Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NA068607, Joan Comparet-Cassani, Judge.
Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Kristoffer Morris appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to second degree burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 459) and his admission that he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) and 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Pursuant to the negotiated plea, he was sentenced to the upper term of three years, doubled to six years by reason of the Three Strikes law. His request for a certificate of probable cause was granted.
In support of his request for a certificate of probable cause, he asserted he had not been able to contact Lawrence Young, the attorney he hired to represent him at trial, and that associates from Mr. Young’s office appeared in court. The day before jury selection commenced, an associate appeared and said he would be representing appellant because appellant had not paid Mr. Young enough money to go to trial. Substitute counsel informed appellant he did not feel comfortable with the case as he had not contacted any of the witnesses and recommended appellant “take the deal.” Appellant feels he was mislead and did not have proper legal representation. He also feels he was entitled to a continuance to prepare for trial pursuant to Penal Code section 1049.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The evidence is taken from the preliminary hearing.
On December 27, 2005, Francis Deegan was working at an Ace Hardware store in Long Beach when he saw appellant enter the pickup truck of his boss, Trent Barnes. The truck was parked in a parking structure across the street from the store and Mr. Deegan saw appellant step onto the bumper of the truck, step into the bed, then struggle to open the back window and then crawl in. Mr. Deegan returned to the store to summon Mr. Barnes and when they returned to the parking structure, Mr. Barnes saw appellant exiting the bed of the truck and moving towards his own car. Mr. Barnes and Mr. Deegan ran up to appellant’s car, yelled for him to stop, and put their hands on the car. Appellant revved the engine and put the vehicle in gear, causing Mr. Deegan and Mr. Barnes to believe appellant was going to run them over.
On July 14, 2006, appellant filed a motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995.
On July 17, 2006, appellant pled no contest to second degree burglary of a vehicle and admitted he suffered a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony within the meaning of Penal Code sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivision (b) through (i)). Pursuant to the negotiated plea, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) were dismissed, and appellant’s motion pursuant to Penal Code section 995 was withdrawn.
After review of the record, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief requesting this court to independently review the record pursuant to the holding of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.
On August 22, 2007, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist. Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not supported by the appellate record. (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 917, fn. 12) Further, appellant had more than five days after his plea to prepare for trial as required by Penal Code section 1049. Appellant has, by virtue of counsel’s compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, J., MANELLA, J.