People v. Morris

20 Citing cases

  1. People v. Mitchell

    124 A.D.2d 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)   Cited 11 times

    We disagree. While it clearly appears that the trial court erred in using the phrase "reasonable degree of certainty" in explaining the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v La Rosa, 112 A.D.2d 954; People v Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600), the absence of any objection by the defendant constituted a failure to preserve this issue for our review as a matter of law (CPL 470.05). The error is not one which expressly shifts any burden of proof to the defendant and is subject to the requirement of preservation for appellate review (see, People v Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467; see also, People v Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 310). A reading of the entire charge convinces us that the concept of reasonable doubt was otherwise properly explained to the jury (see, People v Blackshear, 112 A.D.2d 1044; People v Fisher, 112 A.D.2d 378; People v Dee, 106 A.D.2d 582; People v Griffin, 100 A.D.2d 659). As the evidence of defendant's guilt was strong, and the charge, when viewed as a whole, conveyed the proper standard to the jury, the error does not warrant reversal in the interest of justice (CPL 470.15 [a]; see, People v Fisher, supra; People v Dee, supra).

  2. Beverly v. Walker

    118 F.3d 900 (2d Cir. 1997)   Cited 500 times
    Holding that failure to comply with state procedural rule does not bar habeas review when the state court "rule on the merits . . . without commenting on the apparent default"

    Finally, Beverly contends that the court lowered the burden of proof when it instructed the jury that the prosecution's burden was to establish the defendant's guilt "to a reasonable degree of certainty." The phrase "reasonable certainty" has been denounced by New York intermediate appellate courts, see, e.g., People v. Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600, 601 (2d Dep't 1984); People v. Forest, 50 A.D.2d 260, 262 (1st Dep't 1975), and we agree with Beverly that the language is misleading. However, this error did not render the entire charge constitutionally deficient.

  3. People v. Shelton

    98 A.D.3d 988 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 5 times

    People v. Wright, 62 A.D.3d 916, 918, 878 N.Y.S.2d 788). Although the prosecutor arguably laid a proper foundation that the alibi witness was familiar with the means to make such information available to law enforcement authorities due to her community activism and contacts at the District Attorney's office, the prosecution failed to establish that she had been aware of any charges pending against the defendant, or that she had reason to recognize that she possessed exculpatory information, since she testified, in effect, that she did not believe the defendant was involved in any matter involving the gunshots that she heard. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to establish that she had a reasonable motive for acting to exonerate the defendant, as she testified that she had first met him that evening ( see People v. Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600, 473 N.Y.S.2d 550). Additionally, the prosecutor's summation went beyond the bounds of fair advocacy in frequently characterizing the alibi witness, in effect, as having a flawed moral character, and being generally unworthy of belief ( see People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d at 317–318, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914, 406 N.E.2d 771;see also People v. Figueroa, 181 A.D.2d at 692, 580 N.Y.S.2d 789). The defendant's remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of our determination.

  4. People v. Calabria

    260 A.D.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)

    Since the prosecutor repeatedly violated the court's rulings, a mistrial should have been granted ( see, People v. Gomez, 227 A.D.2d 210; People v. Russell, 199 A.D.2d 345). "Although a one-witness identification is sufficient to support a judgment of conviction ( see, People v. Joyiens, 39 N.Y.2d 197), in this close case, [the] errors committed by the trial court may have tipped the balance against the defendant and operated to deprive him of a fair trial" ( People v. Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600). In light of the multiplicity of errors, and the prosecutor's repeated refusal to comply with the trial court's directives, a new trial is mandated.

  5. People v. Pugh

    258 A.D.2d 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 7 times

    These statements were clearly improper ( see, People v. Bull, 218 A.D.2d 663). Although a one-witness identification is sufficient to support a judgment of conviction, in this close case, all of the foregoing errors "may have tipped the balance against defendant and operated to deprive him of a fair trial" ( People v. Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600). The defendant's remaining contentions are either without merit or need not be addressed in light of our determination.

  6. People v. Jara

    212 A.D.2d 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 1 times

    Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. The trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine a defense witness regarding his failure to present exculpatory information to law enforcement authorities without first establishing the proper foundation, as required by People v. Dawson ( 50 N.Y.2d 311), for such cross-examination (see, People v. Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600). Furthermore, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that a witness has no moral or civil obligation to go to the police with exculpatory information (see, People v. Brown, 104 A.D.2d 383). However, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, these errors are harmless (see, People v. Cook, 117 A.D.2d 675).

  7. People v. Richardson

    172 A.D.2d 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)   Cited 3 times

    Defendant failed to object to the Court's instructions in the identification charge, that identity must be proven by the People with "sufficient certainty to preclude any reasonable possibility" of mistaken identification. As such, defendant has failed to preserve the issue for review. Although we note that "reasonable certainty" language has been condemned, and the present instruction is improper (see, People v. Reyes, 151 A.D.2d 435; People v. Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600), in view of the strong identification evidence, and the absence of other errors which affect the substantive rights of defendant, we decline to review in the interest of justice. Finally, when counsel, on cross-examination, elicited that the victim saw defendant on a later occasion but did not call the police, the People could properly establish on re-direct that the victim had seen defendant being arrested on an unrelated crime, thus obviating any imminent need to call police.

  8. People v. Pizzali

    159 A.D.2d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    In the event a new indictment is issued, the defendant shall be entitled to a new suppression hearing. We are of the opinion that the cumulative impact of certain errors in this case cannot be considered harmless (see, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242; People v Jones, 108 A.D.2d 824, 826; People v Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600, 601). First, we agree with the defendant's contention that the court erred in permitting testimony to be read back to the jury without the official court interpreter being present, since the interpreter was required in this case to adequately protect the defendant's right to be present at this stage of the trial (see, CPL 310.

  9. People v. Baucom

    154 A.D.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 10 times

    In any event, we note that it was not error to instruct the jurors that reasonable doubt existed if they had a doubt upon which they believed "a reasonable person would hesitate to act" (see, People v Quinones, 123 A.D.2d 792, 793; see also, 1 CJI[NY] 6.20, at 248). Moreover, while it was error to make use of the phrase "reasonable certainty" (see, People v Smith, 113 A.D.2d 905, 908; cf., People v La Rosa, 112 A.D.2d 954; People v Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600), neither the single instance where the trial court did so here nor the other claimed imperfections diluted the effect of the charge, which repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt (see, People v Canty, 60 N.Y.2d 830; People v Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296; see also, People v Hammond, 143 A.D.2d 1043, supra, People v Brown, 133 A.D.2d 773, supra; People v Smith, supra). The defendant's contention that, because of a claimed failure to observe the procedures set forth in CPL 410.70, the sentencing court was without authority to impose terms of imprisonment on two previous convictions for which he was originally sentenced to probation is without merit.

  10. People v. Lyng

    154 A.D.2d 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 11 times

    In his pro se brief, defendant argues that County Court's use of the words "moral certainty", "reasonable certainty" and "mathematical certainty" in the reasonable doubt charge was erroneous. While these challenged phrases have at times, and under conditions not here found, been held improper and erroneous (e.g., People v Hewlett, 133 A.D.2d 417; People v La Rosa, 112 A.D.2d 954; People v Morris, 100 A.D.2d 600; People v Lanni, 73 A.D.2d 538), we find that this defendant was not denied a fair trial. Taken as a whole, the charge correctly placed the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution (see, People v Patterson, 76 A.D.2d 891). Defendant failed to make timely objection (see, CPL 470.