" 720 ILCS 5/3-7(c) (West 2012). ΒΆ 7 A long line of Illinois cases holds that, "[w]here an indictment on its face shows that an offense was not committed within the applicable limitation period, it becomes an element of the State's case to allege and prove the existence of facts which invoke an exception to the limitation period." People v. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d 540, 546 (1990). Morris held that the issue is like "the other elements which the State must prove, such as the elements of the offense with which a defendant is being charged."
See People v. Stone, 374 Ill. App. 3d 980, 987, 871 N.E.2d 871, 877 (2007) (an element of the State's case to allege and prove); People v. Meier, 223 Ill. App. 3d 490, 491, 585 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1992) (allegations must not only be proved but pleaded as well); People v. Hawkins, 34 Ill. App. 3d 566, 568, 340 N.E.2d 223, 225 (1975) (an element which must always be pleaded and proved). These holdings are derived from the supreme court's decisions in People v. Strait, 72 Ill. 2d 503, 381 N.E.2d 692 (1978), and People v. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d 540, 554 N.E.2d 150 (1990). Both cases considered the State's appeal after the appellate courts had reversed the defendants' convictions, finding that the charging documents should have been dismissed as insufficient for failing to allege the tolling of the limitation period.
Strait, 72 Ill. 2d at 504-05. In People v. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d 540 (1990), also cited by defendant, the supreme court modified the rule, concluding that "the State must not only set forth circumstances which, in and of themselves, would provide a basis for tolling a limitation period, but the State must make clear that those circumstances are in fact the basis upon which the State seeks to toll the limitation period." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, in light of Gray and Wasson, as well as defendant's failure to file a pretrial motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds, the fact that the indictment did not explicitly allege that an extended limitations period applied is not fatal to the State's case. ΒΆ 27 The cases upon which defendant relies are factually distinguishable from the instant cause and are, therefore, inapposite to the case at bar. In People v. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d 540, 542 (1990), the defendant filed two timely pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment that included challenges to the statute of limitations; he did not wait until appeal to challenge the sufficiency of the indictment. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d at 542.
β It is well established that we will read all counts of a multiple-count indictment as a whole. People v. Morris, 135 Ill.2d 540, 544, 143 Ill.Dec. 215, 554 N.E.2d 150 (1990). β[E]lements missing from one count of an indictment may be supplied by another count.
"Where an indictment on its face shows that an offense was not committed within the applicable limitation period, it becomes an element of the State's case to allege and prove the existence of facts which invoke an exception to the limitation period." People v. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d 540, 546 (1990). "As with the other elements which the State must prove, such as the elements of the offense with which a defendant is being charged, `[t]he grounds upon which the People seek to wrest from a defendant the protection of section 3-5 of the Criminal Code [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 3-5 (now 720 ILCS 5/3-5 (West 2006))] should be stated in the information with sufficient specificity to enable him to defend against them.'"
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the trial court's analysis of the law. In People v. Morris (1990), 135 Ill.2d 540, 545-46, 554 N.E.2d 150, 152-53, the supreme court held that the term "conduct" as used in section 3-7(c) of the Criminal Code is broader than the term "acts." It noted that conduct is defined by the Criminal Code as " 'an act or a series of acts.' "
The limitations period, however, may be extended in certain circumstances (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 3-6), at least three of which arguably may be applicable here, but such circumstances must be alleged in the information. (See People v. Morris (1990), 135 Ill.2d 540, 543, 554 N.E.2d 150, 151; People v. Munoz (1974), 23 Ill. App.3d 306, 308, 319 N.E.2d 98, 100.) The facts upon which an extension of the limitations period is sought are material allegations to the criminal charge which must not only be proved but must be pleaded as well. ( People v. Hawkins (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 566, 569, 340 N.E.2d 223, 225; Munoz, 23 Ill. App.3d at 308, 319 N.E.2d at 100.
ΒΆ 25 "It is a well-established rule in Illinois that all counts of a multiple-count indictment should be read as a whole and that elements missing from one count of an indictment may be supplied by another count." People v. Morris , 135 Ill. 2d 540, 544, 143 Ill.Dec. 215, 554 N.E.2d 150 (1990). Accordingly, when one count of a multiple-count indictment states the alleged predicate offense for another count with specificity, the latter count should not be held void unless the indictment itself, or the prosecutor, affirmatively indicates that some other offense is the predicate or there remains a realistic possibility of prejudicial uncertainty as to the predicate offense in light of the facts.
( Strait, 72 Ill.2d at 504-05.) (See also People v. Morris (1990), 135 Ill.2d 540, 543.) The information failed to allege that any of defendant's actions occurred within the appropriate limitation period.