Opinion
No. 338923
07-24-2018
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARL WESLEY MOTT, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2016-003281-FH Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and MURPHY and MARKEY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); and larceny of property valued at less than $200, MCL 750.356(5). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 10 to 30 years' imprisonment for his home invasion conviction and 93 days for his larceny conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant's convictions arise from his actions at Skibbe Farms on the evening of July 26, 2016. On that date, defendant stole a picnic table from the property, which an eyewitness saw defendant loading into the back of his maroon truck. Notably, the evidence also indicated that defendant entered a residential dwelling where farm employees were living. No one actually saw defendant inside the building; however, after hearing the screen door slam, witnesses saw defendant on the outside steps. Defendant hunched down and then climbed inside the truck. The farm manager and an employee tried to prevent defendant from leaving the property, but defendant fled in his truck with the picnic table. Inside the building, one of the residents found that all of the drawers and cabinets in the kitchen were open. Nothing was missing from inside the house, but a bag of returnable cans was missing from outside the house. The jury convicted defendant of first-degree home invasion and larceny of property valued at less than $200.
Defendant first argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree home invasion. First, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he entered the dwelling. Second, defendant argues that there was no evidence he intended to commit larceny in the building. These arguments are without merit.
"This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence." People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 180; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). "Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the question on appeal is whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 421; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). "Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime." People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "In determining whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction, the reviewing court will not interfere with the fact-finder's role of deciding the credibility of the witnesses." Solloway, 316 Mich App at 180. "It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences." Hardiman, 466 Mich at 428.
The first-degree home invasion statute, MCL 750.110a(2), has "alternative elements," meaning that the crime "can be committed in several different ways." People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 43; 780 NW2d 265 (2010). As charged in this case, the prosecutor had to show (1) that defendant entered a dwelling without permission, (2) that when entering the dwelling, defendant intended to commit larceny, and (3) that when defendant was entering, present in, or leaving the dwelling, another person was lawfully present in the dwelling. See id.; MCL 750.110a(2). On appeal, defendant only challenges the first two elements, as there was no dispute that a farm employee and his family members were lawfully inside the dwelling.
Regarding the first element, although no one actually saw defendant inside the dwelling, the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to establish that defendant entered the building without permission. First, a witness saw defendant outside loading the picnic table in his truck, and defendant then "kind of disappeared." The witness then heard the screen door slam and saw defendant leave the house and walk down the steps from the front door toward the maroon truck. Likewise, a second witness, who was asleep inside the dwelling, testified that he woke up when he heard the screen door slam. The witness then saw a man going down the front steps. After seeing a man on the steps, the witness found all of the drawers and cabinets in the kitchen open, yet all of the drawers and cabinets had been closed when he went to sleep. While defendant speculates that someone else in the house could have opened the drawers and cabinets, the only other people in the house went to sleep before the witness and they were still in bed when the witness checked on them after hearing the screen door slam. Given this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant entered the house. See Carines, 460 Mich at 757. Additionally, the testimony was clear that defendant did not have permission to be in the house. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could rationally conclude that defendant entered the dwelling without permission. See MCL 750.110a(2); Hardiman, 466 Mich at 421.
In regard to the second element, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant had the intent to commit a larceny when entering the dwelling. "A factfinder can infer a defendant's intent from his words or from the act, means, or the manner employed to commit the offense." People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 458; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). "Because intent may be difficult to prove, only minimal circumstantial evidence is necessary to show a defendant entertained the requisite intent." People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 178; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). Both the manager and another witness testified that they saw defendant steal the picnic table from just outside the dwelling, and a bag of returnable cans that had been next to the front door was also missing after defendant left. Defendant fled the scene in the maroon truck, even after an employee crashed a vehicle into defendant's truck in an effort to stop defendant. Given the evidence that defendant stole items, opened drawers and cabinets inside the home, and fled when confronted, a rational juror could infer that defendant was looking for something to steal when he entered the dwelling, satisfying the second element of first-degree home invasion. See MCL 750.110a(2); Hawkins, 245 Mich App at 458. Overall, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty of first-degree home invasion beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hardiman, 466 Mich at 421.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to strike a juror for cause because the juror was a "close acquaintance" of one of the prosecution's witnesses, specifically the manager of Skibbe Farms. We disagree.
A defendant can challenge a prospective juror for cause on any ground set forth in MCR 2.511(D) or for any other reason recognized by law. MCR 6.412(D)(1). We review a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause for an abuse of discretion, deferring to "the trial court's superior ability to assess from a [juror's] demeanor whether the person would be impartial." People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 521; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). "Although, as a general matter, the determination whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause is within the trial court's discretion, once a party shows that a prospective juror falls within the parameters of one of the grounds enumerated in MCR 2.511(D), the trial court is without discretion to retain that juror, who must be excused for cause." People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379, 382-383; 677 NW2d 76 (2004). To merit reversal based on a trial court's denial of a challenge to a juror for cause:
there must be some clear and independent showing on the record that: (1) the court improperly denied a challenge for cause, (2) the aggrieved party exhausted all peremptory challenges, (3) the party demonstrated the desire to excuse another subsequently summoned juror, and (4) the juror whom the party wished later to excuse was objectionable. [People v Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 81; 517 NW2d 270 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]"Jurors are presumptively competent and impartial, and the party alleging the disqualification bears the burden of proving its existence." People v Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 256; 631 NW2d 1 (2001).
