Opinion
E074309
04-02-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEXAS ISABEL MORRISON, Defendant and Appellant.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1803113) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Steven G. Counelis, Judge. Affirmed. Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Alexas Isabel Morrison of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse and misdemeanor child endangerment. On appeal, Morrison argues there was insufficient evidence to convict her of child endangerment. We affirm.
I
FACTS
In 2018, Morrison and her husband John Doe were living with their three children—aged roughly seven, five, and one—at John's parents' home. John was offered and accepted a promotion that would require him to be in Denver four days a week. Morrison picked him up from work later that day. On the way home he told her about the promotion, and that he had to report to work on Monday. When she heard the news, she became angry and hit the car's dashboard so hard she broke it.
John's testimony at trial sometimes contradicted his statements to police and the 911 dispatcher. Because we interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment, we credit the statements presented to the jury which best support the verdict
When they got home, Morrison told John she was leaving and began packing a bag. John told her he wouldn't go to Denver. At the time he was in the living room, sitting with his oldest son on the couch. The other two children were in the dining room. Morrison wasn't mollified; instead, she attacked John. She pulled his shirt over his head so he couldn't see, then began to "wail" on him with closed fists. Morrison also ripped the chains off his neck and scratched him, leaving a four- to five-inch scratch on his torso and numerous scratches on his back.
Morrison eventually left the house, and John locked the door behind her. He called 911 and told them Morrison assaulted him in front of his children. During the call with 911, Morrison broke a window by throwing a wrench through it. She then came in through the broken window. Morrison threw shoes at John during the call, causing him to briefly hang up and call back. The children could be heard in the call, and Morrison and John could both be heard talking to the children. Morrison ordered at least one of the children to get in her car, and John said he didn't want the kids leaving with her. He told the children to stay away from the windows and was generally trying to get them into another room. He also told the 911 operator, "[m]y kids are right here as a witness." Morrison eventually left out the back door.
By the time police arrived, Morrison was gone. The police interviewed John and took pictures of his injuries before leaving. After the police left, Morrison returned. John called 911 again and told the operator Morrison was banging on the door and windows. Again, John could be heard telling the children to go into another room. Police returned and found Morrison still on the scene. She was argumentative and upset.
On July 18, 2018, the Riverside County District Attorney charged Morrison with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code) and misdemeanor child endangerment. (§ 273a, subd. (a).) Morrison proceeded to trial.
At trial, a police detective testified that domestic abuse has a psychological effect on the children who witness it. He testified that "the chaos in an abusive relationship will and does translate to the children," that boys where the father is the abuser are at high risk to grow up to be abusers, that girls learn negative coping skills such as emotional suppression, and that in general the children will grow up to lack the ability to properly cope with stress.
The jury found Morrison guilty on both charges. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Morrison on probation for four years. She was also required to serve in the "Work Release Program" for 176 days.
Morrison timely appealed the judgment.
II
ANALYSIS
Morrison argues there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for misdemeanor child endangerment. In particular, she argues there was insufficient evidence to show any child suffered psychological harm or that she endangered any of her children in a way likely to produce great bodily harm. We disagree and find substantial evidence supported the jury's finding.
When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court determines " 'whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 (Johnson).) In doing so, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the People and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence which supports the judgment. (Johnson, at p. 576, citing People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 395.) "Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].' " (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) "We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and questions of credibility 'in favor of the verdict . . . .' " (People v. Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014, quoting People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 226-227.)
"Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value." (People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 585.) " 'The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable.' " (People v. Duncan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1018.)
The jury was instructed to find Morrison guilty of child endangerment under section 273a, subdivision (a), if the People showed she (1) "willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering," (2) "caused or permitted the child to suffer or be endangered under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm," and (3) "was criminally negligent when she caused or permitted the child to suffer or be endangered." (CALCRIM No. 821.)
Morrison contends there was insufficient evidence to support either of the first two elements: that a child actually suffered harm, or that she permitted the child to be endangered under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury.
1. Actual Harm
"Violation of section 273a, subdivision (a), ' "can occur in a wide variety of situations: the definition broadly includes both active and passive conduct, i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child endangering by extreme neglect." [Citation.] . . . Section 273a[, subdivision (a)] is "intended to protect a child from an abusive situation in which the probability of serious injury is great." [Citation.] "[T]here is no requirement that the actual result be great bodily injury." [Citation.]' " (People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 784.) The crime may be "based on the mental suffering resulting from a child being exposed to physical abuse by one parent against the other" (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1441), so long as the defendant caused or permitted "the child to be placed in a hazardous situation." (People v. Harris (1996) 239 Cal.App.2d 393, 398.)
Morrison cites People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447 (Burton) to support her argument that there was insufficient evidence of actual harm to her children. Burton was convicted of misdemeanor child endangerment under section 273a, subdivision (b), which does not require proof the defendant placed the child at risk of great bodily harm. Burton was convicted after attacking the mother of his children as she was in the car leaving with her two children in or near the car at the time. He permanently disfigured the victim but didn't physically injure either child or otherwise threaten to injure them. (Id. at pp. 450-451.) On appeal, Burton argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction "because his older son did not see the actual attack on [the victim], it did not occur in the minor's presence and was not directed at him." (Id. at p. 453.) The court disagreed. In coming to that conclusion, the court noted Burton's conviction depended on "whether the evidence is sufficient that defendant willfully caused or permitted the minor to suffer, or inflicted unjustifiable mental suffering." (Id. at pp. 454-455.) The court concluded there was such evidence, in part because "the attacker was not just anyone, but the minor's father, and the victim was not just anyone, but the minor's mother." (Id. at p. 455.) After all, children who witness domestic violence between their parents "suffer adverse effects similar to victims of direct physical and sexual abuse." (Id. at p. 456.)
