Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 200-01 (noting that because a term of MSR is mandated by statute, courts have no authority to withhold the mandatory MSR term when imposing a sentence); People ex rel. Scott v. Israel, 66 Ill. 2d 190, 194 (1977) (interpreting mandatory parole, the predecessor to MSR); People v. Hunter, 2011 IL App (1st) 093023, ¶ 23; People v. Morgan, 128 Ill. App. 3d 298, 300 (1984); People v. Coultas, 75 Ill. App. 3d 137, 138 (1979). ¶ 14 In an attempt to sidestep the foregoing authority, defendant, without any analysis, directs us to People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, and United States ex rel. Carroll v. Hathaway, No. 10 C 3862, 2012 WL 171322 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 19, 2012). In Munoz, the trial court's written sentencing order reflected a two-year MSR term, but the Department's inmate records listed the defendant's MSR term as "3 Yrs to Life-To Be Determined."
Still, other precedent existed at the time under which defendant could argue that his MSR term was void.¶ 16 On appeal, defendant relies upon People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, 356 Ill.Dec. 947, 962 N.E.2d 632 and People v. Kerns, 2012 IL App (3d) 100375, 359 Ill.Dec. 193, 966 N.E.2d 514. In Munoz, the defendant's IDOC records listed an indeterminate MSR term of three years to life, a period that complied with the relevant statute but differed from the trial court's written sentencing order erroneously setting a two-year MSR term. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, ¶¶ 10–12, 356 Ill.Dec. 947, 962 N.E.2d 632. This court held the IDOC lacked the power to set the term of MSR to be served and remanded to the trial court to impose an MSR term within the statutory range.
The court properly summarily dismissed defendant's postconviction petition.¶ 17 In his pro se postconviction petition, defendant relied on several cases involving improper terms of MSR, i.e., Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936), and United States ex rel. Carroll v. Hathaway, No. 10 C 3862, 2012 WL 171322 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2012), as well as People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App. (3d) 100193, 962 N.E.2d 632 (2011). Defendant mischaracterized the precedent these cases establish.
blished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (affirming the summary dismissal of defendant's successive post-conviction petition after granting appellate counsel leave to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)). ¶ 3 On May 16, 2012, defendant filed the subject pro se complaint for mandamus relief primarily alleging his due process rights were violated by the imposition of a mandatory supervised release (MSR) term by the Department of Corrections (DOC). In a written order entered on June 22, 2012, the circuit court denied defendant's complaint for mandamus relief, finding that the three-year MSR term was appropriately added "by operation of law" to his 40-year term of imprisonment. ¶ 4 Defendant now appeals from that order contending that his due process rights were violated by the "automatic IDOC imposition" of a three-year MSR term, which was not mentioned by the trial court in either its oral pronouncement of sentence or its written sentencing order. Citing People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, ¶ 11, defendant argues that the power to impose an MSR term is exclusively the function of the trial court and, thus, it is unconstitutional for the DOC to impose an MSR term without the express authorization of the trial court. ¶ 5 The State responds that defendant's claim lacks merit because a term of MSR attaches by operation of law to any sentence imposed by the trial court and, thus, its "assignment" by the DOC does not violate due process.
¶ 8 On appeal, defendant directs us to several decisions that predate McChriston and demonstrate that his petition had an arguable legal basis when it was filed. In People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, ¶¶ 2, 10-12, the defendant's DOC records listed an indeterminate MSR term of three years to life, a period that comported with the relevant statute but differed from the erroneous two-year MSR term ordered by the trial court. This court ruled the DOC's imposition of MSR was void because the trial court had "sole authority to impose a term of MSR as part of a defendant's sentence."
Carroll v. Hathaway, No. 10 C 3862, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2012) (observing that MSR term was required by state law). Still, additional precedent existed at the time under which Jones could argue that his MSR term was void.¶ 12 On appeal, Jones directs us to Earley and People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, which also was cited in the original opinion in Carroll. In Munoz, the defendant's DOC records listed an indeterminate MSR term of three years to life, a period that comported with the relevant statute but differed from the erroneous two-year MSR term in the trial court's written sentencing order.
The appropriate remedy to rectify this essentially clerical omission is to vacate the term of MSR added by the DOC and remand to the trial court with directions to correct the sentencing order to reflect the MSR term provided under section 5-8-1(d) of the Code. See People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, ¶ 19. Because defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender due to his criminal background, the three-year MSR term applicable to the Class X conviction was part of his sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-15(c), 5-8-1(d)(1) (West 2012); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009).
The appropriate remedy to rectify this essentially clerical omission is to vacate the term of MSR added by the DOC and remand to the trial court with directions to correct the sentencing order to reflect the MSR term provided under section 5-8-1(d) of the Code. See People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193, ¶ 19. Because defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender due to his criminal background, the three-year MSR term applicable to the Class X conviction was part of his sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-15(c), 5-8-1(d)(1) (West 2012); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009).
Defendant's argument is that while the legislature may determine the appropriate sentences, including supervised release, only a court can enter a judgment of confinement because an administrative agency lacks the authority to do so. See People v. Munoz, 2011 IL App (3d) 100193 (vacating the term of MSR imposed by the DOC and remanding to the trial court with directions to impose MSR as provided under section 5-8-1(d) of the Code). ¶ 24 In this case, a statute mandated that defendant serve a three-year term of MSR. Therefore, the trial court had no discretionary power as to whether the MSR would be imposed.