Opinion
January 22, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (George, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that his guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt in view of inconsistencies in the testimony of the People's two main witnesses and the conflict between their version and the defendant's version of the occurrences at bar. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
In addition, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting the People's motion to consolidate the two robbery indictments against the defendant (see, CPL 200.20 [c]; [4]). Upon examination of the defendant's affirmation in opposition to consolidation, it appears that the defendant failed to demonstrate that consolidation would prejudice his right to a fair trial and further failed to make the required showing that he had pertinent testimony to give with respect to one indictment and a strong need to refrain from testifying with respect to the other (see, People v Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1, 8; People v Montanez, 149 A.D.2d 627, 628; People v Burton, 134 A.D.2d 269). Furthermore, there is no proof in the record that the defendant suffered actual prejudice. The defendant was positively identified by each of the victims shortly after the respective incidents (see, People v Nelson, 133 A.D.2d 470, 471), and proof of each crime was presented separately and clearly and was easily discernable and separable in the minds of the jurors, and the defendant had ample opportunity to defend against, and did defend against, each robbery count (see, People v Nelson, supra; see also, People v Angelo, 133 A.D.2d 832). Finally, to avoid the possibility of prejudice, the court instructed the jury that consolidation was merely for the convenience of the court and not to consider any evidence with respect to the first incident while deliberating on the second incident (see, People v Nelson, supra; People v Mack, 111 A.D.2d 186, 188).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Kooper, Sullivan and O'Brien, JJ., concur.