Morrison's argument rests on her attempt to distinguish Burton in a number of ways. She argues the injuries inflicted in that case were more severe, the child reacted negatively to his mother's injuries in the moment, and the People in that case put on affirmative evidence of the child's continuing mental distress. Morrison points out that immediately following the incident the child "screamed 'we have to go, we have to get out of here, we have to leave, he's going to come back;' " and attempted to put the car in reverse to drive away. (Burton, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 455.) In addition, the People in that case presented evidence that after the incident the child began getting into trouble in school, and even wrote in his journal that he hated his life and wished he " 'was dead by a gun or a knife,' " or that he'd never been born. (Id. at p. 455.) In contrast, the People here did not put on any evidence that any of Morrison's children suffered any mental trauma or pain, either during or after the incident.
Nevertheless, we agree with the People that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the jury could reasonably infer the children suffered mental harm. As discussed more below, there is little question the children were witnesses to the whole incident. They can be heard on the 911 calls, and both Morrison and John can be heard speaking to them. Indeed, in the recording John explicitly says his children were witnesses to Morrison's outburst. As discussed below as well, the children were also physically present for much of the assault. Morrison's eldest was sitting on the same couch as John when she attacked him by pulling his shirt over his head, hitting, and scratching him. There is also evidence the children were in the area when Morrison threw the wrench through the window, as John had to instruct them to stay away from the windows and was generally trying to get them into another room throughout the incident. Given this, a reasonable jury could conclude that in some ways the children in this case were in a better position to experience psychological trauma compared to the child at issue in Burton. In Burton the child only saw the aftermath of his father's attack; here the evidence allows a jury to conclude the children witnessed the entire affair.
In addition, though the People didn't put on any affirmative evidence of the children's suffering, they did present testimony from a police detective about the possible negative psychological effect on children of witnessing one parent abuse another. While this testimony alone doesn't establish that these particular children suffered harm, it does establish that children can suffer harm merely from witnessing violent altercations between parents. Given this testimony and the evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that a child who watched their mother attack their father in the same room, then break a window, leave and return to bang on the doors, suffered mental harm from the incident.
2. Circumstances Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury
Next, Morrison contends there was insufficient evidence to establish that she caused or permitted a circumstance likely to cause great bodily injury. Again, we disagree.
Causing or permitting a circumstance " 'likely' " to produce great bodily injury to a child under section 273a does not mean "that death or serious injury is probable or more likely than not. . . . [It] means a substantial danger, i.e., a serious and well-founded risk, of great bodily harm or death." (People v. Wilson (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204.) As the jury was instructed, "[g]reat bodily harm means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm." (CALCRIM No. 821; § 12022.7, subd. (f).)
Once again, there is essentially no question at least one child, if not all three, were present during Morrison's outbursts. Morrison first attacked John while John was sitting on the couch with his eldest son. Throughout both 911 calls John and Morrison can both be heard speaking to the children, and the children themselves can sometimes be heard too. Indeed, John can be heard trying to coax his children into another room, presumably for their safety.
Thus, the question is not whether Morrison caused or permitted the children to be in a circumstance that posed some risk to them, but whether that circumstance was likely to produce great bodily harm. Morrison contends that there is no evidence any of the children were ever at risk of great bodily harm because she only attacked John and the home itself, that there is little evidence any child was ever near enough to her that she could have hurt them, and that even if her actions did pose some risk of harm the harm would have been minimal.
However, we agree with the People that given the inherently chaotic nature of domestic violence—or indeed any unplanned violence—the evidence supports the jury's conclusion that Morrison's attacks created circumstances likely to inflict great bodily harm on her children. Morrison hit John with closed fists while her son was sitting on the same couch nearby These actions could have resulted in a stray blow to a child of about seven. If the other children were also present, she risked hitting a child as young as one. While Morrison writes this risk off by saying "[a] black eye or hypothetical cut somewhere . . . does not constitute a risk of" great bodily injury, this ignores that an adult's errant punch, thrown object, or even just an adult falling during a fight and landing on a child can do significant damage to a seven year old, let alone a toddler or an infant. Even accepting that a black eye isn't a great bodily injury—an argument Morrison doesn't support with any citations to case law—attacking John still posed a much greater risk to her small children than she claims.
Finally, even if that was not enough on its own to represent a threat of great bodily injury, Morrison threw a wrench through a window, breaking it. A flying wrench or broken glass could cause an adult serious physical harm, let alone a young child. Nor can Morrison claim the children weren't at risk at that time. The evidence shows the children were in the area when she threw the wrench and broke the window, as John could be overheard warning two of the children to stay away from the windows. Based on this alone, a jury could reasonably conclude Morrison created circumstances likely to cause the children to suffer great bodily injury.
Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of misdemeanor child endangerment.
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. RAPHAEL
J.