Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside, No. RIF136295, John D. Molloy, Judge.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
A jury convicted Martin Romero Mota in the beating death of his two-year-old daughter, Diana. He was convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and assault on a child under age eight resulting in death (§ 273ab). Mota was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life for the assault conviction. The sentence for second degree murder was imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
The issues on this appeal are fairly straightforward. Mota does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. This appeal challenges the giving of two jury instructions, which were predicated on evidence that Mota repeatedly gave a false name to police and emergency personnel, and that he persuaded his wife to also give police a false name for Mota. He contends the admitted lies to police during the investigation of his daughter's death are not the types of false statements that would justify giving the jury instructions at issue in this case. We find substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision to give the challenged instructions and will affirm the convictions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since Mota does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, we will set forth an abbreviated statement of facts in order to provide context for the discussion that follows.
At about 11:45 a.m. on April 13, 2007, Mota's wife Gloria Hernandez left the family home with her son and Mota's brother. Mota remained in the house where the child, Diana, had been left sitting on the couch in front of the television. At about 11:54 that morning Mota took Diana to the nearby fire station and reported to Corona Firefighter/Paramedic Chris Douglas. The child was obviously in distress and unconscious.
Mota told Douglas that the child had choked on her breakfast, but Douglas found no obstruction. Douglas believed there had been brain injury. The child had bruises and marks on her head and face.
Douglas wanted to ask Mota about possible injuries to the child, but Mota left before Douglas could talk to him.
Diana was ultimately taken to Loma Linda Hospital, where she died three days later.
Diana was killed by one to three blows of blunt force trauma to her head. Additionally, she had suffered past and current injuries including a fractured rib, kidney damage, bruises and abrasions all over her body, malnutrition and evidence of shaking injury. In short, she was a battered child who had been beaten to death.
Mota gave police a false identification. He told police his name was Carlos Navarette Duenes. Mota also instructed his wife to lie to the police about his identity and to give a false surname for their son. Ultimately, confronted by police, Mota acknowledged he had lied about his name and gave his correct name.
DISCUSSION
Based upon testimony that Mota lied to the police about his true identity and that he persuaded his wife to also lie to the police, the trial court gave the jury relevant instructions, CALJIC No. 2.03 (Consciousness of Guilt-Falsehood) and CALJIC No. 2.05 (Efforts Other than By Defendant to Fabricate Evidence). Mota challenges the two instructions in two separate arguments. We will consider the instructions together since their validity is based on the same question: Do Mota's lies to the police about his identity serve as substantial evidence for the instructions? If so, there is no separate basis to challenge CALJIC 2.05 because there is no dispute that Mota persuaded his wife to support his false statements to the police.
CALJIC No. 2.03 provides: "If you find that before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider that statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt. However, that conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are for you to decide."
A court may instruct a jury on the use of the defendant's false pretrial statements and fabrications of evidence authorized by the defendant if a reasonable inference of consciousness of guilt can be made from those statements or efforts. (People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1103-1104; People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1167-1168.) The inference from the instructions is permissive and the cautionary provisions of the instructions provide guidance to the jury that is protective of the defendant's interests. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1222.)
Mota concedes he and his wife deliberately lied to authorities regarding Mota's true identity. He simply argues that such lies were not the type of false denial of guilt, or misleading assertions that would support an inference of consciousness of guilt. We disagree and find that case law supports the trial court's decision to use the challenged instructions.
The court in People v. Williams, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, held that deliberate false statements to police about matters that are within the arrestee's knowledge and materially relating to his or her guilt or innocence "have long been considered cogent evidence of a consciousness of guilt." (Id. at pp. 1167-1168.)
Two older cases, without extensive analysis of this precise issue, do squarely hold that a deliberate lie to police about one's true identity qualifies for an inference of consciousness of guilt. In People v. Liss (1950) 35 Cal.2d 570, 576, the Supreme Court held that false identification justified a jury instruction. Liss was later followed by the Court of Appeal in People v. Bertholf (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 599, 602. (See also People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 643.)
We find Mota's lies about his identity qualify for an inference of consciousness of guilt. When he turned the child over to the paramedic, Mota disappeared before essential questions could be asked. His story about the child choking on her breakfast was patently false. One could surely infer that he was positioning himself to flee if suspicion focused too closely upon him. Of course, Mota did not testify so we do not know if there are other reasons for his intentional evasion. However, based on clear authority in case law and the common sense notion that Mota was lying to find a way to extricate himself from his own criminal conduct, we are satisfied the court properly instructed the jury.
To the extent there may have been any error, any error is clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J., HALLER, J.
CALJIC 2.05 provides: "If you find that an effort to procure false or fabricated evidence was made by another person for the defendant's benefit, you may not consider that effort as tending to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt unless you also find that the defendant authorized that effort. If you find defendant authorized the effort, that conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are for you to decide."