Relying on MCR 2.511(D)(2), (3), and (4), defendant maintains that Juror 3 should have been dismissed for cause because he was biased and had preexisting opinions that would prevent him from rendering a just verdict. Defendant raised this argument during voir dire, challenging Juror 3 for cause because of purported bias arising from his relationship with the manager. The trial court denied the challenge for cause, and defendant thereafter exercised a peremptory challenge to have Juror 3 dismissed from the jury.
It is grounds for a challenge for cause that the juror: "is biased for or against a party or attorney," MCR 2.511(D)(2), "shows a state of mind that will prevent the person from rendering a just verdict, or has formed a positive opinion on the facts of the case or on what the outcome should be," MCR 2.511(D)(3), or "has opinions or conscientious scruples that would improperly influence the person's verdict," MCR 2.511(D)(4).
On these facts, defendant is not entitled to relief. First of all, defendant did not meet his burden of showing that Juror 3 was biased or incapable of rendering a just verdict due to preexisting opinions. At most, Juror 3 described the manager as "a close acquaintance;" and Juror 3 explained that Skibbe Farms owned a field that abutted his own property. However, Juror 3 stated that he and the manager did not "get together and hang out;" they were not close enough to attend birthday parties or send Christmas cards to each other; and he had never talked to the manager about this case. Juror 3 maintained that he could remain impartial and assess the manager's credibility as he would anyone else. Considering the nature of the relationship described by Juror 3, we find that the mere fact that he was acquainted with a prosecution witness did not necessitate the conclusion that he was biased or had opinions that would improperly influence his verdict, particularly when the juror affirmatively stated that he could be impartial. See People v Emerson, 203 Mich App 345, 349; 512 NW2d 3 (1994); People v Walker, 162 Mich App 60, 64-65; 412 NW2d 244 (1987). Consequently, defendant has not shown cause for dismissing Juror 3 under MCR 2.511(D), and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's challenge for cause. See Eccles, 260 Mich App at 382-383; Williams, 241 Mich App at 521. In any event, even assuming arguendo that Juror 3 should have been excused for cause, we also find that defendant would not be entitled to relief because, although he used all of his peremptory challenges, there is no evidence that defendant "desire[d] to excuse another subsequently summoned juror" or that any other juror was "objectionable." Legrone, 205 Mich App at 81 (quotation marks and citation omitted). To the contrary, defense counsel ultimately indicated that he was "satisfied" with the impaneled jury. Defendant's argument is without merit.
Finally, defendant argues on appeal in his Standard 4 brief that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in allowing an interpreter to translate for the prosecution witnesses at the preliminary examination and at trial without the proper certification, qualification, or voir dire. We disagree. Defendant's argument is unpreserved because he failed to object to the interpreter's qualifications in the trial court. People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 382; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). We review unpreserved claims for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Cain, 498 Mich 108, 116; 869 NW2d 829 (2015). Under the plain error standard, defendant must show "that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was 'plain'—i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the error affected substantial rights—i.e., the outcome of the lower court proceedings was affected." Id.
The rules for appointing a foreign language interpreter are set forth in MCR 1.111. Under MCR 1.111(B)(1), an interpreter should be appointed if needed for a witness testifying in a criminal case. Relevant to this case, MCR 1.111(F)(1) states:
When the court appoints a foreign language interpreter under subrule (B)(1), the court shall appoint a certified foreign language interpreter whenever practicable. If a certified foreign language interpreter is not reasonably available, and after considering the gravity of the proceedings and whether the matter should be rescheduled, the court may appoint a qualified foreign language interpreter who meets the qualifications in (A)(6). The court shall make a record of its reasons for using a qualified foreign language interpreter.
In this case, the interpreter who translated at the preliminary examination and at trial was not a "certified foreign language interpreter;" but, he was a "qualified foreign language interpreter," who was registered with the Supreme Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) and met the SCAO's requirements. See MCR 1.111(A)(6)(i), (ii). At trial, the trial court engaged in voir dire of the interpreter regarding his background and education, and based on this voir dire, the trial court concluded that the interpreter was qualified to interpret in this matter. See MCR 1.111(A)(6)(a)(iii). In terms of the trial court's decision to use a qualified interpreter as opposed to a certified interpreter, the trial court noted that a certified interpreter was the "best practice," but that "it is difficult to find certified interpreters." The trial court also noted that the difficulty in finding certified interpreters is "probably" why a qualified interpreter was called in this case. Under MCR 1.111(F)(1), the trial court should have done more than generally speculate about the availability of certified interpreters; the trial court should have determined whether or not a certified interpreter was "reasonably available" for this case. Nevertheless, even if the trial court should have made a more thorough record, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief, because he cannot show that any error affected the outcome. See Cain, 498 Mich at 116. Defendant has not pointed to any translation errors, he has not shown that a certified interpreter was reasonably available, and the interpreter was, in fact, qualified. Thus, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced, and he is not entitled to relief. See id.
Although not contained in his statement of the questions presented, defendant also asserts on appeal that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the interpreter's qualifications. On the record before us, this argument fails because any objection to the interpreter's qualifications would have been futile and defendant has not shown that counsel's failure to object affected the outcome of the proceedings. See People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). --------
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E. Markey