Opinion
June 19, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds was properly denied without a hearing, since it was clear from the court file and the parties' papers that a significant portion of the 13-month delay between arrest and the People's announced readiness for trial was excludable and the defendant failed to establish that there remained a sufficient unexcludable period (People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351; cf., People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859; People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333; People v. Edwards, 118 A.D.2d 581). We note that the defendant absconded for two lengthy periods, used two aliases, was incarcerated under one of the aliases and was the subject of two separate bench warrants.
We further find that the Supreme Court properly precluded the testimony of a witness sought to be introduced by the defendant since the introduction of such testimony was proffered to contradict the complainant's answers concerning collateral matters (see, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282; People v Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, cert denied 396 U.S. 846).
Finally, we find that the sentence imposed was neither unduly harsh nor excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Mollen, P.J., Mangano, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.