Opinion
2016-2901 N CR
12-13-2018
Nassau County Legal Aid Society (Tammy Feman and Gianpaolo Ciocco of counsel), for appellant. Nassau County District Attorney (Jason R. Richards and Michael K. Degree of counsel), for respondent.
Nassau County Legal Aid Society (Tammy Feman and Gianpaolo Ciocco of counsel), for appellant.
Nassau County District Attorney (Jason R. Richards and Michael K. Degree of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: JERRY GARGUILO, J.P., ANTHONY MARANO, BRUCE E. TOLBERT, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
On September 16, 2016, defendant pleaded guilty to separate charges of driving while intoxicated per se ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2 ] ) and unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 [1 ] ) in full satisfaction of other accusatory instruments charging various misdemeanor and traffic offenses.
During the plea colloquy, the District Court inquired of defendant, who was aided by an interpreter, with defendant's counsel present, whether defendant was "under the influence of any drugs or alcohol that [would] make [him] not understand what's going on here." Defendant stated, "Yes. Yes. I understand." The court then asked defendant again if he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He stated, "Oh, no. No." When the court asked defendant if, at the time he had been driving his vehicle, he had been intoxicated due to the consumption of beer, he replied, "Sorry, your Honor." Upon the court's follow-up question, defendant agreed that he had been driving while intoxicated per se because he had been drinking beer before operating a motor vehicle. There was no recitation of any of the facts underlying defendant's plea to unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The court imposed sentences immediately following the entry of the guilty pleas (see People v. Louree , 8 NY3d 541 [2007] ).
On appeal, defendant contends that the judgments of conviction should be reversed and the pleas of guilty vacated. With respect to the plea to the charge of driving while intoxicated per se, defendant argues that it was factually insufficient because it did not establish every element of that offense. With respect to the plea to the charge of unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, defendant states that there was no recitation of the underlying facts of that offense. Additionally, defendant argues that his initial responses to the court's inquiries regarding whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the plea and whether, due to his consumption of beer, he had been driving a vehicle while intoxicated, demonstrate that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him and that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into.
"[A]n allocution based on a negotiated plea need not elicit from a defendant specific admissions as to each element of the charged crime. Nor is [t]he court's duty to inquire further ... triggered merely by the failure of a pleading defendant, whether or not represented by counsel, to recite every element of the crime pleaded to" ( People v. Goldstein , 12 NY3d 295, 301 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Moreover, courts have "refused to disturb pleas ... even when there has been absolutely no elicitation of the underlying facts of the crime" (id. ). "It is enough that the allocution shows that the defendant understood the charges and made an intelligent decision to enter a plea" (id. ). Defendant's affirmative responses to the District Court's questions during the allocution as to his guilt or innocence of the charges against him were sufficient to establish his guilt (see People v. Anlyan , 142 AD3d 670, 670-671 [2016] ; People v. Griffith , 136 AD3d 1114, 1115 [2016] ; People v. Martinez , 79 AD3d 1378, 1378-1379 [2010] ; People v. Bosticco , 52 Misc 3d 140[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51169[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]; cf. People v. Worden , 22 NY3d 982, 984-986 [2013] ). Furthermore, defendant's response to the court regarding whether he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs casts doubt neither upon his guilt nor upon the voluntariness of his guilty pleas.
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
GARGUILO, J.P., MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ., concur.