a $70 court security fee, which is reflected in the minute order as a "Constr./court operations fee." This fee was formerly called a court security fee but is now called the court operations fee. (§ 1465.8.) The statute requires a defendant to pay $40 for each conviction. (Ibid.) The abstract of judgment correctly reflects that defendant is obligated to pay the court operations fee of $40, pursuant to section 1465.8.
We further note the abstract of judgment correctly reflects that defendant is obligated to pay a conviction assessment fee of $30, pursuant to Government Code section 70373, even though the court neglected to mention it at the hearing.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has done. His handwritten brief is essentially a continuous narrative, which contains mainly questions and assertions. Defendant appears to be contending that his plea was not knowingly or intelligently made because he suffered a stroke approximately one year prior to his convicted offense, which resulted in extreme memory loss and a diminished capacity. He additionally claims he could not see or read the plea agreement he signed, and thus the court erred in allowing the plea hearing to continue. He also claims the court abused its discretion by not asking him what type of medication he was taking, when he indicated he had taken some prior to the hearing.
To the extent defendant is attempting to withdraw his plea because it is invalid due to his lack of understanding, such claim fails. Section 1018 provides, in relevant part: "On application of the defendant at any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, the court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." "Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea. [Citations.] But good cause must be shown by clear and convincing evidence." (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.)
Defendant has failed to show any mistake or ignorance in entering his plea. The court thoroughly advised him and confirmed several times that he understood the agreement. At no time did he suggest his understanding was hampered in any way. Moreover, he has not established that he actually had a stroke or any type of mental incapacity or disorder. Defendant attached a radiology report to his brief, which appears to show he had a CT scan done of his head. However, the report was from 2016—nearly three years prior to his plea hearing—and it does not demonstrate that he had a stroke or suffered from any mental incapacity.
Regarding the claim that he could not see the plea agreement, defendant correctly points out that the court noticed a puzzled look on his face during the hearing, and he informed the court he had trouble seeing. He now faults the court for not inquiring further into his ability to see, read, and acknowledge the plea and for not asking if he wore reading glasses. However, the court said it just wanted to make sure he understood what he was doing. It then articulated the terms of the plea agreement and asked if he understood the agreement. Defendant expressly confirmed that he did. Thus, there was no reason for the court to inquire any further into his ability to see or understand the plea agreement. Similarly, when defendant said he had taken medication, there was no need for the court to inquire further, since he informed the court that the medication did not affect his ability to understand the proceedings in any way.
Defendant also contends his counsel was ineffective for letting him enter a plea agreement, despite knowing he had a stroke, and for failing to have a medical evaluation of his eyes performed or his mental health assessed, in order to determine if he could knowingly and intelligently enter the plea. Defendant additionally claims his mental disorder contributed to him failing to register. For the same reasons discussed ante, we reject these claims as having no established basis.
Finally, defendant argues the court abused its discretion by not determining, by its observations, that he did not know the nature of the hearing or consequences of his plea. There was no abuse of discretion, in light of his multiple assurances to the court that he understood the plea agreement. Moreover, defense counsel reviewed the plea form with defendant and told the court he was satisfied that defendant understood everything on the form. Ultimately, the record reflects that the court questioned and observed defendant, then properly found that he understood the nature of the charge and consequences of the plea and entered his plea freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
We have now concluded our independent review of the record, and we have found no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. MENETREZ
J.